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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is motivated by two sets of research questions: (a) Whether, how, and when hostcountry market and institutional conditions have implications for the performance of foreign
subsidiaries? And (b) Whether, how, and when investment purposes/motives for which foreign
subsidiaries are established relate to the extent to which the subsidiaries/their parents overcome
the hazards of or capitalize on the opportunities from operating in locations of high institutional
voids?
The first essay examines how the decision to enter African markets relates to the exit probability
of MNE subsidiaries. Using a longitudinal, paired-sample design of Japanese foreign subsidiaries
operating in Africa and OECD countries, it finds that entry to Africa increases the hazard rate of
subsidiaries, but that subsidiaries entering with more diverse investment purposes and greater
market-seeking orientation have a better likelihood of survival. Consistent with the institutionalbased theory of corporate diversification, the research findings introduce purpose diversity and
market-seeking orientation as potential mechanisms to mitigate the hazards of institutional
voids/instability. Also, by considering the phenomenon of within-subsidiary diversity (of
purposes) and its interaction with institutional conditions, the essay advances the notion of
subsidiary scope and its implications.
The second essay examines the relationship between country-level income distribution and the exit
of foreign subsidiaries using longitudinal data from 6,699 Japanese market-seeking subsidiaries
operating in 47 countries. It finds a strong empirical evidence of a curvilinear relationship between
the nature of host-country income distribution and the probability of subsidiary exit. Whereas
extreme levels of income distribution (i.e., highly egalitarian or highly dispersed) correspond to
higher risk of subsidiary exit, intermediate levels of income distribution are associated with a
decrease in exit probability. Further, this relationship is moderated by the level of host-country
institutional development.
The third essay draws on the modified one-tier bargaining model characterizing Chinese inward
FDI in developing countries to advance a theory of political connections and their implications on
MNE competitive advantage in developing countries. It develops a typology of political
connections based on the approach to political action (transactional and relational) and the level of
i

participation (individual and collective). It argues that the collective-relational approach to
political connections makes for superior competitive advantage, as the collective aspect facilitates
access to and mobilization of resources and the relational aspect helps build favourable legitimacy.
Further, it considers relevant organizational and institutional boundary conditions. The theoretical
arguments integrate perspectives from the resource-based view and resource dependence theory
and provide explanation to the rising prominence of Chinese MNEs in the developing world.
On the whole, this dissertation makes contributions to a better understanding of institutional voids
and their economic and strategic implications. As well, it generates useful theoretical and empirical
insights regarding the investment purposes/motives of multinational enterprises operating in
locations of high institutional voids.

Keywords: Entry to Africa, investment purpose, investment motives, market-seeking orientation,
institutional voids, institutional instability, income distribution, subsidiary exit,
purpose diversity, survival analysis, market-seeking subsidiaries, political connection,
MNE-host country bargaining, political institutions, political market, resource-seeking
subsidiaries resource-based view, resource dependence theory, new institutional
economics, transaction cost economics (politics)

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I believe that God works through people. I feel blessed to have been surrounded by such people
throughout my life. My hard work and luck notwithstanding, I owe my achievements to people
who have helped shape my identity, character, and skill sets. My PhD journey was no exception.
Throughout, I’ve benefited from the kind, generous support and guidance of many. In what
follows, I take this opportunity to extend my gratitude.
The foremost gratitude goes to my doctoral supervisor, Paul Beamish. It truly is an honor of a
lifetime to have the opportunity to work under the supervision of Paul, who is not only one of the
most distinguished authorities in international business scholarship but also one of the most
understanding and compassionate persons I have ever met in my life. Over the years, I have
substantially benefited from his scholarly guidance and support. His insightful feedback, profound
wisdom, and keen attention to detail have greatly informed my dissertation. I would also like to
take this opportunity to acknowledge his financial as well as personal support during my PhD
journey. I have parlayed all these to rise above the academic as well as personal challenges I faced
over the last five years. But in my opinion the most enduring contribution of Paul is to my outlook
and research orientation. By providing me with the opportunity to be involved in the 39 Country
Initiative, Paul has instilled in me the virtue of providing practical solutions to practical problems
facing society. As well, his useful advice regarding the values of seeing the big picture and making
relevant contributions will continue to influence my academic career for decades to come.
I am also indebted to the guidance and support I received from my thesis committee and proposal
committee. I thank Andreas Schotter for his professional service in both committees in which he
provided useful feedback and key insights. My gratitude also goes to Brian Pinkham for his key
role in the proposal committee and for his guidance on several aspects of my doctoral study. His
detailed, insightful feedback on my proposal has added a considerable value. I would also like to
thank Dominic Lim for his service in the proposal committee. His feedback was instrumental in
refining my proposal and developing my dissertation. Further gratitude goes to members of the
thesis examination committee. I would like to acknowledge David Sharp for his suggestions,
especially those associated with clarifying the theoretical mechanisms used in the dissertation. I
would also like to thank Godwin Arku for his insightful feedback regarding the theoretical and
empirical foundations of the dissertation. To all members of the proposal and thesis committees, I
iii

would like to express my sincere gratitude for taking the time to read, evaluate, and provide
feedback on my thesis.
I am also grateful to other Ivey faculty members and students for making my PhD education
intellectually rewarding and personally enjoyable. I would like to extend a special gratitude to the
following Ivey faculty: Chris Higgins, Rod White, Matt Thomson, Romel Mostafa, Li Dai, JeanLouis Schaan, June Cotte, and Tony Frost. I am also indebted to the valuable friendship, guidance,
and support from the following fellow PhD students: Majid Eghbali-Zarch, Bassam Farah,
Vanessa Hasse, Patrick Shulist, Mike Sartor, Megan Zhang, Mark DesJardine, Maya Kumar,
Lucas Wang, Ramzi Fathallah, Ying-Ying Hsieh, Felipe Rodrigues, Max Stallkamp, Dwarka
Chakravarty, Hadi Chapardar, Ellen Choi, Maryam Memar Zadeh, Salar Ghamat, Kwiyoung
Chung, Chris Perry, and many others. My gratitude also goes to Anna Potrawiak, Carly
Vanderheyden, and Paola Hernandez for their kind and unreserved assistance throughout my
doctoral education. The interactions, academic or social, with the Ivey community have
substantially contributed to my professional as well as personal development. I forever remain
grateful for these experiences.
The influences on my success go beyond the walls of Ivey. I am grateful to Maureen Beamish for
her strong interest in my success and the kindness she has demonstrated to me and my family. I
drive lots of inspiration out of her active role in helping people in need. I am also grateful to the
friends and fellow Ethiopians whom I have met here in London. By helping me achieve my social
and spiritual needs, they have enabled me maintain an ideal balance in life. I have also benefited
from the prayers and emotional support of my family back in Ethiopia including Shewangizaw
Getachew, Elfu Azmach, Ermias Getachew, Netsanet Getachew, Habtamu Getachew, Betelhem
Getachew, Tinsaye Getachew, Eden Tadesse, and many others. But if I need to attribute my
success in the doctoral education to a support of a single person, it has to be my sweetheart, my
love, my dear wife, and the mother of my son—Eleni Tegegn. She has endured all the hardship of
putting up with me and remained the core of my strength. I cannot thank her enough for being by
my side and always insisting that I concentrate on my education and on satisfying Paul with my
performance. Exactly ten months ago, we welcomed to our family our lovely son, Marken. He is
a gift of God and brought lots of happiness and laughter to our house. I know he wanted to spend

iv

the whole time with me, but I had to leave for work to complete my thesis. I am grateful for his
patience and for reenergizing me with his smiles, laughter, hugs, and kisses.
Finally, I would like to extend my thanks to Ivey Business School and Western University for
making it possible for me to pursue my doctoral degree. I thank Bill Brock, Anne Brock, and
Ralph Barford for their financial support during my doctoral studies. Further, I am grateful to
Canada and the Canadians who have impressed me through their love, generosity, and respect. I
will continue to say ‘sorry’ and ‘thank you’ as a mark of my Canadian experience. My gratefulness
also goes to my home country Ethiopia and fellow Ethiopians who have influenced me in one way
or another. Armed with faith in God, I will dedicate my future career to making positive
contributions to Ethiopia and Ethiopians. Ethiopia—you will be the pride of and inspiration for
Africa as you had been so decades ago. But all of these would not have been possible if it had not
been for the Almighty God and His blessing to which I remain forever grateful. The prayers and
intercession of Virgin Mary, all the saints, and the Angels of God have been instrumental to my
success and will remain so going forward.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….
Acknowledgements………………………………………………………………………
Table of Contents………………………………………………………………………….
List of Tables, Figures and Appendices………………………………………………….

i
iii
vi
viii

CHAPTER 1: Introduction……………………………………………………………

1

Institutional Voids……………………………………………………………………….
Investment Motives……………………………………………………………………...
Foreign Divestment……………………………………………………………………….
Dissertation Overview…………………………………………………………………….
Essay 1……………………………………………………………………………….
Essay 2……………………………………………………………………………….
Essay 3……………………………………………………………………………….
References…………………………………………………………………………………

4
5
6
7
10
12
13
16

CHAPTER TWO: Foreign Subsidiary Exit from Africa: The Effects of Investment
Purpose Diversity and Orientation…………………………………………………….

19

Introduction………………………………………………………………………………
Theoretical Development…………………………………………………………………
Investment Purposes Diversity…………………………………………………………....
Market-seeking Orientation……………………………………………………………….
Research Design………………………………………………………………………….
Research Context…………………………………………………………………….
Data and Sample…………………………………………………………………….
Variables…………………………………………………………………………….
Key Independent Variables………………………………………………………….
Entry to Africa………………………………………………………………….
Investment purpose diversity……………………………………………………
Market-seeking orientation……………………………………………………...
Control Variables…………………………………………………………………….
Statistical Method……………………………………………………………………........
Results…………………………………………………………………………………….
Discussion and Conclusion……………………………………………………………….
References…………………………………………………………………………………

19
23
29
32
34
34
36
39
39
39
40
43
43
44
45
52
61

CHAPTER THREE: Host-Country Income Distribution and Exit Rates of MarketSeeking Subsidiaries: The U-Curve Hypothesis……………………………………… 70
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………
Theoretical Development…………………………………………………………………
Market-seeking subsidiary…………………………………………………………...
Income distribution and subsidiary exit………………………………………………
Highly egalitarian income distribution………………………………………….
vi

70
74
74
78
81

Highly dispersed income distribution……………………………………………
Income inequality and free-market institutional development………………………
Methods………………………………………………………………………………….
Data and sample…………………………………………………………………….
Variables…………………………………………………………………………….
Modeling procedure………………………………………………………………….
Results…………………………………………………………………………………….
Discussion…………………………………………………………………………………
Conclusions……………………………………………………………………………….
References…………………………………………………………………………………

82
85
89
89
89
95
96
104
109
112

CHAPTER FOUR: The Collective-Relational Approach to Political Connection: A
Case for Political Rent?..................................................................................................... 118
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………….
Theoretical Development………………………………………………………………….
Sources of Competitive Advantage……………………………………………………….
MNE-Developing Host Country Bargaining Models…………………………………….
Typology of Political Connections……………………………………………………….
The Collective Approach……………………………………………………………...
The Relational Approach…………………………………………………………….
The Collective-relational Approach…………………………………………………...
Investment Motive as Boundary Condition……………………………………………….
Institutional voids as Boundary Condition……………………………………………….
Political Institutions as Boundary Condition……………………………………………...
Discussion and Conclusion……………………………………………………………….
References…………………………………………………………………………………

118
122
126
131
137
141
143
144
146
148
150
153
158

CHAPTER FIVE: Conclusions…………………………………………………………

164

General conclusions………………………………………………………………............ 164
Limitations and future directions…………………………………………………………. 172
References………………………………………………………………………………… 175
Curriculum Vitae…………………………………………………………………………

vii

177

LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND APPENDICES
TABLES
Table 1: List of African host countries included in the data……………………………… 37
Table 2: Comparison of subsidiaries in Africa and OECD countries across variables
using t-tests and probit regression on matching model………………………
Table 3: Frequency distribution of investment purposes and motives………………...
Table 4: Data summary………………………………………………………………...
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 2150) …………………………
Table 6: Results from the extended Cox regression model………………………….
Table 7: Country-level data on number of subsidiaries, inequality, and institutions….
Table 8: Descriptive statistics and correlations………………………………………
Table 9: Results from the extended Cox regression model………………………….
Table 10: Results from subgroup analyses…………………………………………….
Table 11: Summary of IB/strategy research on political behavior and its resource
and/or legitimacy implications………………………………………………
Table 12: Comparison of the bargaining models for inward FDI to developing
countries…………………………………………………………………….
Table 13: A typology of political connections with developing host states……………

39
42
46
47
48
92
98
99
101
128
138
140

FIGURES
Figure 1: Overview of the Dissertation………………………………………………….
Figure 2: Estimated hazard of subsidiaries operating in the OECD countries and
Africa………………………………………………………………………….
Figure 3: Moderating effects of purpose diversity………………………………………
Figure 4: Moderating effects of market-seeking orientation……………………………
Figure 5: Smoothed hazard estimates for subgroups of subsidiaries……………………
Figure 6: Interaction between income inequality and institutional development……….
Figure 7: Theoretical model of the research…………………………………………….

9
50
51
52
102
107
153

APPENDIX
Appendix: Purpose diversity measure…………………………………………………

viii

67

1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Issues of host-country contexts have remained central to international business (IB) research and
scholarship. Underlying research in such areas as host-country business systems (e.g., Jackson and
Deeg, 2008; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005), culture (e.g., Hofstede, 1980), and infrastructure (e.g.,
Hoskisson et al., 2013) is the need to understand the implications of host-country conditions for
multinational enterprise (MNE) investment and subsequent management. Research on hostcountry contexts falls within the location literature, which draws from works across multiple
disciplines including international business (IB), strategic management, and economic geography
(Cantwell, 2009). The location literature in IB has specifically considered location (dis)advantages
as one of the major determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) by MNEs (e.g., Dunning,
1988). In fact, Dunning (2009) noted that location has become an increasingly vital element in
determining the scope, pattern, form, and growth of MNE activity. Of the myriad location-specific
factors influencing FDI, the presence (absence) of market-supporting institutions is arguably the
most important and one that has received considerable scholarly attention (e.g., Chan et al., 2008;
Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009; Hoskisson et al., 2013). This is even more important in developing
countries where such market-supporting institutions are absent, weak, or fail to perform well (Peng
et al., 2009; Zoogah et al., 2015). The concept of institutional voids represents this phenomenon
(Mair and Marti, 2009).
Institutional voids mainly represent limitations in market entry, information access, property rights
protection, and contract enforcement (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Whereas the implications of
these limitations for MNE investment, management, and strategy have been widely studied (e.g.
Chan et al., 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011), a closer
1
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examination reveals two potential shortcomings. First, research on the implications of institutional
voids has largely drawn on insights from the new institutional economics (NIE) which emphasizes
transaction cost effects. However, research leveraging insights from industrial organization theory
suggest potential for market power effects as well (Porter, 1981; Teece, Pisano, Shuen, 1997).
Second, we have a limited understanding of whether and how investment motivation(purposes)
interact with host-country institutional contexts to affect subsidiary strategy and performance.
Research in this area is important as host-country attributes interact with firm/subsidiary attributes
and how these attributes influence investment of an MNE is likely to vary with differences in
motives underlying such investment (Dunning, 2001; Mesquita, 2016).
The investment motives literature holds that foreign affiliates of MNEs may be established to
achieve any or a combination of the following purposes: (natural) resource-seeking, efficiencyseeking, market-seeking, and strategic asset/capability seeking (Dunning, 1998; Dunning and
Lundan, 2008). Such classification suggests the need to avoid adopting an aggregated treatment of
MNE foreign investments by highlighting the inherent strategic as well as structural heterogeneity
among MNE affiliates (subsidiaries). Investment motives define the strategic orientation of a
subsidiary and the role it is expected to play in the MNE network. For example, an efficiencyseeking subsidiary emphasizes securing the minimum cost of production by leveraging cheap
labour, materials, or technology available in the host country (Dunning, 1998). As well, investment
motives may have implications for the structure of the subsidiary. For instance, a resource-seeking
subsidiary represents a vertically integrated extension of its parent MNE and accordingly the
subsidiary’s activities are likely to be synchronized with both the parent MNE and ‘sister’
subsidiaries (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). A market-seeking subsidiary, on the other hand,
represents a standalone unit, loosely linked to the parent MNE and its ‘sister’ subsidiaries (Nachum
2
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and Zaheer, 2005). Such strategic and structural differences among these different types of
subsidiaries is likely to have a bearing on how host-country conditions—such as marketsupporting institutions—relate to the exit likelihood of foreign subsidiaries.
The overall thrust of this thesis, therefore, is to contribute to the location literature by advancing a
better understanding of institutional voids, examining its interaction with investment motives (or
purposes), and generating insights on potential implications for the MNE strategy of divesting their
subsidiaries. A reverse of FDI, foreign divestment is a corporate-level strategy and an important
topic in IB research. Its practical as well as theoretical importance notwithstanding, our
understanding of this phenomenon is limited (Berry, 2013; McDermott, 2010). By examining how
investment motives interact with host-country institutional and market contexts to affect foreign
divestment, this dissertation looks to contribute to a better understanding of this phenomenon.
Further, the three essays included in this dissertation contribute to the overall thrust by considering
different aspects of host-country contexts (institutional and market, for example) and drawing on
(and contributing to) the institutional voids literature, the NIE, foreign divestment literature, and
the non-market strategy literature, among others.
This chapter proceeds with a brief review of the extant literature pertaining to institutional voids,
investment motive (purpose), and foreign divestment, before briefly discussing the outline of the
dissertation and discussing its theoretical as well as empirical contributions. This chapter
concludes with a brief discussion of each essay in order to provide an overview of the research
that constitutes the dissertation.

3
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Institutional voids

Institutions represent humanly devised restrictions that structure interactions and associated
incentive structures (North, 1991). Fundamental to proper market functioning are institutional
mechanisms that promote property right protection, contract enforcement, and information and
market access, among others (World Bank, 2002). The concept of institutional voids entails the
absence or lack of these mechanisms. Institutional voids, therefore, are responsible for market
imperfections. The dissertation leverages insights from Dunning and Rugman (1985) regarding
market imperfections to submit that institutional voids can engender two different forms of market
imperfections. The first, which is central to NIE, is transaction-cost market imperfection that
constrain market exchanges and therefore limit efficiency. Such imperfections ‘…arise naturally,
or at least are assumed to be exogenous to the MNE,’ (Dunning and Rugman, 1985: p. 229). This
type of imperfection is responsible for the economic challenges MNEs encounter in the form of
the increased costs associated with obtaining information and protecting property rights, for
example. The second type is structural market imperfection, which results from potential to close
markets and thereby secure market power by leveraging firm-specific advantages, such as
advanced technology (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). By discouraging competition, institutional
voids promote the formation of such imperfection. Unlike transaction-cost market imperfection,
structural market imperfection results from firms’ actions and therefore is endogenous (Dunning
and Rugman, 1985).
A more complete understanding of institutional voids and their implications, therefore, requires a
better understanding of the associated transaction-cost and structural market imperfections. For
MNE subsidiaries, transaction-cost market imperfections are responsible for economizing
challenges whereas structural market imperfections present strategizing benefits (Getachew and
4
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Beamish, 2017; Teece et al., 1997; Williamson, 1991). The viability of MNE subsidiaries
operating in locations of high institutional voids, therefore, is a function of how well they mitigate
the associated economic hazards and leverage pertinent strategic benefits.
As well, much of the existing research on institutional voids and market imperfections has
emphasized their role in foreign investment (or entry), with little attention being paid to their
implications for foreign divestment (or exit) (Berry, 2013). McDermott (2010) noted that limited
scholarly attention has been paid to foreign divestment, despite its place as an integral area of
IB/global strategy, and urged scholars in the area to redress the balance and foster better
understanding of the phenomenon. As well, much of the research implicitly assumes that the effect
of institutional voids and market imperfections on foreign investment is independent of the motives
underlying such investments (Dunning, 2009; Mesquita, 2016). However, the validity of this
assumption is questionable as existing research in the area suggests that such location factors
interact with investment motives to influence FDI strategy and performance (Dunning, 2009;
Mesquita, 2016). In fact, Mesquita (2016) called for future research to look into how investment
motives influence (or interact with) location factors to influence FDI scope and patterns. By
examining how investment motives interact with host-country institutions to influence foreign
divestment, this dissertation seeks to respond to calls by McDermott (2010) to better understand
foreign divestment and by Mesquita (2016) to examine the effects of investment motives as they
interact with location factors.
Investment Motives

In the investment motives literature, Dunning (1998) elaborated on four major motives that drive
MNE investments. We consider each in turn. The resource-seeking motive explains FDI in search
of a resource that is not available in the home country or that is cheaply available in the foreign
5
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country. Investments in resource-endowed countries are likely to have been driven by such
motivation. The efficiency-seeking motive is pursued by a firm looking to secure lower production
costs and economies of scale/scope. The market-seeking motive entails efforts to serve a market
in the host country or in nearby regions. It also may involve reducing the transportation cost
component to ensure better price competitiveness in the host country. The strategic asset seeking
motive involves, for example, acquiring a new technological base or useful local knowledge. A
related line of research on subsidiary mandate/charter has extended our understanding of the
inherent heterogeneity among subsidiaries (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998).
Building on the investment motives literature, research on subsidiary mandate/charter looks at,
among other things, the performance implications of the specific purposes for which subsidiaries
are established (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998).
Dunning (1998) has also examined the heterogeneity among subsidiaries (i.e., some are resourceseeking, others market-seeking, and so forth). Combining these two streams leads to an argument
that location-specific (e.g., institutional) advantages or challenges are unique to different
subsidiaries depending on their investment motives. This dissertation integrates Dunning’s (1998)
insight on investment motives with his work on institutions (e.g., Dunning and Lundan, 2008) to
better appreciate the underlying interdependence between the two and understand how they
interact to influence divestment of foreign affiliates.
Foreign Divestment

Foreign divestment entails “…the sale of international subsidiaries, closure of foreign plants, and
exit from foreign markets.” (Soule, Swaminathan, and Tihanyi, 2014, p. 1032). Just as Dunning
(1988) developed a theory of FDI, so too Boddewyn (1985) introduced a theory of foreign
divestment. Extant research on foreign divestment suggests that it does not necessarily indicate
6
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failure as it may result from a deliberate attempt by an MNE to better align itself with a changed
environment, gain better efficiency through market transactions rather than hierarchical
transaction, or secure a more efficient reallocation of MNE resources (e.g., Boddewyn, 1985). In
fact, pertinent research in the area advocates the consideration of foreign divestment as a corporate
strategy and underscores the value of considering it as being part of the internationalization process
of firms (Berry, 2013; Boddewyn, 1985; McDermott, 2010).
Boddewyn (1983) developed a Dunning-like ‘eclectic theory of foreign divestment’ in which he
argued that MNEs are likely to divest their foreign affiliates when (a) competitive advantage is no
longer secured; (b) internalizing no longer provides net-benefits and that market exchange is more
favourable—perhaps because market-supporting institutions have developed over time; and (c) it
is no longer profitable to internalize its net competitive advantages in the particular host country.
Clearly, each of these conditions are likely to be contingent on the status of host-country conditions
and associated changes. Also, the investment motives underlying FDI are likely to have
implications for the corporate strategy of foreign divestment.
Dissertation Overview

This dissertation is organized as a collection of integrated essays. Figure 1 presents the structure
of the dissertation, detailing the theoretical foundations underpinning each essay, along with both
the theoretical and phenomenological contributions that link the essays together. Collectively, the
dissertation contributes to a better understanding of the structural and transaction-cost market
imperfections associated with institutional voids. Whereas transaction-cost market imperfections
have been central to research in institutional voids, this dissertation brings a scholarly attention
also to structural market imperfection which are endogenous to firms. Likewise, it advances our
understanding of the strategic and economic implications of institutional voids for foreign
7
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divestment. Also, by integrating insights from the investment motives and subsidiary
mandate/charter literatures, the dissertation contributes to a better understanding of purposes
underlying foreign investment and their performance implications. Further, the dissertation has
contributions to the notion of foreign divestment especially from locations characterized by high
institutional voids and market imperfections. Generally, each of the three essays constituting the
dissertation makes conceptual and empirical contributions both at the level of the phenomena
under consideration and, at a broader level, to the location, investment motives, and foreign
divestment literatures.
Essay 1 looks at foreign divestment in locations of high institutional voids and high institutional
instability, which results from such exogenous forces as a sudden change of government
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Walsh, 2015; Zoogah, Peng, and Woldu, 2015). It also examines whether
and how investment purpose diversity and market-seeking orientation interact with the institutional
conditions to influence divestment of foreign subsidiaries. Essay 2 considers another host-country
factor (i.e., income distribution) and examines whether and how host-country income distribution
relates to the probability that market-seeking subsidiaries exit from the host country. Further, this
essay looks at the potential interaction between host-country income distribution and institutional
development to influence foreign divestment. Essay 3 draws on the modified one-tier bargaining
model characterizing Chinese resource-seeking FDI in developing countries to advance a theory
of political connection and its implications for competitive advantage (and by extension survival)
of Chinese subsidiaries in their respective host countries.
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Figure 1. Overview of the Dissertation
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Essay 1
The first essay (Chapter 2) is entitled Foreign subsidiary exit from Africa: The effects of investment
purpose diversity and orientation. It examines whether and how the decision to enter African
markets relates to the exit probability of MNE subsidiaries. The implications of institutional
voids/instability for the strategy and performance of foreign subsidiaries is well studied (e.g.,
Chan, Isobe, and Makino, 2008; Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). Consistent with North’s (1991)
notion of institutional economics, research in the area suggests that foreign affiliates operating in
location of developed, stable market-supporting institutions are likely to register better
performance and survive longer (e.g., Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). Nonetheless, other studies
have found empirical evidence in support of the alternative claim that subsidiaries operating in
locations of high institutional voids/instability are more likely to register better performance than
their counterparts (Chan et al., 2008). This essay draws on Williamson (1991) to argue that
institutions have economizing as well as strategizing implications and that research in the area
needs to consider both mechanisms to build a clearer understanding of how institutions relate with
FDI strategy and performance.
A result of transaction-cost market imperfections, economizing suggests that subsidiaries incur
greater transaction and transformation costs in location of high institutional voids/instability, thus
undermining their performance. The strategizing mechanism suggests that institutional voids
provide opportunities for subsidiaries to close markets and secure market power. Institutional
voids limit the level of competition facing subsidiaries and make it easier for them to engage in
rent-seeking behaviors to influence, for example, local and national governments. This essay
argues that considering both the economizing and strategizing implications of institutions is
necessary to fully understand how institutions influence subsidiary strategy (including foreign
10
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divestment) and performance. It further argues that the dynamics and balance between these two
mechanisms is context specific in that in certain contexts the economizing challenges may
outweigh the strategizing benefits. Similarly, the strategic orientation of certain subsidiaries may
help limit the economizing challenges and/or maximize the strategizing benefits.
This essay explores these possibilities first by considering the implications of institutional
voids/instability for subsidiaries operating in the African market. It then considers subsidiaryspecific attributes of investment purpose diversity and market-seeking orientation to understand
whether and how such attributes influence the balance between economizing challenges and
strategizing benefits, thereby influencing subsidiary exit. These arguments are tested using a
longitudinal, paired-sample design of Japanese subsidiaries operating in Africa and OECD
countries. The results yield support for the arguments.
This essay makes theoretical contributions on multiple respects. First, by engaging the economic
and strategic implications of institutional voids/instability and considering potential boundary
conditions, it advances a more nuanced understanding of how institutions influence subsidiary
strategy and performance. Second, by introducing the investment purpose diversity construct, it
brings to the fore the notion of subsidiary scope. Prior IB/strategy research has considered scope
mainly at the firm level, thereby limiting our understanding of scope at the subsidiary level. Third,
in considering investment motive (purposes), the essay departs from existing emphasis on the
‘how’ questions (e.g., entry mode research) and focus on the ‘why’ questions of FDI. In so doing,
the essay revives attention to this important topic in IB research. Fourth, by considering the
interaction between institutional voids/instability and investment motives, the essay responds to
calls to better understand the interplay between location-specific advantages and firm-/subsidiaryspecific attributes (Dunning, 2009; Mesquita, 2016). Fifth, the essay contributes to the institutional
11
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voids literature by identifying investment purpose diversity and market-seeking orientations as
potential mechanisms to mitigate the hazards of operating in such environments. This essay has
already been published in Global Strategy Journal.
Essay 2
The second essay (Chapter 3) is entitled Host-country income distribution and exit rates of marketseeking subsidiaries: The u-curve hypothesis. It looks at the location-specific advantage of marketseeking subsidiaries and whether and how host-country income distribution is related to the exit
likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries, for which local market and networks of relationships
are critical. This essay advances the notion that income distribution in the host country can
influence the local market and relationships and thus the survival likelihood of market-seeking
subsidiaries. Specifically, it postulates that a rise in income inequality from low levels is associated
with a decrease in exit probability, but only to a point after which a rise in inequality level
corresponds to a higher risk of subsidiary exit. Further, it argues that institutional development
mitigates potential market/economic inefficiencies wrought by income inequality and facilitates
coordination inside the subsidiary and outside in the product as well as factor markets. These
predictions were tested using longitudinal data from 6699 Japanese market-seeking subsidiaries
operating in 47 countries. The arguments received statistical support.
This essay has several important theoretical and empirical implications. First, it advances a more
refined understanding of location-specific advantages by acknowledging that such advantages
need to be understood in conjunction with the specific motives of foreign investment. That is,
depending on the investment motives underlying establishment of subsidiaries, some aspects of
the local context may be more relevant than others. Research regarding the organization-
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environment relationship can benefit by first specifying which aspect of the environment is most
relevant to the particular form of organization (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Second, by emphasizing
the inherent structural and strategic differences between market-seeking subsidiaries and other
forms of subsidiaries and looking at how host-country market conditions relate with foreign
divestment, the essay advances the notion that foreign divestment is contingent on the alignment
of subsidiary structure and strategy with host-country conditions. Third, by integrating insights
from literature on environmental munificence and the new institutional economics, the essay seeks
to leverage the underlying theoretical synergies and responds to calls for a joint consideration of
economic and ecological perspectives (Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).
Fourth, by attempting to explain the exit likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries, the essay
contributes to the foreign divestment literature—which, despite being an integral element of IB
research, has received only limited attention (Berry, 2013; McDermott, 2010).
Essay 3
The third essay (Chapter 4) is entitled The collective-relational approach to political connection:
A case for political rent? It seeks to build theory regarding non-market strategy associated with
foreign direct investment in developing countries. Particularly, it draws on the modified one-tier
bargaining model characterizing investment of Chinese resource-seeking MNEs in developing
countries (Li et al., 2013) to advance a theory of political rent-seeking and its implications for
foreign subsidiary competitive advantage. As with Essays 1 and 2, it considers the interplay
between investment motives and host-country conditions to influence viability of foreign direct
investment. In particular, it examines the potential moderating effect of investments of resourceseeking nature. This essay builds on the findings from Essay 1 regarding the implications of the
strategizing mechanism for investments in locations of high institutional voids/instability to
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develop a better understanding of this mechanism by considering a unique bargaining model of
Chinese resource-seeking investments.
In this model, the Chinese government directly bargains strategic and operational entry deals on
behalf of a consortium of Chinese companies. These companies receive financial and
infrastructural supports from the Chinese government and are expected to operate in the host
country. In this bargaining model the Chinese government avails development assistance to the
host country in the form of low-interest loans, infrastructural development, and grants in return for
the host country to provide investment opportunities and facilitate entry and local operations of
the Chinese MNEs.
Building on Hillman & Hitt's (1999) arguments about the nature of political actions, Essay 3
develops a typology of political connections based on the approach to political action
(transactional and relational) and the level of participation (individual and collective).
Accordingly, it identifies four alternative approaches to MNE-host country bargaining: individualtransactional, individual-relational, collective-transactional, and collective-relational. By
examining the natures of the bargaining models identified in related literature—namely, one-tier
bargaining, modified one-tier bargaining, and two-tier bargaining—it matches the practical
approaches with their corresponding theoretical category to build theory about their implications
for competitive advantage. Also, by drawing on mechanisms from the resource-based view and
resource dependence theory, it forwards propositions suggesting the relative superiority of the
collective and relational approaches to political connections in securing greater competitive
advantage. Competitive advantage or lack thereof is an important determinant of foreign
divestment (Boddewyn, 1983). Further, propositions are presented on potential boundary
conditions. This essay argues that the advantage of using the collective-relational approach to
14
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political connection is contingent on the asset specificity of the respective investment and the
development of host-country institutions (economic and political).
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CHAPTER TWO
Foreign Subsidiary Exit from Africa: The Effects of Investment Purpose Diversity and
Orientation
INTRODUCTION
Emerging markets are places of striking contrasts. On one hand, they are characterized by
‘institutional voids’ (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011), where market-supporting institutions are
absent, weak, or fail to accomplish the role expected of them (Mair and Marti, 2009) and
‘institutional instability’, resulting from such exogenous forces as a sudden change of government
(Hoskisson et al., 2000; Walsh, 2015; Zoogah, Peng, and Woldu, 2015). These institutional
conditions are in large part responsible for the exceedingly high levels of uncertainty which
multinational enterprises (MNEs) face when conducting business there (Dai, Eden, and Beamish,
2013; Williamson, 2000; North, 1991; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011, Xu and Meyer, 2013). Yet,
with established markets fast becoming saturated, MNEs are increasingly turning to emerging
markets for future growth potential. As well, the lack of institutions to foster competition in those
markets means that MNE subsidiaries already operating in those markets are more likely to
develop market power and thus generate supernormal profits (Chacar and Vissa, 2005; Chacar,
Newburry, and Vissa, 2010; Miller and Eden, 2006).
Underlying these arguments regarding the institutional context of emerging markets are two
contrasting mechanisms: economizing and strategizing. The economizing mechanism emphasizes
increased transaction and transformation costs associated with performing in locations with high
levels of institutional voids/instability; the strategizing mechanism, however, supports the opposite
view that missing/unstable institutions act as entry barriers, which afford MNE subsidiaries already
operating in those locations with greater market power and rent-seeking opportunities
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(Williamson, 1991; Porter, 1981). Do the strategizing upsides more than offset the economizing
downsides associated with operating in locations of high institutional voids/instability? Do the
economic implications outweigh the market power benefits? Or, do the effects cancel out?
Answers to these questions are likely to be context dependent and contingent on several boundary
conditions. This study seeks to shed light on the issue by examining the exit implications of entry
to the African context and considering the effects of relevant boundary conditions.
By emphasizing the remarkable degree of heterogeneity among emerging markets, recent research
in the area calls for future research to advance a more fine-grained understanding of institutions
and their performance implications (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Africa, for example, has distinct
characteristics. Generally, the level of institutional voids is greater in Africa than in any other
region in the world (Azzimonti and Sarte, 2007; Zoogah et al., 2015). Also, highly unstable
institutional environments and discontinuous institutional transitions beset foreign investment in
Africa, perhaps more so than in any other part of the world (Azzimonti and Sarte, 2007; Henisz,
2000). The combined presence in the African markets of such institutional hazards makes for a
complex operating environment for foreign subsidiaries (Jackson, 2004). Whereas economizing
challenges abound, so do strategizing opportunities. In other emerging markets such as China and
India—countries on which existent emerging markets research disproportionately relies—
institutional voids and instability are not nearly as high as in Africa and thus economizing
challenges and strategizing opportunities are relatively limited (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Zoogah et
al., 2015). The African market, therefore, presents an interesting setting from which to generate
fresh insights about the influences of institutional voids and dynamics on the performance of MNE
subsidiaries. As well, research in a context that has largely been ignored by global strategy scholars
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can promote better understanding of what Hoskisson et al., (2013) called the ‘traditional emerging
markets’.
Relatedly, the study considers relevant boundary conditions that may enable some subsidiaries
operating in Africa better deal with, mitigate, or even capitalize on the lack and/or instability of
institutions. Specifically, it considers two such conditions, namely subsidiary purpose diversity
and purpose orientation, to understand whether/how these strategic factors can help to mitigate
the hazards of institutional voids and instability. Research on investment purpose features in the
investment motives literature. Dunning (1998), for example, identified four major categories of
motives that underlie MNEs’ foreign investment: resource seeking, market seeking, efficiency
seeking, and strategic-asset seeking. This classification not only indicates the limitation in a
wholesale treatment of MNEs’ foreign investment but also fosters a better understanding of the
inherent, strategic heterogeneity among MNE subsidiaries. A related line of research on subsidiary
mandate/charter has refined this insight further (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw and Hood,
1998). Building on the investment motives literature, research on subsidiary mandate/charter looks
at, among other things, the performance implications of the specific purposes for which
subsidiaries are established (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). It also provides theoretical arguments
and empirical evidence suggesting that some subsidiaries may be responsible for a diverse group
of purposes (Birkinshaw, 1996).
By integrating insights from these related streams of literature, the study examines whether
purpose diversity of subsidiaries operating in Africa influence their exit likelihood. Following a
similar logic from the institutional-based view of diversification, the paper argues that subsidiaries
which enter Africa with diverse investment purposes are in a better position to deal with
institutional challenges than their counterparts. Also, it considers whether the type of investment
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purpose assigned to a subsidiary influences its ability to mitigate the effects of incomplete markets
in Africa. In particular, it examines how the market-seeking orientation of a subsidiary relates to
its ability to overcome institutional voids. It is argued that the unique structure (i.e., less globally
integrated and more locally responsive) and strategy (i.e., substantial reliance on host country
market) of such subsidiaries (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010) makes
for better learning and adaptation useful in reducing exit probability.
These arguments were tested using a longitudinal, paired-sample design of Japanese subsidiaries
operating in Africa and OECD countries. Selection bias is likely to be a major concern in trying to
understand the survival implications of entry to Africa. Clearly, MNE subsidiaries operating in
Africa are not randomly selected; rather, they have self-selected themselves into the African
market and are more likely to have different characteristics from those investing elsewhere. As a
result, the study employed an econometric strategy called Propensity Score Matching (PSM) to
identify counterfactual cases of matching subsidiaries operating elsewhere. To achieve greater
variation, it identified ‘control’ subsidiaries with an equal propensity of entering Africa but which
actually entered the OECD group. Those subsidiaries entering Africa are considered to be the
‘treatment’ group. Using this strategy creates a quasi-experimental condition, thus limiting
endogeneity concerns (Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood, 2012).
This study is important in at least five ways. First, by engaging the economic and strategic
implications of institutional voids/instability and considering potential boundary conditions, it
seeks to advance a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between institutions and
subsidiary exit. Also, the use of a paired-sample design with substantial between-group variation
in institutional conditions makes for a greater confidence in the results. Second, it brings to the
fore the notion of subsidiary scope and its performance implications. Prior research in global
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strategy has considered scope mainly at the firm level, thereby limiting our understanding of scope
at the subsidiary level. Research on the diversity/type of subsidiary purposes can address this gap.
Also, considering the potential interaction between subsidiary scope and investment location can
help us understand how subsidiary scope may be contingent on the institutional conditions of the
host country and how, if at all, subsidiaries modify their scope to embed elements of flexibility
into their structure. Third, in looking at investment purposes, it departs from existing emphasis on
the ‘how’ questions (e.g., entry mode research) and focus on those that look at the ‘why’ of
investing in emerging markets. Fourth, it contributes to the institutional voids literature by
suggesting response mechanisms operating at the subsidiary level. It finds that subsidiaries with
diverse investment purposes and greater market-seeking orientation can deal with institutional
voids/instability better than their peers. Fifth, global strategy research has largely ignored Africa
as a research setting, limiting our understanding of this region. This research responds to the
numerous calls to help fill this gap (e.g., Jackson, 2004; Walsh, 2015; Zoogah et al., 2015).
In the sections to follow, theoretical arguments leading to the research hypotheses are presented.
This is followed by a brief discussion of the design employed to answer the research questions,
along with the modeling procedure utilized. Next, results are presented and their implications
drawn. The paper concludes by discussing contributions, highlighting limitations and identifying
promising directions for future research.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
The notion of institutions and their influences on organizations has been central to emerging
market research. Institutional economists consider institutions, ‘…humanly devised constraints
that structure political, economic, and social interactions’ (North, 1991: 97). Their view of
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institution is as one that is created to bring order to exchanges and reduce attendant uncertainty
(North, 1991). This view largely underpins our understanding of how institutions (or lack thereof)
influence business strategy as well as performance. Weak and/or unstable institutions
characterizing emerging markets pose economic challenges in the form of increased uncertainty
and transaction costs (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). Whereas
research in global strategy has provided considerable support to this argument, some other research
has provided contrasting evidence.
Notably, Chan, Isobe, and Makino (2008) find that subsidiaries operating in countries with less
developed institutions, on average, registered better performance than their counterparts. This
finding was inconsistent with their prediction, which drew on arguments from institutional
economics and the institutional voids literature. A potential explanation of this finding rests in the
market failure literature in strategic management that points to the strategic opportunities inherent
in the weakness and/or instability of institutions (Taussig and Delios, 2015). This literature
suggests that less developed institutions create market power opportunities for those firms with
the required set of resources and capabilities. Therefore, a potential explanation of such contrasting
finding as that in Chan et al. (2008) rests in the possibility that the strategic advantages of weak
institutions outweigh corresponding economic challenges. A joint consideration of the economic
as well as strategic implications of institutions is, therefore, key for a better understanding of
institutions and their influence on firm/subsidiary performance (Nickerson, Hamilton and Wada,
2001; Williamson, 1999).
Williamson (1991) has identified two different approaches to business strategy: economizing and
strategizing. Whereas the former is mainly concerned with organizational efficiency, the latter
emphasizes market power advantages. Teece, Pisano, and Shuen (1997) further clarified this
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classification by identifying the theoretical underpinnings of each. Economizing holds that the
route to competitive advantage is through minimization of transaction and transformation costs
(Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997; Williamson,1991); strategizing suggests that competitive
advantage results from limitations on competition and building defensible positions against
competitive forces (Porter, 1981; Teece et al., 1997). Given that institutions help determine the
levels of transaction/ transformation costs and market competition (North, 1990; Williamson,
2000), they are likely to have both economizing and strategizing implications.
The economizing implications arise largely from two sources: institutional voids and institutional
instability (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011).

Institutional voids refer to contexts “…where

institutional arrangements that support markets are absent, weak, or fail to accomplish the role
expected of them” (Mair and Marti, 2009: 422). Institutional voids lead to informational problems,
inefficient judicial systems (enforcement problems), and misguided regulation (competition
problems) that render host markets less efficient (Khanna and Palepu, 1997). These problems give
rise to increased levels of uncertainty and transaction costs (North, 1991; Williamson, 2000). On
the other hand, emerging markets are also characterized by institutional instability arising, for
example, from an abrupt change of government and/or discontinuities in government policies and
actions (Azzimonti and Sarte, 2007). Such changes and their consequences are usually difficult to
predict and can adversely affect the capital, factor, and product markets in which MNE subsidiaries
conduct their businesses (Khanna et al., 2005).
Foreign subsidiaries operating in locations with institutional voids often face problems in obtaining
(reliable) information about potential exchange partners. In advanced markets, such institutions as
rating agencies, chambers of commerce, and other independent (third-party) organizations provide
useful information about customers, distributors, and suppliers. In contrast, in emerging markets,
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MNE subsidiaries have to make do without this essential input. As a result, they face much greater
uncertainty and transaction costs than their counterparts operating in advanced markets (Dhanaraj
and Khanna, 2011; Khanna and Palepu, 1997).
Locations with institutional voids are also fraught with enforcement problems. Even if partners
have been identified and exchange contracts have been made, the issue of whether these partners
will honor the transaction commitments is important. Strong contract and property rights
enforcement mechanisms (e.g., sound and reliable court systems) are essential to provide
incentives for honoring contracts; however, such mechanisms are largely missing in emerging
markets, subjecting subsidiaries to the hazards of opportunistic behaviours and attendant
inefficiencies (Williamson, 2000).
Emerging markets are also lacking in institutions useful to promote competition in product as well
as factor markets. For example, entry barriers in a subsidiary’s factor markets can decrease the
number of suppliers available. In the product market, such barriers can limit the number of
intermediaries with which a foreign subsidiary can work (Dhanaraj and Khanna, 2011; Khanna
and Palepu, 1997). Such limits to competition in any of or both markets can undermine the
bargaining power of the foreign subsidiaries, resulting in higher costs of operating (Porter, 1981).
On the other hand, regulatory restrictions encourage rent-seeking practices by government
officials—practices that may adversely affect the performance of foreign subsidiaries (World
Bank, 2002).
In addition to extant institutional voids, uncertainty occasioned by the dynamic, changing nature
of institutions can affect the performance of foreign subsidiaries operating in emerging markets.
Instability of government regulations and other institutional elements requires foreign subsidiaries
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to frequently adapt to these changes (Meyer and Peng, 2016). Also, emerging markets such as
those in Africa often have a highly fragile political climate, with political conflicts arising
unexpectedly and promising countries suddenly falling into disorder (Zoogah et al., 2015). Since
foreign subsidiaries are often considered by Africans as agents of imperialistic rule, they are highly
susceptible to attacks following political crisis (Chironga et al., 2011). Such attacks may range
from introducing policy changes that adversely affect operations to reneging on contracts and even
to the expropriation of assets.
These economizing challenges notwithstanding, weak institutions make for considerable
strategizing (positioning) benefits. Two lines of arguments suggest a possible net-positive
performance implication of operating in emerging markets. First, the lack of regulations promoting
competition in the market where a focal subsidiary is operating can help the subsidiary secure
market power and subsequently gain greater economic rent than would be possible otherwise. As
well, because of their affiliation with MNEs, foreign subsidiaries are likely to have more resources
with which to influence governments than local firms do and therefore can more easily (than in
OECD countries) exploit institutional voids and weak governments to get an advantage1. This view
of ‘institutional voids as opportunities’ is also emphasized elsewhere, albeit from a slightly
different angle (Dhanaraj and Khanna, 2011; Khanna and Palepu, 1997). Also in line with this
view is the argument that increased local density typical of institutionally well-developed locations
heightens competitive pressures, which in turn can increase subsidiary exit (Miller and Eden,
2006).

1

We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this mechanism.
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Second, literature on the performance persistence of MNE affiliates operating in emerging market
(Chacar and Vissa, 2005; Chacar et al., 2010) indicates that foreign subsidiaries tend to persist
even in the face of poor performance because of (a) the understanding by MNE management of
the relatively greater challenges of operating in emerging markets and thus a correspondingly
greater allowance for substandard performance (i.e., strategic explanation); (b) the tendency for
MNE managers to persevere with short-term losses and stay the course in the hope of developing
experience and gradually building share, local identity, and useful political connections (Chacar
and Vissa, 2005)(i.e., evolutionary/path-dependence explanation); and (c) the tendency to avoid
the stigma associated with failing in emerging markets (i.e., behavioural explanation).
The potential implications of institutional voids/instability for the exit probability of foreign
subsidiaries is likely to depend on the balance between associated economizing challenges and
strategizing opportunities. Williamson (1991) observed that economizing is much more
fundamental than strategizing and that strategizing benefits seldom prevail in the presence of
significant cost burdens in production, distribution, and organization. Teece et al., (1997) echo this
view by arguing that organizing effectively and efficiently to identify and embrace opportunities
is more fundamental to value creation and capture than seeking market power through such actions
as raising rival’s costs and excluding new entrants. As well, economic rents in the strategizing
(positioning) approach are monopoly rents (Teece et al., 1997), which are available only to a
limited range of firms/subsidiaries and difficult to sustain in such dynamic institutional settings as
those in most African countries. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: MNE subsidiaries entering the African market face a greater likelihood of
exit than their counterparts entering the OECD market (the economizing
mechanism is more potent than the strategizing mechanism).
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Empirical testing of this hypothesis can only indicate which of the two countervailing mechanisms
(i.e., economizing and strategizing) dominate in the context of MNE investment in Africa.
Consideration of relevant boundary conditions is thus needed to gain a more refined understanding
of the dynamics between these mechanisms and the corresponding implications for the exit
likelihood of subsidiaries. MNE-and/or subsidiary-level strategies can help mitigate institutional
hazards and/or harness market power opportunities, thus influencing subsidiary exit likelihood
(Delios and Henisz, 2000; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Here, this study considers two such
strategies: investment purpose diversity and market-seeking orientation.
Investment Purposes Diversity
Successful investments in uncertain environments require an understanding of the environment
and associated dynamics (Miles and Cameron, 1982). The investment strategy to be used can
reflect such understanding and preparation, or the absence thereof. One essential issue in the
strategy formulation process is specifying the intended purpose(s) of the investment. Clearly,
investment purposes are context dependent in that different investment locations and environments
may be suitable for achieving different purposes. For instance, an environment suitable for
advancing a research and development purpose may not be suitable for achieving a market access
purpose. Likewise, some environments may be conducive for pursuing both purposes mentioned
above, while some may not be suitable for any of the purposes.
Discussion of investment purposes has featured in prior literature on investment motives. Dunning
(1998), for example, elaborated on four major motives that drive MNE investments. The resourceseeking motive explains FDI in search of a resource that is not available in the home country or
relatively cheaper in the foreign country. Investments in resource-endowed countries are likely to
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be motivated by a desire to access such resources. The efficiency motive is pursued by a firm
looking to secure decreased production costs and scale and/or scope economies. The marketseeking motive entails efforts to serve a market in the host country or in nearby regions. It also
may involve reducing the transportation cost component to ensure better price competitiveness in
the host country. The strategic asset seeking motive involves acquiring a new technological base.
A related line of research has extended our understanding of subsidiary heterogeneity by providing
evidence suggesting that subsidiaries can have diverse purposes, possibly spanning across multiple
categories (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998).
Drawing on the investment motives literature and acknowledging that foreign subsidiaries may
have diverse investment purposes can generate unique insights about subsidiary scope, its
interaction with institutional environments, and its performance implications. The number and
relatedness of purposes a subsidiary is expected to achieve in the host country determines its
activities and thus its scope. Also, investment purposes specify the rationale for a move to a given
market and define the behavior and orientation of the focal subsidiary (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005).
Virtually every decision regarding the subsidiary, including one on entry mode choices, is likely
to be influenced by the selected investment purpose(s) (Franco, Rentocchini, and Marzetti, 2010).
In general, adaptation and learning are essential elements of operating in such emerging markets
as Africa (Luo and Peng, 1999); having diverse purposes can foster both. Thompson (2011)
suggests that, under the norms of bounded rationality, firms entering environments fraught with
uncertainties seek ways to buffer their technical core or infuse in their structures elements that help
in adapting to changes. In the context of MNEs, having diverse purposes for a subsidiary is likely
to promote possible resource reallocation, which refers to the reassignment over time of resources
from deteriorating areas/activities to more promising ones (Adner, 2007; Klingebiel and Adner,
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2015). In fact, Adner (2007) argued that existing work on flexibility has disproportionately focused
on what he calls ‘flexibility as a redirection of activity’ (redirecting activities across subsidiaries
in response to environmental changes) and suggested that future research explores ‘flexibility as
reassignment of resources’ (shifting resources to a more favourable activity in a subsidiary). This
paper considers the latter. Subsidiaries with diverse purposes have the option to abandon an
investment purpose and reassign resources to more attractive others (Adner, 2007) and the value
of such option is greater in emerging markets characterized by missing/unstable institutions.
Institutional voids tend to limit the flexibility of organizations operating in them (Santangelo and
Meyer, 2011). As such, MNEs entering markets with high institutional voids may need to deploy
mechanisms that help them secure flexibility which the environment does not provide. A simple
syllogism may clarify: Flexibility is essential when operating under institutional voids (Khanna
and Palepu, 1997); such environments limit flexibility (Santangelo and Meyer, 2011); therefore, it
is incumbent on the firm to devise its own mechanism of flexibility. One such mechanism is having
diverse investment purposes. An MNE subsidiary with diverse investment purposes can better
respond to changes in, for example, government regulations as resources can readily be
reconfigured to focus on a purpose least affected by the change or to revise resource allocations
among the functions/activities targeted at the purposes.
Furthermore, entering emerging markets with diverse investment purposes can promote
exploration, which in turn can facilitate learning about the business environment, experimenting
with different activities, and understanding what works and what does not (Sorensen and Stuart,
2000). Subsidiaries having diverse investment purposes are likely to develop a better
understanding of the host-country environment and build useful connections because of their
potential exposure to different markets/industries and interactions with different host-country
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partners (Hashai et al., 2010). Such exposure and connections can provide access to information
useful in exploring opportunities. The global strategy literature on business groups points to a
diversification premium when operating in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000), a
finding leading to the institutional-based theory of corporate diversification which posits that
diversified firms overcome market imperfection prevalent in emerging markets (Khanna and
Palepu, 2000; Peng et al., 2005; Wan, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Following similar logic,
this study contends that subsidiary level diversification—in the form of purpose diversity—can
help mitigate the hazards and/or expand the opportunities of conducting business in locations of
high institutional voids. These, therefore, lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Investment purpose diversity negatively moderates the relationship between
entry to Africa by an MNE subsidiary and its exit likelihood such that it
weakens or reverses the positive relationship described by H1.
Market-seeking Orientation
Foreign investments with greater market-seeking orientation are undertaken to serve the hostcountry (and at times, regional) markets through local production and distribution of
goods/services, rather than exporting from the home country or other third countries (Dunning,
1998; Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Unlike their counterparts, foreign subsidiaries with greater
market-seeking orientation are more loosely coupled with their parent MNE and sister subsidiaries.
They often play a more limited role in the global value-chain process than, for example, resourceseeking subsidiaries and are more locally responsive to the tastes and needs of their actual and
potential customers (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). This attribute of market-seeking subsidiaries
provides them with greater learning opportunities and an enhanced ability to fill institutional voids.
Out of the desire to serve local markets emerges the need for greater local embeddedness of
subsidiaries with greater market-seeking orientation. Such embeddedness, in turn, enables the
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subsidiary to have greater exposure to the host market and to build important ties and networks
with relevant host-country stakeholders (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). As a result, the
subsidiary is likely to garner relevant host-country knowledge, which may prove useful in
mitigating the adverse effects of institutional voids. Likewise, the connections established and the
familiarity developed can make it easier for such subsidiaries to more easily access and more
successfully work with local intermediaries. Also, in response to adverse institutional conditions
in the host country, MNEs may relocate their subsidiaries. However, the need for greater local
embeddedness of market-seeking subsidiaries makes it difficult to exercise this option2.
Moreover, because market-seeking subsidiaries usually act as standalone units (operationally less
integrated with the parent MNE as well as sister subsidiaries), adverse conditions in the hostcountry institutional environment are less likely to directly affect the parent MNE and sister
subsidiaries. As a result, parent MNEs are more likely to tolerate poor performance of marketseeking subsidiaries than other kinds of subsidiaries. Subsidiaries with (natural) resource-seeking
orientation, for example, tend to be a part of their respective parents’ supply-chain and thus have
operations closely synchronized with those of the parent MNEs and ‘sister’ subsidiaries (Nachum
and Zaheer, 2005). As a result, when adverse institutional conditions affect the focal subsidiary,
the parent MNE and associated sister subsidiaries are likely to feel the effects, prompting the MNE
to terminate the focal subsidiary. The foregoing arguments, therefore, lead to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The level of market-seeking orientation negatively moderates the relationship
between entry to Africa by an MNE subsidiary and its exit likelihood such that it
weakens or reverses the positive relationship described by H1.

2
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RESEARCH DESIGN
Research Context
The last decade has seen a rapid surge in the economic development of Africa, attracting the
attention of investors. In 2012, the continent registered a 5 percent increase in its FDI inflows
while the global FDI inflow decreased by 18 percent (UNCTAD, 2013). A possible factor behind
such a difference is the higher average rate of return for foreign investment made in the continent.
In fact, the rate of FDI return is higher in Africa than in any developing region of the world (Leke
et al., 2010).
Despite such progress and promising prospects, the continent is still fraught with systemic
challenges with performance implications for MNEs operating there (Chrysostome and Lupton,
2011). Most, if not all, of the challenges are related to the paucity of effective institutions. Also,
many African countries are characterized by a high degree of political instability and a lack (or
absence) of rule of law (Azzimonti and Sarte, 2007). Similarly, ineffective financial institutions
and inadequate regulatory infrastructures give rise to unstable macroeconomic environments,
which in turn lead to high uncertainty and greater perceived risk of investment (Asiedu, 2002).
The use of the African context was motivated by several reasons. First, by focusing on the African
context, the study attempts to respond to a call for a greater focus of global strategy research on
emerging economies whose institutional environments are completely different from those of
developed economies, not just in their basic natures but also in the way they influence
organizational behavior and performance (e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna et al., 2005; Peng
et al., 2008). In fact, such distinction has been made even among emerging economies in that
economies such as those in Africa have considerably higher levels of institutional voids/instability
and thus merit separate consideration (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Also, the relevance to developing
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countries of conventional management theories—especially those concerned with the relationship
between organizations and contexts—has been questioned (Kiggundu, Jørgensen, and Hafsi, 1983)
and calls for a contextualization of international business (IB) theories have been made (e.g.,
Welch et al., 2011). In fact, the issue of context and how it relates with MNE performance and
behaviour is fundamental in IB scholarship (Shenkar, 2004; Vernon, 1994). The distinct
institutional context of African countries, thus, presents an ideal setting to better understand
international business and strategy in a market where institutions are weak and/or unstable.
Second, Africa’s economic momentum and future growth prospects have attracted unprecedented
levels of FDI activity (UNCTAD, 2013). Indications are that this trend is set to continue. Clearly,
along with such increased activity and focus on the continent comes the need for a better
understanding of the economic and institutional realities not just in the continent but in each
country as well. Recognizing this need, the Academy of Management (AOM) launched the AOM
Africa Initiative in 2011, issued a Call for Papers on management topics related to Africa, and held
its first global conference in Africa in January, 2013.
Third, despite an increasing interest in research about emerging economies, high quality research
in such contexts has paid very limited attention to Africa (Kolk and Lenfant, 2010; Zoogah et al.,
2015). Even from the limited research examining issues in the continent, a significant portion
concerns issues of corporate social responsibility and most use country-level, macro indicators
which provide but a telescopic view of situations on the ground. Such a shortage of empirical
work about Africa is more troubling for IB whose main unit of analysis is MNEs operating across
countries and regions. This study, thus, looks to address the gap and takes a modest step toward
bringing more scholarly attention to Africa.
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Data and Sample
To test the hypotheses, the study uses a longitudinal data of Japanese overseas investments in
Africa obtained from the Toyo Keizai (TK) dataset. The dataset is based on an annual survey of
general managers of Japanese overseas subsidiaries throughout the world. This dataset is ideal to
test the hypotheses for several reasons. First, the longitudinal nature of the data is useful not only
in increasing confidence in the results and underlying causal arguments (Bono and McNamara,
2011), but also in conducting survival analysis, which require data on multiple points. Second, it
contains a fairly comprehensive data on foreign investment activities in Africa, a region largely
missing from the mainstream global strategy research in part due to the lack of access to reliable
data (Hoskisson et al., 2000). Third, Japan has been one of the major home countries for outward
foreign investment throughout the world.
To achieve the empirical purpose, the study employed data on Japanese multinational subsidiaries
operating in Africa. Some essential data screening and cleaning were conducted to develop a
suitable dataset. Also, to ensure that the study focuses on FDIs with significant foreign investment,
the study followed Beamish and Inkpen’s (1998) suggestion and limited the sample to subsidiaries
having at least 20 employees. Also, following Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino (1994), the study
restricted the sample to those subsidiaries that were at least two years old to consider only those
subsidiaries that reached an initial period of stabilization. These procedures resulted in a final
sample of 126 Japanese subsidiaries operating across 28 African countries, extending over 19 years
(1990 ̵ 2008), and constituting 998 subsidiary-year cases. Table 1 presents a list of these African
countries along with the number of subsidiaries operating there. Data about relevant parent-level
factors were obtained from the Nikkei-NEEDS dataset.
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Table 1. List of African host countries and number of subsidiaries
Country
No. of
Country
Subsidiaries
Algeria
2
Mozambique
Angola
1
Niger
Burkina Faso
2
Nigeria
Cameroon
2
People’s Rep. of the Congo
Dem. Rep. of the Congo
1
Senegal
Egypt
14
South Africa
Ethiopia
3
Sudan
Ghana
3
Swaziland
Ivory Coast
4
Tanzania
Kenya
5
Togo
Madagascar
3
Tunisia
Malawi
1
Uganda
Mali
2
Zambia
Mauritius
2
Zimbabwe

No. of
Subsidiaries
2
1
22
1
1
34
1
1
7
1
2
3
3
2

Understanding the exit implications of entry to the African market is complicated because of the
inherent self-selection bias. To account for this concern, the study used a control (counterfactual)
sample of comparable subsidiaries operating elsewhere. Accordingly, it identified matching
subsidiaries operating in OECD countries to ensure enough variability in the characteristics of
business/institutional environment between the ‘treated’ (i.e., African subsidiaries) and the
‘control’ subsidiaries (i.e., OECD subsidiaries). It employed the PSM procedure to identify
matching control subsidiaries (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). First, a comprehensive list of
subsidiaries operating in 29 OECD countries is complied. Then, these subsidiaries were pooled
with the treatment subsidiaries and a probit model was fitted by using subsidiary size, subsidiary
age, foreign ownership ratio, the number of foreign parents, parent size, and parent R&D intensity
to predict the propensity of a subsidiary to enter Africa. Using the estimated propensity score, the
study identified 123 control subsidiaries matching the 126 treated subsidiaries. These 123 control
subsidiaries are spread across 10 OECD countries. Three of the treated subsidiaries share matching
subsidiaries with other three treated subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are retained in the final sample
(per Dehejia and Wahba, 1999). The final sample includes 249 subsidiaries.
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To verify the success of the matching procedure, two sets of tests were conducted. First, as reported
in Table 2, t-test of means was run on the covariates used to develop the matching model. Results
show no statistically significant differences between the means. Second, a probit regression was
conducted using the sample of 249 matching subsidiaries to predict the probability of entering the
African market. As shown in Table 2, estimates for the covariates used in the matching model are
insignificant, indicating that the matching process was reasonably sound. The use of the PSM
technique provides for a more randomized sample of subsidiaries with counterfactual cases, thus
helping address potential endogeneity concerns (Reeb et al., 2012).
Table 2. Comparison of subsidiaries in Africa and OECD countries across variables using t-tests
and probit regression on matching model
t-test of means
Matching model
Variables
African subsidiaries OECD subsidiaries
β
p-value
Subsidiary age
14.71
15.11
-0.00
0.97
Subsidiary size
2.26
2.32
-0.43
0.29
Ownership ratio
43.45
44.65
-0.00
0.99
Sector dummy
2.34
2.43
-0.64
0.14
Number of foreign
1.38
1.40
-0.17
0.66
parents
Parent size
4.24
4.29
0.09
0.53
Parent R&D intensity
0.02
0.05
-0.00
0.64
Purpose diversity
0.70
0.90***
Market-seeking
0.44
0.59***
orientation
Institutional voids
45.85
25.91***
Institutional instability
0.76
0.29***
Years before exit
5.74
6.57***
Constant
2.83
0.12
Number of
2150
observations
Log-likelihood
-178.39
Wald χ2
4.12
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001(two-tailed)
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Variables

As with any survival analysis, the dependent variable is made up of two components. The first
represents the length of time in years a subsidiary takes to cease operation or to be right-censored
(i.e., not cease operation within the time frame of the analysis). In the model, this is a random
variable, whereas the censoring time is fixed to the year 2008. The second component is an exit
indicator given by the following function.

1 if Ti  U i
……………………….……………………………………. (1)
0
if
T

U
i
i


i  

In the above function δi represents the censoring result for a given subsidiary. Ti is the failure time.
A subsidiary is assigned 1 if Ti is less than or equal to Ui, which is the censoring time. If otherwise,
a subsidiary is said to be right-censored because there is no way to tell when that subsidiary will
experience the event. In keeping with previous studies that used the same dataset, this study
considers a subsidiary terminated when its records no longer appear in the dataset (e.g., Delios and
Beamish, 2001). The data used in the study are published on a yearly basis, so this is the metric
for specifying time.
Key Independent Variables
Entry to Africa. This variable underlies the baseline, main effect argument. Clearly, one of the
most important strategic decisions of MNEs is a decision on investment locations. This decision
is captured with a dichotomous variable assuming a value of ‘1’ for subsidiaries entering Africa
and ‘0’ for those entering any of the OECD countries included in the sample. Here, the study makes
a reasonable assumption that at the start MNEs need to confront a strategic decision of either to
enter the African market or not to. Such a regional orientation of MNE location decision is
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consistent with the theoretical and empirical evidence underlying the regionalization/semiglobalization literature in IB (e.g., Arregle et al., 2013, Rugman and Verbeke, 2004).
To observe the differences in institutional environments of the two broad investment destinations
(i.e., Africa and OECD), data on the levels of institutional voids and institutional instability were
compiled. The study uses the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom measures to
establish the level of institutional voids (Kane, Holmes, and O’Grady, 2007). The index aggregates
measures on multiple aspects of economic freedom. It is a time series data providing indices from
1995 onwards. This study followed Dikova and van Witteloostuijn's (2007) approach and used the
1995 score for the years between 1990 and 1994 inclusive. The index can assume values ranging
from zero to 100, higher values indicating better overall economic freedom. The values on this
index were subtracted from 100 to develop the institutional voids variable so that higher values
indicate greater institutional voids. Institutional instability was measured using the POLCON
measure of political constraints that captures the distribution of power across the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches of government to provide an estimate of how difficult it is for host
government to change the rules of the game in a way that adversely affects the interest of the
foreign subsidiaries (Henisz, 2000).
Investment purpose diversity. This variable was used as a moderator in the models, and it was
developed out of the TK dataset using the following procedure. Related theoretical arguments
suggest that having multiple purposes provides adaptability/flexibility advantage in response, for
example, to unexpected policy change. Nonetheless, the degree of relatedness between or among
the purposes is also important in determining the feasibility of adaptation. A concept in the real
options perspective called the subadditivity of option portfolios holds that options which are within
a given category or affected by the same environmental factors have lower value in managing
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uncertainty than more diverse options (Belderbos, Tong, and Wu, 2014); that is, when one purpose
is affected, the others will also be so, limiting the opportunity for the subsidiary/firm to redirect its
focus and stay in operation (i.e. less ability for resource reallocation). However, a subsidiary with
multiple, unrelated purposes is less likely to see all its purposes adversely affected by a policy
change. As a result, in response to a policy change that makes a purpose less attractive, such
subsidiary can reconfigure its resources to focus on the purpose(s) not(less) affected by the policy
change.
Therefore, it is essential that the variable developed contains information about both the number
of purposes a subsidiary performs as well as the degree of relation between or among those
purposes. The following procedures were used to develop this variable. First, investment purposes
of each subsidiary as specified by the respective general managers were identified. Next, using
Dunning’s (1998) classification of investment motives, the investment purposes were categorized
into four categories: resource seeking, efficiency seeking, market seeking, and strategic-asset
seeking. A fifth category was also included to represent other investment purposes that are not
specified in the data. The investment motives and the subsidiary mandate (charter) literatures were
consulted and feedback from three colleagues was obtained in classifying the purposes along the
motive categories. These categories were used to decide on the relatedness of purposes. That is,
purposes that fall into two different categories are considered unrelated. Table 3 presents the
frequency distribution of the investment purposes and motive categories used in this study. Then
the widely-used entropy measure was adopted to calculate purpose diversity scores for each
subsidiary. The mathematical function used to calculate the investment purpose diversity is as
follows:
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PD=  Pi ln(1 / Pi ) ……………………………………………………. (2)
i 1

In the above function, Pi is the share of attention given to the ith investment purpose. Here the study
assumes that equal attention is given to each purpose. A useful feature of the entropy measure is
its ability to capture the two essential elements of investment purpose diversity: (1) the number of
investment purposes a subsidiary has; and (2) the degree of relatedness among these investment
purposes (Palepu, 1985). Two subsidiaries having an equal number of investment purposes may
differ in their overall investment purpose diversity score because of differences in the degree of
relatedness among their respective purposes. A detailed and technical illustration of the procedure
used to develop this variable is available in the Appendix.
Table 3. Frequency distribution of investment purposes and motives
OECD subsidiaries
Motive
Investment purpose
Frequency Frequency
category
(purpose)
(motive)
Efficiency Labour intensity
214
768
seeking
Tax breaks for investment
38
Building international networks
343
of production
Export to Japan
138
Financing and currency hedging
35
Market
Market access
1078
1468
seeking
Building international networks
216
of distribution
Export to other countries
39
Building new businesses
39
Controls business of the area
18
Trade conflict
78
Resource Natural resources, materials
42
42
seeking
Strategic
Alliance with customers in
70
476
asset
Japan
seeking
Information gathering, royalty
338
revenue
Research and development
68
Others
Other purposes
34
34
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African subsidiaries
Frequency Frequency
(purpose)
(motive)
247
824
198
330
49
0
672
141

844

31
0
0
0
173

173

2

146

126
18
83

83
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Market-seeking orientation. This is another moderating variable developed out of the TK dataset.
First, for each subsidiary, the number of investment purposes falling into the market-seeking
category was counted. Such investment purposes include market access, building new business,
and building international networks of distribution. Then, this number was divided by the total
number of purposes the subsidiary has to arrive at the market-seeking orientation score. The value
of this variable ranges from 0 percent (indicating no market-seeking orientation) to 100 percent
(indicating high market-seeking orientation).
Control Variables
To account for other potential explanations, the study controlled for several variables found at
three different levels. First at the subsidiary-level, it controlled for a number of variables which
have been shown to be theoretically related to subsidiary exit. It introduced subsidiary age variable
to control for subsidiary age as young firms have a higher probability of exit than old ones (Carroll
and Delacroix, 1982). As subsidiary size has been shown to influence exit (Moulten and Thomas,
1993), it controlled for it using the log of number of employees as its proxy. This variable is timevariant and can also proxy for many subsidiary characteristics, such as the extent of local linkages,
economies of scale, and importance within intra-firm and external networks (Yang, Mudambi,
Meyer, 2008). Dhanaraj and Beamish (2004) found a statistically significant relationship between
foreign ownership level and subsidiary exit probability. Therefore, the study controlled for foreign
ownership level by using the combined percentage of equity ownership of the foreign partners in
the focal subsidiary. It also controlled for sector effect by introducing two dummy variables for
three sector groups namely, primary, secondary, and tertiary.
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It also included parent-level controls to account for alternative explanations of subsidiary exit
arising from parent affiliation. Makino and Beamish (1998) found that the presence of multiple
foreign partners increases managerial complexity, thereby influencing exit. As such, the study
controlled for the number of foreign partners listed as parents of the focal subsidiary. It also
controlled for parent size and used log of the combined number of employees of the parent
companies as its proxy. The parent size variable is time-variant. Intangible assets of the parent is
related to the exit probability of its subsidiary (Delios and Beamish, 1999) As such, the study
included a parent-level research and development (R&D) intensity variable. This variable is
measured as a ratio of R&D expenditure to the total sales.
To control for the effects of time and periodic crisis on the exit probability of subsidiaries, the study
used the strata option in stcox estimation in STATA version 14. As a result, it specified baseline hazard
of the model to each stratum of three periods namely, 1990 ̵ 1995, 1996 ̵ 2001, and 2002 ̵ 2008. By so
doing, it minimized the effect of unobserved heterogeneity among periods on the exit probability of
subsidiaries. The specified baseline hazard adjusts for such extraneous periodic events as the Asian
financial crisis that occurred in the 1996 ̵ 2001 period in the model and that influenced investments
from Asian countries, including Japan. The paper also introduced host-country fixed effects to account
for unobserved heterogeneity among the countries that may explain differences in the exit probability
of foreign subsidiaries.

Statistical Method
To test the hypotheses, the study employed an extended Cox regression model (Kleinbaum and
Klein, 2005). It can help estimate the parameters without the need to make any assumptions about
the underlying hazard distribution. The model develops a hazard function used to determine the
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probability that a subsidiary experiences an event (i.e., exit), given it has survived up to time t. The
hazard function that is denoted by ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋(𝑡)) is as follows:

h(t , X (t ))  h0 (t ) exp

P1

p2

I 1

j 1

[   i X i    i X j ( t )]

……………………………………………. (3)

ho(t) represents the baseline hazard function that is left unspecified and reflects the underlying
hazard rate when the values of all covariates X1,…Xp1 and X1(t),…Xp2(t) equal to 0. X(t) stands for
the variables in the model and Xi denotes the ith time-independent variable, while Xj(t) the jth timedependent variable. βi’s and σj’s denote their corresponding coefficients. The extended Cox
regression model accommodates the use of time-variant covariates (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005)
and produces a hazard ratio associated with each explanatory variable, along with corresponding
confidence interval estimates.
RESULTS
Table 3 describes the data and provides useful statistic for subsidiaries operating in Africa and
those in the OECD countries. The greater subsidiary years to subsidiary cases ratio for subsidiaries
operating in OECD countries than those in African countries suggests that on average subsidiaries
survive longer in the former than in the latter. This finding is also supported by the greater median
number of years for the OECD subsample. The median time represents a parameter estimate for
the number of years it takes for 50 percent of the subsidiaries to experience the event (i.e., exit).
Relatedly, the hazard rate among African subsidiaries appears to be greater and the study used the
log-rank test to examine whether there is a statistically significant difference between the exit rates
between the two subsamples. The result shows a statistically significant difference in the exit rates
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of subsidiaries in the two subsamples (χ2 = 7.25, p < 0.01), suggesting that African subsidiaries
face a greater hazard rate.
Table 4. Data summary
Items
Number of countries
Institutional voids(mean)
Institutional instability(mean)
Subsidiary years
Subsidiary cases
Exits
Median survival(years)
a
mean values

OECD subsidiaries
10
25.90
0.29
1164
123
64
11

African subsidiaries
28
45.85
0.76
986
126
80
9

Total
38
35.07a
0.50a
2150
249
144
8a

Table 4 presents a correlation matrix on all the variables used in the models as well as the
institutional voids and instability variables. The correlations between all of the variables in the
models are low and thus multicollinearity was not a concern. A collinearity diagnostic was
conducted on all the variables using the variance inflation factor (VIF) method. The calculated
VIF scores for all the variables are below 5, indicating that multicollinearity is not an issue. To
validate the baseline assumption that the African market has a significantly different institutional
environment from the OECD market, the study introduced the institutional voids and institutional
instability variables. The high, positive correlation between these variables and the treatment
variable is consistent with the expectation. As shown in Table 4, the African group faces
significantly higher institutional voids (t = -76.72, p < 0.001) and institutional instability (t = 53.75, p < 0.001) than the OECD group.
Since the response variable is subsidiary exit and the models include a time-variant covariate, the
study used the extended Cox regression to test its hypotheses. The partial likelihood procedure was
employed to estimate regression parameters. The study followed the estimation procedures
outlined in Singer and Willet (2003). Table 5 presents results from the tests. The analyses resulted
in five models. First, the full model (i.e., Model 5), which includes all the variables and interaction
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlations (N = 2150)
Variables
Subsidiary age
Subsidiary size
Ownership ratio
Sector dummy
Number of foreign
parents
Parent size
Parent R&D
intensity
Entry to Africa
Purpose diversity
Market-seeking
orientation
Period dummies

Mean
14.89
2.28
43.74
2.37
1.39

SD
10.18
0.61
33.26
0.55
0.61

1

2

3

4

1
2
3
4
5

5

6

7

8

9

0.24
0.02
-0.06
0.03

-0.21
-0.36
0.04

0.30
0.04

-0.09

4.26
0.04

0.73
0.02

6
7

0.04
-0.02

0.08
0.06

0.04
0.12

0.03
0.01

0.25
0.01

0.17

0.46
0.81
0.52

0.50
0.68
0.34

8
9
10

-0.02
-0.08
-0.04

-0.09
0.11
-0.10

-0.02
-0.00
0.18

-0.13
-0.10
0.26

-0.02
-0.02
-0.02

0.93

0.81

11

0.08

-0.05

0.06

0.10

Institutional voids

35.05

11.68

12

0.07

-0.03

-0.07

Institutional
instability
Survival (years)

0.50

0.31

13

0.08

0.03

6.17

4.19

14

0.39

0.15

-0.05
0.13
0.06

-0.04
-0.09
0.01

-0.15
-0.28

0.39

-0.04

0.07

0.04

0.13

0.09

0.08

-0.18

0.03

-0.08

-0.01

0.86

0.24

-0.14

-0.00

-0.18

-0.17

0.01

-0.14

-0.06

0.76

0.12

0.05

-0.07

0.80

-0.02

-0.09

-0.03

-0.03

0.11

-0.07

0.11

0.07

0.47

-0.03

Correlation coefficients greater or equal to |0.05| are significant at a 5% level
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11

12

13

-0.11
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Table 6. Results from the extended Cox regression model
Independent Variables

Model 5

Model 4

Model 3

Model 2

Model 1

Subsidiary age

0.009**
(0.003)
-0.083*
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.003)
Reference
0.081
(0.458)
0.900†
(0.488)
-0.175
(0.167)
0.279
(0.128)
-0.070
(0.120)

0.009**
(0.003)
-0.083*
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.003)
Reference
-0.004
(0.449)
0.820
(0.481)
-0.169
(0.166)
0.300†
(0.127)
-0.076
(0.118)

0.009**
(0.003)
-0.079
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.003)
Reference
0.208
(0.450)
0.957*
(0.484)
-0.182
(0.166)
0.255
(0.125)
-0.074
(0.120)

0.008**
(0.003)
-0.077*
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.003)
Reference
0.071
(0.448)
0.784
(0.481)
-0.173
(0.166)
0.276
(0.122)
-0.088
(0.115)

0.008**
(0.003)
-0.079
(0.042)
-0.003
(0.003)
Reference
0.071
(0.448)
0.784
(0.481)
-0.173
(0.166)
0.271
(0.122)
-0.168
(0.107)

Included
1.366**
(0.515)
-0.175
(0.266)
0.177
(0.235)
-0.631*
(0.264)
-0.292†
(0.092)
2150
-766.063
79.97***

Included
1.103*
(0.432)
-0.350*
(0.174)
0.264
(0.211)
-0.761*
(0.297)

Included
1.314*
(0.515)
0.040
(0.241)
-0.137
(0.169)

Included
0.660*
(0.322)

Included

Subsidiary size
Ownership ratio
Sector- Primary
Secondary
Tertiary
Number of foreign parents
Parent size
Parent R&D intensity

Country Dummies
Entry to Africa
Market-seeking orientation
Purpose diversity

Purpose diversity × Entry
to Africa
Market-seeking orientation
-0.585*
× Entry to Africa
(0.281)
Number of observations
2150
2150
2150
2150
Log-likelihood
-768.428
-769.833
-771.705
-773.374
χ2 testing model against
77.24***
74.43***
102.84***
70.68***
null model
χ2 testing model against
N/A
3.38†
4.51*
8.72***
17.20***
Model 5
AIC
1477.10
1566.86
1569.66
1571.41
1575.32
†p < .10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001(two-tailed)
Standard errors in parentheses.
Baseline hazards in all models are specific to the stratum of period that includes 1990-1995, 1996-2001, and
2002-2008.

terms, was run. Then, the significances of the interaction and main effects were examined by
dropping one or more variables from the full model and comparing the log-likelihood of each
nested model to that of the full model. The resulting Chi-square statistic was used to determine the
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significance of the variables or interactions excluded from the full model. Model 4 excludes the
interaction term between the entry to Africa variable and market-seeking orientation; whereas,
Model 3 excludes the interaction term between the entry to Africa variable and purpose diversity.
Model 2 excludes the interaction terms as well as the moderating variables. Model 1 further
excludes the main effect. Model 1 is the most reduced model in which the treatment variable (i.e.,
entry to Africa) is also excluded. The corresponding Chi-square statistic resulting from comparing
the log-likelihood of Model 1 and the full model indicates that the full model which includes the
entry to Africa variable is superior to the reduced model (χ2 = 17.20, p < 0.001). A significant
regression coefficient for the treatment variable in Model 5 provides support for H1 (β=1.366, p <
0.01), suggesting that entry to Africa subjects Japanese subsidiaries to increased hazard. Consistent
result was found from a one-tailed test deemed appropriate given the directional prediction of H1
(β=1.366, p < 0.01). The beta coefficient corresponds to a hazard ratio of around 3.923, suggesting
that Japanese subsidiaries that enter the African market have a 2924 percent higher chance of
exiting at time t than those that enter the OECD market. This represents the value of the effect size,
suggesting the substantive significance of the finding. Figure 2 shows the estimated hazard of
Japanese subsidiaries operating in OECD countries and those in African countries.

The hazard ratio is calculated as eβ, interpreted as a percentage of change in hazard probability for 1% change in the
explanatory variables. Caution need to be exercised when applying such interpretation for log-transformed variables as
the changes are in log-transformed terms.
4
The percentage is determined by subtracting 1 from the corresponding hazard ratio.
3
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Figure 2. Estimated hazard of subsidiaries operating in the OECD countries and Africa
The second hypothesis presents a moderation effect of purpose diversity on the relationship
between the strategy of entering the African market and exit probability. Model 3 provides
estimates of parameters useful in testing this prediction. These findings indicate that exclusion of
this interaction effect from the full model results in an inferior model, suggesting that the
interaction term is a significant predictor (χ2 = 4.51, p < 0.05). The negative, statistically significant
beta coefficient of the interaction term supports the prediction in Hypothesis 2 (β = -0.631, p <
0.05). This result suggests that greater purpose diversity weakens the positive relationship between
entry to Africa and exit likelihood. To gain further insight into the interaction effect, the result is
plotted in Figure 3. As shown in the figure, when purpose diversity is high, entry to Africa is
associated with a reduced likelihood of exit. That is, Japanese subsidiaries with high purpose
diversity are less likely to exit the African market than those with low purpose diversity. Also, the
study follows Aiken and West (1991) to test simple slopes at high (1SD above the mean) and low
(1SD below the mean) values of purpose diversity. The slopes when purpose diversity is high and
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low are both significantly different from zero (β=0.512, p<0.01 and β=1.370, p<0.01,
respectively), confirming the results.

Figure 3. Moderating effects of purpose diversity
Model 4 presents results for a test of H3, which predicts a negative moderation effect of the marketseeking orientation variable on the relationship between the entry of a subsidiary to Africa and its
exit likelihood. In line with the expectation, comparison of log-likelihood Model 4 with that of
Model 5 suggests that exclusion of the interaction term of entry to Africa and market-seeking
orientation results in a Chi-square statistic that is marginally significant (χ2 = 3.38, p < 0.1).
Hypothesis 3 is marginally supported (β = -0.292, p < 0.10), such that, from Japanese subsidiaries
entering the African market, those with a greater market-seeking orientation have a lower exit
probability than their counterparts. Figure 4 shows this moderation effect in which high marketseeking orientation lowers the greater exit rate associated with entry to Africa. Simple slope tests
were conducted at high and low levels of the market-seeking orientation variable. The effect of
entry to Africa on exit likelihood is significantly different from zero for both levels (β = 1.400, p
< 0.01 and β = 1.202, p < 0.05 at low and high levels respectively).
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Figure 4. Moderating effects of market-seeking orientation

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Two of the three core areas in IB are MNEs and comparative national business systems (Shenkar,
2004; Vernon, 1994). MNEs exist in virtually every country in the world, where they face different
national business systems. While emerging markets have been an area of growing scholarly
interest (Wright et al., 2005), the focus of studies on such markets has been limited to select
countries and regions, with regions such as Africa largely underrepresented (Xu and Meyer, 2012).
A better understanding of these regions and their institutional environments no doubt advances our
appreciation of emerging markets on a number of fronts, not least of which is on how MNEs deal
with associated institutional voids and the performance implications of their actions.
From the descriptive analyses, the study finds that Japanese subsidiaries entering the African
market have a lower median life of nine years compared to 11 years for those entering the OECD
market. While this indicates the increased hazard of subsidiaries operating in Africa, the relatively
smaller than expected difference in the median years suggests that institutional challenges facing
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subsidiaries operating in Africa may to a certain extent be offset by the decreased competitive
pressures of operating there. Also, as expected, the levels of institutional voids and institutional
instability facing subsidiaries entering the African market are significantly greater than those
facing subsidiaries entering the OECD market. These two variables are central to the increased
levels of uncertainty facing subsidiaries operating in Africa (Zoogah et al., 2015).
Results regarding the first hypothesis provides support to the exit implications of MNEs’ location
decisions. It was found that, on average, the strategy of entering the African market is associated
with greater exit likelihood. The paired-sample design presented counterfactual cases of Japanese
foreign subsidiaries making the alternative decision (i.e., entry to the OECD market), thus
providing greater confidence in building causal arguments between the location strategy and exit
likelihood. The finding is consistent with several recent studies suggesting the economizing
challenges of operating in Africa (Hochberg et al., 2015; UNCTAD, 2015).
The findings regarding the first hypothesis generates several important insights. First, comparison
of subsidiary exit probabilities across two broad, disparate groups of investment locations illustrate
the effects of context on the long-term performance (or exit) of MNE subsidiaries. By doing so,
the study brings attention to comparative national business systems (Shenkar, 2004; Vernon,
1994). In fact, Shenkar (2004) has urged scholars to investigate the potentially disparate influences
of business environments at different investment locations. A similar call has been made to
consider the contextual boundary conditions of IB theories and develop a richer understanding of
the interplay between context and business performance (Welch et al., 2011).
Second, the results shed some light on the economizing and strategizing implications of
institutional voids/instability. Whereas investment in the OECD market benefits from the highly
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developed institutional environments that reduce market imperfections and promote efficient
operations (i.e., economizing benefits), it is also subjected to more intense competitive pressures
as entry barriers are largely limited and market power mechanisms such as collusive behaviours
are largely discouraged (i.e., strategizing challenges). In contrast, institutional voids characterizing
the African environment diminish imitative and competitive pressures and make for rather easier
development of market power (North, 1991). The findings suggest that, in the African market, the
economizing downsides of institutional voids/instability are, on average, more potent than the
associated strategizing opportunities in determining the exit probability of Japanese foreign
subsidiaries. That is, in such regions as Africa, the challenges arising from the lack (absence) of
market supporting institutions outweigh the benefits of decreased competitive intensity. This
finding is consistent with and provides empirical evidence for the notion that economizing is more
fundamental than strategizing (Teece et al., 1997; Williamson, 1991).
Test of the second hypothesis provide a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between
entry to Africa and exit likelihood. Results indicate that entry to Africa is related to a lower exit
likelihood for subsidiaries with high purpose diversity. The theoretical arguments in support of
this finding suggest that subsidiaries with diverse investment purposes can benefit from enhanced
abilities of adaptability and learning, which are crucial when operating in such dynamic and
institutionally less-developed locations (Jackson, 2004; Teece et al., 1997). Subsidiaries with less
diverse purposes are more susceptible to adverse changes in the environment (Belderbos et al.,
2014), limiting their ability to redirect focus and remain in operation. However, for subsidiaries
with more diverse purposes, it is less likely for an environmental change that affects one of the
purposes to also affect the other; hence, in such a situation, these subsidiaries can remain viable
by redeploying more of their resources and attention to the purpose that is not adversely hit by the
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change. From a real options perspective, such advantage is termed a flexibility option as it fosters
managerial flexibility to switch between purposes in response to new information (e.g., Chung et
al., 2010; Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994; Reuer and Leiblein, 2000).
Subsidiaries that enter locations like Africa with diverse investment purposes are also in a better
position to respond to or fill institutional voids. Extant research on diversity acknowledges that as
well as the benefits it confers, it has several downsides. Included in the possible downsides of
diversity are (a) growing strain on management to manage different purposes and deal with
uncertainty along different environmental domains/markets (Grant, Jammine, and Thomas, 1988);
b) increased coordination cost; and c) inefficiencies from conflicting ‘dominant logics’(Markides,
1992). Diversity, therefore, makes economic sense only to the extent that its drawbacks are more
than offset by its benefits (Williamson, 1985). The institutional-based view of diversity suggests
that the extent to which diversity offers net-benefit is contingent on institutional factors, such that
in locations where market-supporting institutions are missing, diversity offers considerable
benefits (Khanna and Palepu, 1997; Peng et al., 2005; Wan, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). The
finding not only offers an additional support to the institutional-based view of diversity, but also
extends our understanding by introducing the notion of within-subsidiary diversity.
By looking at the phenomenon of within-subsidiary diversity (of purposes) and its interaction with
institutional conditions to affect subsidiary exit, the study advances the notion of subsidiary scope
and its implications. Prior research in global strategy has largely focused on scope at the firm level
(e.g., Peng et al., 2005). Diversification has, therefore, been considered in a limited way whereby
the firm operates multiple strategic business units (or subsidiaries) potentially across different
industries and/or institutional environments. The subsidiary scope notion advanced here, however,
responds to the need to gain better understanding of the heterogeneity of MNE subsidiaries. Some
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subsidiaries discharge a broad range of responsibilities –for example, production, marketing, and
central R&D for product development—whereas, others perform just a single activity (e.g.,
manufacturing) (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). This study also contributes to a better
understanding of not just subsidiary scope, but its implications on foreign subsidiary exit as well.
Adner (2007) raised the notion of flexibility as reassignment of resources, noting that existing
treatments of flexibility have largely focused on flexibility as redirection of activity and future
research needs to look at flexibility through reallocation of resources. Similarly, treatments of
flexibility in global strategy research have emphasized the flexibility advantage from shifting
value-chain activities from a country experiencing adverse changes to a more favourable country
within the MNE’s network (Belderbos and Zou, 2007; Chung et al., 2010). Whereas case studies
suggest that MNEs such as GM and Qantas engage in reallocation by releasing resources from
existing activities and redeploying them to new opportunities (Maitland and Sammartino, 2012),
this study identifies investment purpose diversity as a potential lens through which to study such
reallocations. More importantly, it identifies investment purpose diversity as a possible response
to institutional voids/instability, thereby (a) bringing to the fore a response mechanism that has
received less attention and (b) engaging a response that reflects the strategic decision making of
MNEs when investing in emerging markets.
The result of the third hypothesis suggests that the kind of purpose a subsidiary emphasizes also
matters. The study finds that when operating in institutionally weak/turbulent regions, subsidiaries
with greater market-seeking orientations have a lower exit probability than their peers. It argues
that the structural difference between market-seeking subsidiaries (i.e., less globally integrated and
more locally responsive) and their counterpart is responsible for the differential exit rates. Being
less globally integrated makes it possible for the parent MNE to tolerate adverse changes in the
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host country of the focal subsidiary because such adverse change is less likely to affect the parent
MNE and sister subsidiaries (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). Also, being more locally responsive
facilitates the building of ties and networks with important local stakeholders, thereby fostering a
better access to intermediaries and greater understanding of the host-country environment. Such
access and knowledge can help market-seeking subsidiaries to more successfully operate in
locations of institutional voids.
From a measurement standpoint, the use of the market-seeking orientation variable makes two
important contributions. First, unlike previous research which has used proxies—such as whether
a subsidiary sells to unaffiliated customers or affiliated customers (Slangen and Beugelsdijk,
2010)—to determine whether a subsidiary is market-seeking, the approach of looking at the
specific investment purposes to identify market-seeking subsidiaries is not only straightforward
but also likely to provide a more accurate picture. Second, the use of the term ‘orientation’ in the
market-seeking orientation variable reflects the reality that subsidiaries may have a diverse
portfolio of purposes, which can include purposes falling into more than one category. The marketseeking orientation, thus, measures the proportion of a subsidiary’s purposes falling into the
market-seeking category, allowing us to determine whether a subsidiary has more market-seeking
orientation than another subsidiary. Results regarding investment purpose diversity and marketseeking orientation thus contribute to the global strategy literature by reemphasizing past attention
to an important aspect of MNEs investments—investment purpose. The measures introduced here
can inform future research in the area.
For practitioners, the empirical evidence suggests that investments in Africa have a higher
probability of exit than those in OECD countries. Given the rather paradoxical anecdotal evidence
and reports regarding both the merits and hazards of entering the African market, the findings
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provide some clarity. The crux of the study, however, is about how subsidiaries can mitigate the
hazards of operating in the African market. Accordingly, it finds that subsidiaries with diverse
investment purposes are in a better position to deal with institutional voids/instability in Africa
and accordingly have an even lower chance of exit than their counterparts in the OECD market.
Further, subsidiaries entering the African market with a greater market-seeking orientation are
more likely to develop local networks and build a better local knowledge base, thus lowering their
exit likelihood.
The robustness of the findings to variations in the study sample and model specification were
examined. Not all African countries have similar levels of institutional voids and institutional
instability. To examine whether the results are driven by potential outliers in the sample, the
models were reestimated for different sample compositions. To assess whether results might be
influenced by an unusual data distribution in one or more countries, alternative paired-matches
were developed. The models were rerun after five countries with the lowest and highest average
values for institutional voids and institutional instability variables had been removed. While the
values of the estimates did fluctuate, their signs and statistical significances remained unaltered.
Models were rerun by replacing the entry to Africa variable with institutional voids and
institutional instability variables. Once again, the results were consistent with the findings using
the entry to Africa variable.
While it produced some useful insights, the study is not without limitations. The use of subsidiaries
from only one country (i.e., Japan) may limit the generalizability of the findings to subsidiaries
from other countries. In fact, the characteristics and behaviors of subsidiaries from different places,
for example from developed countries and emerging countries, differs significantly (Wright et al.,
2005). As such, the study should be replicated using subsidiary and MNE data from other home
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countries. It should be noted, however, that the use of a single home country data served an
essential statistical purpose of controlling for variance arising from home-country heterogeneity.
Also, the purpose diversity and market-seeking orientation variables introduced in this paper need
to be further examined to verify the extent to which the measures used capture the essence of the
variables. As well, this study is limited to considering only formal institutions and an interesting
direction for future research is to study informal institutional voids and consider the potential
dynamics between formal and informal institutional voids.
A viable extension of this work would be to look at how developments in the institutional
conditions and competitive intensity across African countries influence the exit likelihood of
subsidiaries and examine whether the moderating effects of investment purpose diversity and
market-seeking orientation change accordingly. A growing number of African countries are
continuously liberalizing their economies, with new regulations replacing the old ones (McKinsey
Global Institute, 2010). Also, MNEs from advanced countries are increasingly witnessing
competition arising from emerging market MNEs, including those from Africa. It would be
interesting to study the comparative pace of growth in the level of competition and institutional
development and accordingly identify suitable strategies for better performance and survival.
Further extensions and refinements are also possible regarding the investment purpose diversity
and the market-seeking orientation variables introduced in this paper. For example, as illustrated
in the Appendix, the purpose diversity measure includes within-purpose diversity and betweenpurpose diversity. Future research needs to explore the potential contributions of each component
with respect to adaptability and/or flexibility. Relatedly, future research needs to explore the extent
to which diversity of purpose may help respond to or fill institutional voids. Whereas diversity can
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provide flexibility advantages, too much diversity is likely to introduce complications in
coordination and management (Grant, Jammine, and Thomas, 1988; Markides, 1992).
In closing, this study demonstrates that the strategy of entering the African market, on average,
increases exit probability. However, subsidiaries with more diverse investment purpose and/or
greater market-seeking orientation have a lower exit likelihood than their counterparts. In short,
the study suggests that subsidiaries can mitigate the hazards of institutional voids/instability by
having diverse investment purposes and/or greater market-seeking orientation.
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APPENDIX. PURPOSE DIVERSITY MEASURE5
Consider a firm having N investment purposes. The entropy measure of purpose diversity is
given by the following function:
PD=  Pi ln(1 / Pi )
i 1

Where, Pi is the share of attention given to the ith investment purpose. Here it was assumed that
equal attention is given to each purpose. A useful feature of the entropy measure is its ability to
consider both the number of the investment purposes and the degree of relatedness among them.
Dunning’s (1998) classification of investment motives was used to categorize the purposes. The
classification includes four categories and in the data there is another category called ‘others’
which includes purposes which cannot clearly fall into any of the four motives. The purposes
within a motive category are more related to one another than purposes across categories. The N
investment purposes thus aggregate into M motive categories (see Table 3 in the paper).
Total diversification is a sum of related diversification and unrelated diversification. To calculate
related diversification (within category diversity), two steps were followed:
1st. calculate diversity under each category.
DRj=  Pj i ln(1 / Pj i )
iej

Where, Pji is the share of a purpose in a motive category. For example, if a subsidiary has two
purposes in the market-seeking category, then Pji will be ½.
2nd. Sum diversification scores of each segment
M

RD   DR j Pj
j 1

Where, Pj is the share of a category from the total set of categories. For example, if a subsidiary
has a market-seeking motive, a resource-seeking motive, and an efficiency-seeking motive, then
Pj is 1/3.
Unrelated diversification measures how subsidiary’s purposes spread across diverse categories
and is measured by the following:
M

DU   Pj ln(1 / Pj )
j 1

So, total diversification equals the sum of RD + DU. This is the investment purpose diversity
variable used in the paper.

5

The procedures used here are adapted from Palepu (1985)
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To illustrate, let us calculate diversification scores of four hypothetical cases.
Case 1 (a subsidiary’s general manager reported seven purposes spread across three motive
categories)
Resource seeking

Efficiency seeking

P1

P3

P2

P4

Market seeking

Strategic-asset seeking Other

P5

P6

P7

DR (resource seeking)=  Pj i ln(1 / Pj i ) = (1/2) ln(2) + (1/2) ln(2) = ln(2) = 0.69
iej

DR(Efficiency seeking)=

 Pji ln(1 / Pji ) = (1/3)ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) =1.0986
iej

DR(Strategic) =

 Pji ln(1 / Pji ) = (1/2) ln(2) + (1/2) ln(2) = ln(2) = 0.69
iej

M

Therefore, RD= RD   DR j Pj = 0.69(1/3) + 1.0986(1/3) + 0.69(1/3) = 0.8262
j 1

M

DU   Pj ln(1 / Pj ) = (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) + 1/3) ln(3) = ln(3) =1.0986
j 1

Total purpose diversity = RD + DU = 0.8262 + 1.0986 = 1.9248
Case 2 (a subsidiary’s general manager reported five purposes spread across two motive
categories)
Resource seeking

Efficiency seeking

P1

P3

P2

P4

Market seeking

Strategic-asset seeking

P5

DR (resource seeking)=  Pj i ln(1 / Pj i ) = (½) ln(2) + (½) ln(2) = ln(2) = 0.69
iej

DR(Efficiency seeking)=

 Pji ln(1 / Pji ) = (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3)ln(3) =1.0986
iej

M

Therefore, RD= RD   DR j Pj = 0.69(1/2) + 1.0986(1/2) = 0.8943
j 1

M

DU   Pj ln(1 / Pj ) = (1/2) ln(2) + (1/2) ln(2) = ln(2) = 0.69
j 1

Total purpose diversity = RD + DU = 0.8943 + 0.69 = 1.5843
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Case 3 (a subsidiary’s general manager reported three purposes all in the same motive
category)
Resource seeking
Other

Efficiency seeking
P3

DR(Efficiency seeking)=

P4

Market seeking

Strategic-asset seeking

P5

 Pji ln(1 / Pji ) = (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3) ln(3) + (1/3)ln(3) =1.0986
iej

M

Therefore, RD= RD   DR j Pj = ln(3) (1/1) = 1.0986
j 1

M

DU   Pj ln(1 / Pj ) = (1/1) ln(1) = ln(1)= 0
j 1

Total purpose diversity = RD + DU = 1.0986 + 0 = 1.0986
Case 4 (a subsidiary’s general manager reported single purpose in a single motive category)
Resource seeking
Other

Efficiency seeking

Market seeking

P4
DR(Efficiency seeking)=

 Pji ln(1 / Pji ) = (1/1) ln(1) = ln(1) = 0
iej

M

Therefore, RD= RD   DR j Pj = 0 (1/1) = 0
j 1

M

DU   Pj ln(1 / Pj ) = (1/1) ln(1) = ln(1)= 0
j 1

Total purpose diversity = RD + DU = 0 + 0 = 0
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CHAPTER THREE
Host-Country Income Distribution and Exit Rates of Market-Seeking Subsidiaries: The UCurve Hypothesis
INTRODUCTION
The issue of income inequality has captured the attention of numerous scholars and philosophers
across multiple disciplines. Simon Kuznets and Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureates in Economics in
1971 and 2001 respectively, and many other prominent academics have studied the issue and made
theoretical contributions. As well, theories of class and economic inequality have been featured in
the works of influential philosophers and thought leaders such as Rousseau, Weber, Marx, and
Rawls, among others. From economics to sociology and to epidemiology, different disciplines
have considered societal income inequality as a relevant area of investigation. However, the
organization and management fields have been largely silent on this issue (Bidwell, Briscoe,
Fernandez-Mateo, and Sterling, 2013; Davis, 2015). This is curious for at least two reasons. First,
increasing levels of income inequality around the world have been attributed, at least partly, to the
practices and policies of organizations (Bidwell et al., 2013; Davis and Cobb, 2010). Second,
organization and management scholars have at their disposal an ‘interdisciplinary tool kit’(Bidwell
et al., 2013) and ‘an impressive set of mechanisms’ (Davis, 2015) to study such socio-economic
phenomena as income inequality.
Most studies of income inequality have naturally featured macro-economic issues, paying little
attention to its relationship with economic organizations (See Davis and Cobb, 2010; Sorensen
and Sorenson, 2007 for exceptions). Even more limited is our understanding of how income
inequality relates to organizational performance. One potential approach to fill this gap is by
extending arguments from existing theory on the relationship of income inequality and economic
growth. Yet existing literature in the area offers conflicting suggestions. Increasing inequality
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promotes market/economic efficiency (Okun, 1975; Welch, 1999), hence contributing to better
organizational performance. On the other hand, increasing inequality engenders socio-economic
pressures that may adversely affect performance (Bowles, 2012; Klasen, 2008). Such divergent
perspectives may indicate that the relationship between income inequality and organizational
performance may not be simple and that a linear specification could be misleading. This study
seeks to empirically explore this possibility. Using data on Japanese market-seeking subsidiaries
operating in 47 countries, the study examines the relationship between income inequality and
foreign subsidiary exit. It also investigates whether this relationship is moderated by the level of
host-country institutional development.
This study is important in at least three fundamental ways. First, it responds to calls for
organizational and management research to look into pressing challenges facing society (e.g.,
Davis, 2014; Walsh, Weber, and Margolis, 2003) and examine the potential interaction between
income inequality and institutional development (Lawrence et al., 2015). In fact, Walsh et al.,
(2003) lamented the lack of attention to social issues in management scholarship and urged future
research to rediscover the ‘lost cause’ of management research. Rising income inequality has
increasingly become a practical concern in a number of societies. In these societies, top income
earners are taking an increasingly greater share of the productivity gains and as a result the middle
class that once fostered business growth is rapidly shrinking. Some consider this trend a by-product
of the shareholder capitalism in which stockholders and their agents (i.e., managers) are getting
the upper hand in the power struggle and thus a greater share of the residual surplus (e.g., Bidwell
et al., 2013).
Excessive inequality is associated with wide-ranging social ills, such as reduced levels of life
expectancy, social mobility, and school performance and higher degrees of anxiety, mental illness,
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and high-school dropouts, among others (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). Perrow (1991) argued that
“organizations have absorbed much of society” (p.1). As such, they too can experience the
implications of the challenges facing society. This study seeks to explore this possibility. Davis
(2015) emphasized the fruitfulness of such research in organization and management. Potential
results can inform public policy on income inequality, institutional development, and national
competitiveness.
Second, in examining the potential influence of income distribution on market-seeking
subsidiaries, the study advances the notion that the effects of environmental variables can be best
understood by identifying a form of organization for which such variables are more relevant.
Research regarding the organization-environment relationship can benefit by first specifying
which aspect of the environment is most relevant to the particular form of organization
(Castrogiovanni, 1991). Market-seeking subsidiaries differ from other forms of subsidiaries in at
least two fundamental ways. Structurally, they tend to operate as standalone units, loosely coupled
both with other subsidiaries in their respective MNE network and with their respective parent firms
(Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). As a result, a decision to terminate market-seeking subsidiaries is
likely to have a relatively little, if any, effects on the operations of the MNE’s network of
subsidiaries. Strategically, market-seeking subsidiaries are undertaken to serve particular markets
by local production and distribution, rather than by exporting from the home country or from a
third country (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). As such, they tend to
rely heavily on host-country market and institutional conditions. Therefore, such variables as hostcountry income distribution and institutional development are relevant aspects of their operating
environment.
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The availability of a sufficient market in a host country is important, especially for market-seeking
subsidiaries, in deciding to invest and continue operation there. Determining market potential in
advance is difficult, and some indicators are used for the purpose. Existing literature has largely
relied on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Per Capita Income (PCI) figures (e.g., Brouthers,
Gao, and McNicol, 2008). Often, both serve as useful indicators of host-country market
attractiveness. Nonetheless, they do have limitations, not least of which is their sensitivity to
outliers. An increase in the income of few wealthy households in a country may increase the total
(i.e., GDP) and average (i.e., PCI) national incomes and give a wrong impression that the actual
income of the average households has increased over the period. Since such aggregate figures do
not provide information about the sources of increased GDP, perceived market potential may be
overstated. Income distribution figures, in contrast, provide information about the distribution of
income, about what percentage of the income goes to what percentage of the society. Therefore,
they can provide a more refined insight about demand (spending) patterns and investment potential
of a market.
Third, in trying to answer the research questions, the study integrates insights from the
environmental munificence literature and the new institutional economics. Such integration
leverages the underlying theoretical synergies and responds to calls for a joint consideration of
economic and ecological perspectives (Barron, West, and Hannan, 1994; Ulrich & Barney, 1984).
Indeed, the interdisciplinary nature of the phenomenon under consideration (i.e., income
inequality) demands such an approach. The study draws on insights from the literature on
environmental munificence (e.g., Castrogiovanni, 1991; Dess and Beard, 1984) to develop
arguments for the relationship between host-country income distribution and exit probability of
market-seeking subsidiaries. Loosely integrated to the global value-chain of their respective
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MNEs, market-seeking subsidiaries face more acute selection pressures arising both from their
exposure to local environments and from their loose integration with parents (Bradley et al., 2011).
In presenting arguments on how institutional development interacts with income distribution to
influence subsidiary exit, the study builds on mechanisms from the new institutional economics
(e.g., North, 1990; Williamson, 1981).
The following section presents a brief review of related literature, development of theoretical
foundations, and discussion of arguments leading to the research hypotheses. These are followed
by discussion of the research design, which specifies the research context, data and sample,
empirical model, and the statistical approach used to test the hypotheses. Next, results are
presented along with discussions of their implications. The study concludes by discussing
theoretical and practical contributions, highlighting limitations, and suggesting directions for
future research.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Market-seeking subsidiary
Of general interest in this paper are foreign subsidiaries operating in their respective host countries.
However, not all foreign subsidiaries operating in a given host country have similar resource
requirements; nor are they equally (or similarly) dependent on what the host-country has to offer.
As a result, clustering foreign subsidiaries into a single group can be problematic. In fact, the
purpose for which subsidiaries are formed and their mandates determines the level of dependence
on and interaction with their host-country environment (Dunning and Lundan, 2008). For example,
subsidiaries with a (natural) resource-seeking motive tend to be a part of their respective parents’
supply-chain and thus have operations closely synchronized with those of the parent MNEs and
‘sister’ subsidiaries (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). To that end, the study focused only on market74
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seeking foreign subsidiaries since such subsidiaries tend to operate as standalone units, with
several value-chain activities located in the same host country, and depend more heavily on hostcountry market and institutional conditions (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010).
Nachum and Zaheer (2005) identify several potential explanations for foreign market-seeking
investments, all of which relate to market failure of one sort or another (Williamson, 1981).
Imposition by the host government of import restrictions is one of the reasons for MNEs to
establish market-seeking subsidiaries in the host country, as such restrictions make infeasible
servicing a particular market via exports. Another factor behind market-seeking investments is the
need to reduce transaction costs, for example those arising from transportation and associated
uncertainties. Entry of market-seeking subsidiaries to their respective host country is also driven
by the need for geographic proximity to the target market. Such proximity can facilitate easier (and
better) access to information about the needs and wants of actual and potential customers. Viability
of market-seeking subsidiaries rests, in large part, on whether the parent MNE is achieving its
purposes through the subsidiary and is getting net-benefits from its investments. Generally, foreign
firms are quick to adapt to unfavourable environmental aspects in the host country by terminating
their subsidiaries operating there (Mata and Freitas, 2012). This is especially true of firms having
market-seeking investments in the host country, as the strategic importance of such subsidiaries is
decidedly linked to the host-country environment and their termination has little, if any, impact on
the global MNE network (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010).
International business (IB) research has identified a host of factors explaining subsidiary
exit/survival. Organizing these factors by levels—namely subsidiary, firm, and country—can
facilitate better understanding. Factors at the subsidiary level include ownership (level and mode)
(Guar and Lu, 2007), entry mode (acquisition or greenfield) (Slangen and Hennart, 2008), level of
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diversification (Li, 1995), industry relatedness to the parent (Lu and Xu, 2006), host-country
experience and learning (Kim, Lu, and Rhee, 2012), and possession of intangible assets (Delios
and Beamish, 2001). Included in the firm-level factors category are parent experience (Guar and
Lu, 2007; Delios and Beamish, 2001), parent age and size (Lu and Xu, 2006), and sister subsidiary
experience (Kim et al., 2012). Host-country level factors include local density and competition
(Miller and Eden, 2006), level of economic development relative to home country (Tsang and Yip,
2007), and institutional development (Cuervo-Cazurra and Dau, 2009). All these factors can
explain exit of market-seeking subsidiaries. Nonetheless, given that such subsidiaries are
substantially different from their counterparts in terms of both structure and strategy, it is possible
to find some factors that apply more to these subsidiaries than to other forms of subsidiaries
(Castrogiovanni, 1991). This research argues that host-country income distribution is one such
factor and seeks to examine its relationship with the exit likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries.
The study uses the concept of environmental munificence to frame its argument on how an aspect
of the host-country environment (i.e., income distribution) relates with exit likelihood of marketseeking subsidiaries. Environment munificence refers to the level of resources available and is
usually measured by industry or economy growth (Dess and Beard, 1984; Castrogiovanni, 1991).
The study considers host-country munificence. Host-country munificence reflects the ability of the
host-country resources and markets to support sustained growth (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Less
munificent host countries are characterized by shortage of resources, stagnating or declining
demand, and environmental threats (Goll and Rasheed, 2005). The study argues that host-country
munificence for market-seeking subsidiaries varies with the levels of income distribution. Such
variation reflects the overall stock of resources and demand available for market-seeking
subsidiaries operating in the host country. Host-country resources include productive inputs (e.g.,
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local human, material, and capital resources), marketing resources (e.g., distribution outlets and
customer base), and information resources (e.g., accurate and timely policy-related information)
(Luo, 2003). The level of resource munificence (or scarcity) corresponding to different levels of
income distribution can determine the survival and growth of market-seeking subsidiaries in the
host country (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003).
The decision mechanism involving termination of market-seeking subsidiaries is different from
that of other types of subsidiaries. Natural (resource)-seeking subsidiaries, for example, represent
a vertically integrated extension of the parent firm and consequently exit decisions of such
subsidiaries has to consider not just the host-country performance of the focal subsidiary but the
role it plays in the global supply chain of the parent firm as well (Brouthers et al. 2008). As a
result, a firm may decide against terminating such subsidiaries even if they register a sub-par
performance in their host-country operations. Such complications are not likely to feature in the
exit decisions of market-seeking subsidiaries. That is, because of their limited, if any, integration
with the global supply-chain of the firm, their exit decisions is likely to be based on their present
performance/future prospects (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Further, unlike other types of
subsidiaries, market-seeking subsidiaries tend to locate several value-chain activities in the host
country (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010). These peculiar properties of
market-seeking subsidiaries suggest the importance of considering host-country munificence.
Ultimately, the decision to terminate market-seeking subsidiaries is likely to be contingent on their
host-country performance, which in turn depends on host-country munificence.
Through the process of making available or withholding resources, environments influence
organizations (Aldrich, 1979). The relationship between the host-country environment and marketseeking subsidiaries, therefore, can be couched as the interface between the subsidiaries and
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sources of host-country resources. Given that market-seeking subsidiaries tend to target market
opportunities in the host country and perform several value-chain activities there, their long-term
performance depends on resource provisions from the ecosystem of suppliers, partners,
distributors, consumers (Pierce, 2009). These entities largely determine the level of host-country
munificence. High munificence environments allow management to pursue opportunities and
perform activities that will enhance the firm’s value (Brauer and Wiersema, 2012). In contrast,
low munificent environments limit management’s ability to pursue additional value-generating
opportunities. In such environments termination of a subsidiary is considered a viable strategic
alternative as the firm might want to redirect its resources and capabilities to locations/subsidiaries
with greater potential (Brauer and Wiersema, 2012). In fact, such behavior is indicative of the
selection pressure subsidiaries face at the corporate level and is consistent with the argument that
in such multi-level entities as MNEs, Darwinian selection processes at the unit (subsidiary) level
may lead to adaptions at the corporate (MNE) level (Usher and Evans, 1996).
Income distribution and subsidiary exit
A limited amount of research has attempted to examine the relationship between national income
distribution and organizations. Sociologists, for example, have documented how inequality in a
society is accounted for by differences and changes in compensation across organizations (for a
review, see Carroll and Hannan, 2000). Sorensen and Sorenson (2007) examined the link between
corporate demography (i.e., the number and variety of organizations operating in a region) and
income inequality. They found that increases in the number of firms within industries correspond
to higher income inequality within the society; whereas, increases in the number of industries
within a given economy decreases inequality levels. Likewise, Davis and Cobb (2010) argued that
changes in the relative size of the largest organizations in an economy corresponds to changes in
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income inequality. They noted that economies with a higher proportion of the labour force
employed by large organizations face lower levels of income inequality.
Informative though these studies are, they sought to explain income inequality. These studies
investigated how the nature and configuration of organizations influence the distribution of
income. Given that social issues are central to research in sociology, the emphasis on income
distribution as a dependent variable is justified. The intended contribution is, however, to the
organization and management field in general and to IB/strategy in particular. As such, the study
emphasizes organizational performance and examine if and how it is related to host-country
income distribution. To better understand this relationship, the following conscious decisions were
made: (a) at a conceptual level, the study looks at market-seeking subsidiaries as they target local
demand for which host-country income distribution is a more relevant environmental variable and
(b) at an empirical level, the study considers a long-term performance measure (i.e., exit) as it is
less likely to have the effect of income inequality reflected in short-term performance measures
(You and Khagram, 2005).

To establish arguments about the relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit, the
study draws on prior studies regarding the relationship between income inequality and economic
growth. The decision to draw on this stream of literature is appropriate given that host-country
market potential, often proxied by economic growth (e.g., Brouthers et al. 2008), is a relevant
consideration for market-seeking subsidiaries. A number of studies documented the relationship
between income inequality and economic growth (e.g., Easterly, 2007; Okun, 1975). Research in
the area offers conflicting perspectives, however. For example, an IMF study reports that greater
income inequality is strongly associated with shorter spells of economic growth (Berg et al., 2014).
The study finds that a 50 percent decrease in the inequality levels of some of the most unequal
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nations could lead to a 200 percent longer duration of economic growth. In contrast, others argue
that inequality is vital for a given economy and forms the basic foundations on which strong
economies lie. Okun (1975), for example, noted that more efficiency comes at the expense of
greater inequality. Welch (1999) wrote along the same lines: “It is not much of an exaggeration to
say that all of economics results from inequality. Without inequality…there would be no trade, no
specialization, and no surplus….” (p.2).
The presence of divergent perspectives about the relationship between inequality and economic
performance may be indicative of a non-linear model specification. In fact, Banerjee and Duflo
(2003) examined data used to study the relationship and found that linear structures were wrongly
imposed on the data. This finding helped explain, in part, the mixed results regarding the
relationship between inequality and economic growth. Similarly, Hasanov and Izraeli (2011),
using a longitudinal data of 48 U.S. states, found a non-linear relationship between inequality and
economic growth showing that a rise from a lower level to an average level of income inequality
increases growth, while any increase in inequality above the average level decreases growth.
Integrating insights gleaned from these studies with the notion of environmental munificence
discussed earlier, this study argues that income distribution has a non-monotonic relationship with
the exit probability of foreign subsidiaries. That is, highly egalitarian and highly dispersed income
distribution are associated with decreased levels of host-country munificence in the form of
resources and demand, thus increasing the exit probability of market-seeking subsidiaries. In
contrast, intermediate levels of income distribution correspond to greater host-country
munificence and thus lower likelihood of exit for market-seeking subsidiaries. Hence, the study
argues that income distribution is transitively associated with foreign subsidiary exit through its
influences on environmental munificence. Below, the nature of the proposed relationship is
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examined in fair detail by considering host-country munificence associated with shifts to and away
from two extreme states of income distribution.
Highly egalitarian income distribution
An increase in income inequality from a low level can release resources and expand the
munificence of the host-country environment. To elaborate this argument, consistent with Hannan,
Carroll, & Polos (2003), the study identified three relevant aspects inherent to the environment in
which market-seeking subsidiaries conduct their business: customers (demand), access to qualified
and motivated labour force, and availability of related (or supporting) local businesses. An increase
in income inequality from a very low level can broaden the potential market available for the
foreign subsidiaries. Economic historians have documented how a growing middle class ushered
in a period of remarkable business and economic growth (Adelman & Morris, 1967; Landes,
1998). The introduction of industrial society and the development of financial structures led to
increasing income inequality (Barro, 2000). These increases were largely due to increased
economic productivity, which allocated an increased share of wealth to the middle class. This in
turn created a strong and stable demand for products and services provided by companies, thereby
creating a virtuous cycle (Landes, 1998).
With an increased allocation of wealth to the middle class comes a greater perceived incentive for
education and training (Bapuji, 2015). This can boost both public and individual investments in
education, resulting in an increased supply (i.e., both quantity and quality) of labour for
subsidiaries. The incentive for developing skills and knowledge also influences labour markets
inside each subsidiary and across the population. As well, motivation of and competition among
workers in both the internal and external labour markets can contribute positively to subsidiary
and population performance. Friedman (1962) argued that inequality encourages people to have
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higher aspirations and work harder, thereby increasing productivity. Also, research indicates that
the success of innovative activities vitally relies on location-bound factors, such as labour market
conditions (Porter, 2011).
Another important component in the host country of market-seeking subsidiaries is the availability
of local industries and firms to support the foreign subsidiary population. Since market-seeking
subsidiaries tend to perform several functions—including procurement, production, and
marketing—in the host country, the presence of related industries and organizations is crucial.
Delgado, Porter, & Stern (2010) argued that a presence of strong clusters (i.e., a large presence of
related industries) is associated with the growth and survival of start-up firms. Lippmann, Davis,
and Aldrich (2005) identified two types of entrepreneurship activities in a host country:
opportunity-driven and necessity-driven. Local ventures established to support a population of
foreign subsidiaries seek to take advantage of the special needs of the population and thus are
likely to be opportunity-driven. They found an inverted-U shape relationship between economic
inequalities and the formation and growth of opportunity-driven businesses in that the relationship
is positive at lower levels of income distribution. This finding is consistent with the argument that
highly egalitarian income distribution limits the incentives to saving and investment (e.g., Bowles,
2012) and suggests that as inequality increases from low levels, the formation and growth of related
industries is likely to increase. This in turn can expand the resource base (or factor pool) for
market-seeking subsidiaries, thus decreasing their exit likelihood.

Highly dispersed income distribution
A rise in income inequality after a threshold level can influence the aggregate demand available to
a population of market-seeking subsidiaries. As more income increasingly gets into the hands of
the few, a greater majority of the society will have a smaller share of the total income of the country
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and thus will have a lower ability to consume (You and Khagram, 2005). The propensity to
consume concept suggests that high income people have a higher tendency of saving, thus a lower
propensity of consumption, than low income people (Stiglitz, 2009). If host-country consumption
is lacking, MNEs will see little reason to support their market-seeking subsidiary operating there.
This is especially true given that MNEs’ internal capital market seeks to efficiently allocate capital
across the available network of investments, thus posing a greater selection pressure on the marketseeking subsidiaries with sub-par prospects (Bradley et al., 2011; Williamson, 1981). Hence, as
host-country income inequality becomes excessively high, so does the probability of relocating
MNE resources away from the subsidiary operating there, thus increasing its exit likelihood.
Lippmann et al. (2005) finding of an inverted-U shape relationship between income inequality and
the formation and growth of opportunity-driven businesses suggests that after a certain level, any
increase in income inequality leads to a lower number and growth of opportunity-driven local
businesses. A reduction in the number of local business to support the population of foreign
subsidiaries represents a contraction in the munificence of the host country (Castrogiovanni, 1991).
Such contraction deprives market-seeking subsidiaries of access to quality inputs, reduced prices,
and opportunities for subcontracting and outsourcing (Pe’er, Vertinsky, and Keil, 2016). These
limitations are likely to adversely affect their efficiency and exert selection pressures both at the
local and corporate levels.
In addition, the presence of relational resources such as trust reflects the munificence of the hostcountry environment. Trust is usually the basis on which interactions of firms are established
(Powell, 1996). Not all interactions of businesses are contractual, however. Even when there are
contractual bases, not every issue is in the purview of a contract. Consequently, dealing with local
suppliers, distributors, and partners requires a certain element of trust. Trust helps decrease
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transaction costs (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998). A very high income inequality has been
shown to damage this important element. Costa and Kahun (2003), for example, found that greater
income inequality erodes the levels of trust and civic participation in a society. Such eroded trust
may prove detrimental to businesses. Fukuyama (1995) suggested that organizations operating in
a society characterized by a higher level of trust fare better than those operating in low-trust
societies.
Also, high income inequality affects the quality and quantity of human resource available for
subsidiaries. At higher levels of inequality, human capital development, investment on education,
and employee motivation become very low (Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999). A highly
dispersed income distribution can also give way to socio-political instability and increased political
risks that may pose threats to subsidiary survival. Such instability has the potential to discourage
saving and investment and limit business transactions. It may also exert pressures on governments
to get involved in efforts of income redistribution—efforts that may deter capital accumulation
and investment (Bénabou, 1996). Recently, Davis (2015) argued that highly dispersed
income/wealth distribution is associated with business exit:
In the United States, …income inequality and wealth inequality are at their
highest levels in a century…major employers go bankrupt (General Motors,
Chrysler) or disappear entirely (Circuit City, Borders, Eastman Kodak,
Blockbuster), to be replaced by pop-up businesses with the size and lifespan of a
fruit fly….( p. 6)
Taken together, an increase in income inequality from very low levels is likely to result in a release
of resources and a more munificent environment with respect to market demand, labour market
conditions, and ecosystem of related and support industries, all of which are critical for marketseeking subsidiaries. Such improvement in munificence is, however, only to a certain threshold
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level of income inequality. The marginal contribution of income inequality in expanding hostcountry resource base diminishes as income inequality increases and is likely to be negative at
extremely high levels of income inequality. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: A U-shaped relationship will exist between the national income
distribution level and the exit probability of market seeking
subsidiaries.
Income inequality and free-market institutional development
As with the levels of income inequality, the institutional development of host countries ranges
from very low to very high levels. However, the relationship between income inequality and the
development of economic institutions does not appear to be straightforward. According to standard
measures, nations such as the Netherlands and most Scandinavian countries do have welldeveloped market-supporting institutions along with relatively lower levels of income inequality.
In contrast, other countries such as Singapore and Chile have relatively well-developed market
institutions, but with higher levels of income inequality (see, for example, the data summarized in
Table 7). Nonetheless, income inequality and institutional development levels can interact to
influence the success of foreign subsidiaries (Lawrence et al., 2015). As argued above, highly
egalitarian/dispersed income distribution can limit environmental munificence of the host country.
Institutions are likely to provide mechanisms to mitigate the resource limitation which such
extreme income distributions may generate.
Institutions provide formal and informal rules of the game that structure interactions between or
among agents, including organizations (North, 1990). At a country level, institutional development
generally refers to the extent to which incentive mechanisms are in place to support market
operations (North, 1990; Shinkle and Kriauciunas, 2010). Institutions reduce transaction and
information costs associated with exchanges, thereby reducing uncertainty and establishing a
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stable structure of exchanges (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha, 2005). In countries of high institutional
development, markets are more efficient and costs associated with regulatory burdens, information
asymmetries, property right protection, partner search, and contract enforcement are relatively
lower (Xu and Meyer, 2013).
The extent to which highly egalitarian/dispersed income distribution discourages the formation of
local support and related industries is likely to be dependent on the level of host-country
institutional development. The effect is likely to be less pronounced in host countries with high
institutional development, as ease of obtaining licenses, tax advantages, regulation reliefs and so
forth encourages the formation of new businesses and thus expand the opportunity for marketseeking subsidiaries to access useful inputs and complementary services (Hoskinson et al., 2000;
Khanna et al., 2005). Further, strong property rights in such countries provide incentives for
investment and property ownership (Bowles, 2012) and hence market-seeking subsidiaries
operating in these countries are likely to be constrained less by extreme income distribution in
accessing resources from related and/or supporting industries. In countries with less developed
institutions, the absence of a strong and reliable legal system to protect property rights is likely to
exacerbate the effects of extreme income distribution on the availability of related and/or
supporting industries (Lippmann et al. 2005).
Also, stronger protection of property rights and enforcement of contracts in institutionally
developed locations facilitates the interaction of market-seeking subsidiaries with local
support/related industries and reduces associated transaction costs (Williamson, 1981). Such
benefits can compensate for challenges arising from, for example, resource contractions at higher
levels of income inequality. Subsidiaries operating in countries with less-developed institutions
operate under inefficient judicial systems and thus are more likely to suffer the consequences of
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exchange partners’ opportunistic behaviours (Williamson, 1981). For market-seeking subsidiaries
operating in host-countries with extreme income inequality, such hazard is likely to compound the
already greater selection pressure and increase exit likelihood. Efficient judicial systems encourage
arm’s length transactions and greater cooperation between partners (Khanna et al., 2005). In the
absence of such a system, foreign subsidiaries need to use alternative mechanisms such as
leveraging the potential of trust in cooperative undertakings (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone, 1998).
Nonetheless, extreme levels of income inequality are likely to compromise trust and make for an
even worse situation (Costa and Kahun, 2003). In locations of well-developed institutions,
however, the downsides of depressed trust occasioned by extreme income inequality can be offset
by the presence of an efficient judiciary system.
Another key element in defining the long-term performance of market-seeking subsidiaries is the
presence of an attractive product market (i.e., demand) in the host country. North’s (1990)
economic institutional theory argues that the economic performance differences between nations
are due largely to differences in their institutions. Better national economic performance presents
market opportunities to be exploited by market-seeking subsidiaries (Brouthers et al. 2008).
Further, high income inequality in countries with high institutional development does not
necessarily imply decreased aggregate demand (or purchasing ability). The availability of credit
and related financial instruments in such countries makes for easier access to products and services.
Heathcote, Perri, & Violante (2010) find that in institutionally developed countries, such as the
US, access to financial markets and instruments substantially limited the effects of income
inequality over consumption inequality. Consequently, market-seeking subsidiaries operating in
institutionally developed host countries may be less likely to suffer from limited aggregate demand
associated with highly egalitarian/dispersed income distribution.
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The availability of a skilled and motivated workforce is another essential element determining the
munificence of the host country. Greater income inequality leads to lower human capital
accumulation and economic performance (Chiu, 1998). However, such a prediction is more likely
to be weaker in the context of institutionally developed countries. In such countries, better access
to education and related institutions may lead to a relatively higher human capital accumulation
even if there is a high level of inequality within the society. On the other hand, extreme income
inequality in institutionally developed countries may not necessarily lead to a lack of skilled human
power as such countries have a better potential to attract skilled labour from elsewhere. Also, the
potential negative effect of extreme inequality on motivation and life satisfaction tends to be
stronger in the institutionally under-developed countries than in the developed ones (Graham and
Felton 2005).
Taken together, the presence of well-developed institutional structures in a host country can
decrease transaction costs and promote better incentive alignment and protection of property
rights. As a result, the level of institutional development weakens the negative effects of extreme
income inequality on subsidiary exit such that subsidiaries operating in countries with higher levels
of institutional development are less likely to suffer from the negative consequences of extreme
income distributions. Likewise, foreign subsidiaries operating in countries with less developed
institutions are deprived of the potential benefits of institutions and are thus more exposed to the
negative effects of highly egalitarian/dispersed income distribution. These arguments lead to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The U-shaped relationship between income distribution and exit
probability of market-seeking subsidiaries will be negatively moderated by
the level of institutional development
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METHODS
Data and sample
This study uses a very large longitudinal dataset, published annually by Toyo Keizai Inc., on
Japanese subsidiaries throughout the world. To test the hypotheses, the study used 17 years of data
(the 1990– 2006 period). The dataset is suitable for this study for at least two reasons. First, a study
about the relationship of inequality and subsidiary exit benefits from cross-country comparisons.
The dataset provides subsidiary-, MNE-, and country-level data. Second, the time series nature of
the dataset enables the development of stronger causal attribution. Since the majority of Japanese
foreign investments were made not long before the start of the observation (Kim et al., 2012) and
subsidiary age data is included in the models (Guo, 1993), left-truncation was not a series concern.
The sample constitutes 6,699 Japanese market-seeking subsidiaries across 47 countries. In arriving
at this sample, several data cleaning procedures were conducted. The study used data only from
countries having a minimum of five subsidiaries so that the country-level inequality variable has
sufficient subsidiary-level data. It excluded countries for which inequality data are not available.
In addition, a list-wise deletion was applied for cases with missing data in any of the variables
under study. To ensure that the final sample includes only viable subsidiaries for which a study of
income inequality is more relevant, the study followed Beamish and Inkpen’s (1998) suggestion
and restricted its sample to subsidiaries having at least 20 employees. In addition, following
Woodcock, Beamish, and Makino (1994), the study removed subsidiaries with fewer than two
years of operation to consider only those subsidiaries that reached an initial period of stabilization.
Variables
The dependent variable consists of two components. The first represents the length of time in years
a subsidiary takes to cease operation or to be right censored (i.e., not cease operation within the
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time frame of the analysis). In the models, this is a random variable, whereas the censoring time
is fixed to the year 2006. The second component is a censoring indicator given by the following
function:

1 if Ti  U i
…………………………………………………………….(1)
0 if Ti  U i

i  

In the above function, δi represents a censoring result for a given subsidiary. A subsidiary is
assigned 1 if Ti, that is the number of years before experiencing the event (i.e., exit), is less than
Ui, that is the number of years covered by this study. If otherwise, a subsidiary is said to be rightcensored because there is no way to tell when that subsidiary will experience the event. The stset
function in STATA was used to declare the data to be survival-time data and consider two
components in combination. In line with previous studies that used the same dataset, the study
considered a subsidiary terminated when its records are no longer found in the dataset (Delios and
Beamish, 2001). The data we use for the study are published on a yearly basis, so this is the metric
for specifying time.
The key independent variable in this study is the level of inequality. The study used one of the
most commonly used measures of income inequality—the Gini coefficient. Also called the Gini
index, it measures the extent to which the income distribution of individuals or households in a
given society deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A coefficient of zero signifies complete
equality, whereas a coefficient of 100 represents a complete inequality. The Standardized World
Income Inequality Database (SWIIDv4) was used to collect Gini coefficients for the 47 countries
in the analysis. The database integrates inequality data from various sources and its coverage and
comparability is far better than other income inequality datasets (Solt, 2014).
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The study period was divided into three (i.e., 1990-1995, 1996-2001, and 2002-2006) and average
levels were used to represent the smoothed values of income inequality for the years in each period.
This approach is consistent with research in the area (Forbes 2000; You and Khagram, 2005) and
justified by at least two reasons. First, because exit decisions are likely to be based on trends
extending over several years, it is conceptually more appropriate to use averages over a longer
period rather than single year data. In fact, prior research on the distribution of income inequality
data suggests that variations within countries over time explained only a very small fraction of the
total variation (Li, Squire, and Zou, 1998). Second, averaging the data over a longer period helps
minimize measurement error. A substantial part of the variation in income inequality within
countries across time is likely to result from measurement errors and averaging helps to reduce it
(You and Khagram, 2005). By considering period averages, the study treats the Gini index as a
period-dependent variable in the models. That is, the hazard function for subsidiary i at time t is
dependent on the value of the respective Gini index for period p and the corresponding values of
the remaining variables in the model. The sensitivity of the results was tested by varying the
lengths of the periods used and findings remain qualitatively similar.
The moderating variable in the study is free-market institution development. The Heritage
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom measures were used to represent the level of free-market
institutional development (Kane, Holmes, and O’Grady, 2007). The index aggregates measures on
multiple aspects of economic freedom. It is a time series data providing indices from 1995
onwards. The index can assume values ranging from zero to 100, higher values indicating better
overall economic freedom.
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Table 7. Country-level data on number of subsidiaries, inequality, and institutions
Country
Rep of Korea
China
Hong Kong
Vietnam
Thailand
Singapore
Malaysia
Philippines
Indonesia
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Iran
Norway
Sweden
Denmark
UK
Ireland
Netherlands
Belgium
France
Germany
Switzerland
Portugal
Spain
Italy
Poland
Russian Fed.
Austria
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Turkey
Canada
USA
Mexico
Panama
Colombia
Venezuela
Peru
Chile
Brazil
Argentina
Egypt
Nigeria
South Africa
Australia
New Zealand
Subsidiaries
total

Region

Asia

Europe

North
America

South
America
Africa
Oceania
-

# of
sub.

Mean 1990-95

Mean 96-01

Mean 02-06
Gini

Inst.

351
1,271
314
69
694
440
319
171
356
69
9
9
8
6
15
7
280
5
78
60
121
242
16
11
42
45
5
11
18
12
14
7
91
1,108
55
13
7
9
5
9
134
13
9
14
7
133
17
6,699

30.9
42.4
34.7
34.0
45.0
38.4
42.8
41.0
33.4
48.6
31.7
32.3
44.3
22.9
22.2
23.6
33.8
33.2
25.8
23.8
28.7
26.7
30.6
31.8
33.0
32.1
28.0
37.6
28.7
21.5
29.6
43.5
28.3
34.6
47.4
50.4
48.3
40.3
51.8
50.1
51.9
42.3
31.9
45.0
55.9
29.7
31.9

30.5
46.3
43.9
35.0
42.5
38.3
44.2
44.4
32.7
48.8
29.3
34.0
42.8
23.9
23.2
22.3
34.3
32.0
24.1
26.4
28.1
26.7
28.2
35.2
34.3
34.0
29.3
41.2
26.3
25.5
29.3
41.5
30.6
36.9
48.0
50.4
50.3
42.5
54.0
50.3
51.8
44.7
33.9
47.2
55.9
30.8
33.4

30.9
52.9
46.0
38.2
41.5
40.6
41.3
43.2
34.1
49.0
30.2
38.5
41.7
24.9
23.3
23.0
34.5
31.1
26.4
26.3
27.4
27.8
28.1
36.1
31.8
33.8
30.7
40.4
26.8
26.1
27.9
40.8
31.7
37.2
46.0
49.5
51.0
41.5
50.8
48.9
49.7
44.9
32.8
42.4
56.6
31.6
32.9

67.9
53.0
89.5
47.3
64.9
88.2
60.9
58.4
53.5
52.1
55.4
61.6
43.6
66.6
70.3
73.5
78.7
80.9
74.5
69.0
59.9
69.7
79.2
64.1
68.3
63.8
60.9
51.2
68.5
66.4
63.7
53.3
69.4
79.3
64.8
66.4
61.9
49.2
63.2
77.3
61.9
56.2
54.8
49.3
64.8
78.3
81.5
-

Gini

Inst.

-

72.0
52.0
88.6
41.7
71.3
86.3
66.7
55.0
54.9
45.1
57.6
60.6
35.9
67.4
61.4
67.8
77.9
68.5
70.5
64.3
64.4
69.8
77.7
62.4
62.8
61.2
50.7
51.1
70.0
67.8
55.2
60.3
69.4
76.7
63.1
71.6
64.5
59.8
56.9
71.2
51.4
68.0
45.7
47.3
60.7
74.1
80.0

Source: SWIID, Heritage Foundation, and TK dataset
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Gini

Inst.

70.8
53.3
89.2
41.7
67.8
87.2
71.9
61.8
59.3
48.9
55.5
64.3
35.9
67.4
64.2
67.8
76.7
74.5
70.5
64.3
59.4
67.0
77.7
65.0
63.5
60.8
59.2
51.5
66.7
69.0
59.8
58.4
69.6
76.5
59.1
71.9
65.1
54.9
66.5
74.6
56.2
71.4
53.9
51.8
63.5
76
80.0
-

Gini
Grand
Mean
30.8
47.2
41.6
35.7
43.0
39.1
42.8
42.9
33.4
48.8
30.4
35.0
42.9
23.9
22.9
23.0
34.2
32.1
25.4
25.5
28.1
27.1
29.3
34.4
33.0
33.3
29.3
39.7
27.3
24.4
28.9
41.9
30.2
36.2
47.2
50.1
49.9
41.4
52.2
49.8
51.1
44.0
32.9
44.9
56.1
30.7
32.7
-

Inst.
Grand
Mean
70.2
52.8
89.1
43.6
68.0
87.2
66.5
58.4
55.9
48.7
56.2
62.2
38.5
67.1
65.3
69.7
77.8
74.6
71.8
65.9
61.2
68.8
78.2
63.8
64.9
61.9
56.9
51.3
68.4
67.7
59.6
57.3
71.5
77.5
62.3
70.0
63.8
54.6
62.2
74.4
56.5
65.2
51.5
49.5
63.0
76.1
80.5
-
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As with the inequality data, yearly disturbances were smoothed and period average values were
used. For the 1990-1995 period, there is only one observation and it was used in lieu of the period
average. The use of the economic freedom data as a measure of free-market institutional
development is common in management research (e.g., Meyer et al., 2009; Shinkle, Kriauciunas,
and Hundley, 2013). Also, the time series nature of the data makes it compatible with the
subsidiary and inequality data used.
To account for other possible alternative explanations of exit, several control variables from
multiple levels were introduced. First at the subsidiary-level, control variables were introduced for
a number of variables which have been shown to be theoretically related to the exit of subsidiaries.
Subsidiary age variable was used to control for subsidiary age as young firms have a higher
probability of dying than old ones (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982). As subsidiary size has been
shown to influence exit probability of organizations (Moulten and Thomas, 1993), the study
controlled for it using number of employees as its proxy. This variable is time-variant6 and is
logarithmically transformed to normalize the data distribution. Industry fixed effects were
introduced to account for differences in exit likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries associated
with industry attributes.
Parent-level controls were also introduced to account for alternative explanations of subsidiary
exit resulting from parent affiliation. Makino and Beamish (1998) found that the presence of
multiple foreign partners increases managerial complexity, thereby influencing exit. As such, the
study controlled for the number of foreign parents. Guar and Lu (2007) found a statistically

To ensure that data on time-varying variables correspond to data on the variables of interest (i.e., income inequality and
institutional development), period average values were used. Therefore, the time-varying variables vary across the three
periods under consideration. Such approach is also logical as, in the dataset, the time-varying variables under
consideration tend to vary in a fairly longer period than a year.
6
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significant relationship between foreign-parent ownership level and subsidiary exit probability.
Therefore, the study controlled for the level of foreign ownership in subsidiaries. Larger parents
may have greater flexibility in reallocating resources among a broader portfolio of global
subsidiaries (Delios and Beamish, 1999). Thus, parent size control was introduced and was proxied
by the number of employees of the parent company. The parent size variable is time-variant and
is logarithmically transformed to normalize the distribution. The study also introduced parent
international experience variable as it has been shown to be related to subsidiary exit probability
(Guar and Lu, 2007). The variable is measured as the combined number of years of international
experience possessed by parent(s) prior to the establishment of a focal subsidiary. Intangible assets
of the parent can also influence exit probability of its subsidiary (Delios & Beamish, 1999). As
such, a parent-level research and development (R&D) intensity variable was included. This
variable is measured as a ratio of R&D expenditure to the total sales.
Time and country fixed effects were also introduced. To control for the effects of time and crisis
on the exit probability of subsidiaries, the study included period fixed effects. It did so by
introducing two dummies for the three periods under consideration (i.e., 1990-1995, 1996-2001,
and 2002-2006). By so doing, it can account for changes in exit probability associated, for
example, with the 1997 Asian financial crisis that influenced investments from Asian countries,
including Japan. The study also introduced host-country fixed effects to account for unobserved
heterogeneity among the countries that may explain differences in the exit probability of foreign
subsidiaries. Technically, these fixed effects allow each country to have a different intercept to
capture the cross-sectional differences among the countries. This was achieved by introducing 46
country dummy variables.
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Modeling procedure
To test the hypotheses, the study used fixed effects extended Cox regression. It can help estimate
the parameters without the need to make any assumptions about the underlying hazard distribution.
The model develops a hazard function to determine the probability that a subsidiary experiences
an event (i.e., exit), given it has survived up to time t. The hazard function that is denoted by
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑋(𝑡)) is as follows:

h(t , X (t ))  h0 (t ) exp

[

P1

p2

I 1

j 1

  i X i    i X j ( t )]

…………………………………………….(2)

ho(t) represents the baseline hazard function that is left unspecified and reflects the underlying
hazard rate when the values of all covariates X1,…Xp1 and X1(t),…Xp2(t) equal to 0. X(t) stands for
the variables in the model and Xi denotes the ith time-independent variable, while Xj(t) the jth timedependent variable. βi’s and δj’s denote their corresponding coefficients. The extended Cox
regression model accommodates the time-variant nature of some of the covariates used in the
models (Kleinbaum and Klein, 2005) and produces a risk ratio associated with each explanatory
variable. The use of Cox regression is consistent with the objectives of the study. Unlike logit and
probit methods which consider whether a subsidiary has exited or not, Cox regression further
relates a subsidiary’s exit status to the number of years it took for a subsidiary to exit or be rightcensored. Also, by introducing the exit indicator component, it corrects for issues associated with
a censoring of subsidiaries which have not exited within the study period but may do so later. A
fairly detailed assessment of the advantages of event history methods (of which Cox regression is
one) over logit models is available in Allison (2010). Nonetheless, the robustness of the findings
was checked using a fixed effects logit model and results remained consistent.
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RESULTS
The study tested the main effect of income inequality on subsidiary exit using data on Japanese
market-seeking subsidiaries from a globally representative sample of host countries. To further
elaborate the main effect, sub-group analyses were conducted in which the dynamics in the nature
of the proposed relationship and distributional differences in exit probabilities of the subgroups
were examined. The study also tested the moderation effect of institutional development on the
relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit. To examine the substantive
significance of the findings, statistical findings were complemented with graphical representations
and discussion of effect sizes.
Table 8 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations among the variables used in the study.
The correlations between the variables in the models are not so high as to cause concerns of
multicollinearity. As a further diagnostic, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores were calculated
for the variables. Multicollinearity was not a serious concern as the VIFs for all the variables in
the models were below 5 (i.e., the highest VIF being 4.3). Variables were mean centered before
computing interaction terms and transformations.
The study tested its hypotheses using fixed effects extended Cox regression. Table 9 includes
models used for this purpose. It used the partial likelihood procedure to estimate regression
parameters. The study followed estimation procedures outlined in Singer and Willet (2003) to first
fit the full model (i.e., Model 5), which includes all the variables and interaction terms. Then test
of significance of the interaction and main effects were conducted by dropping one or more
variables from the full model and comparing the log-likelihood of each nested model to that of the
full model. The resulting Chi-square statistic was used to determine the significance of the
variables or interactions excluded from the full model. Model 4 excludes interaction terms of Gini
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coefficient with institutional development. Models 3 excludes the second-order Gini coefficient to
test for the presence of a curvilinear relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit.
Model 2 further excludes the first-order Gini coefficient. Model 1 excludes the main effect of
institutional development.
The Chi-square statistics resulting from comparing the log-likelihood of each model with that of
the full model suggests that the full model offers the best fit to the data. This indicates that the
introduction in the successive models of the main and interaction effects resulted in superior
models. Model 2 excludes both the first-and second-order Gini coefficient variables, thus allowing
for assessment of the main-effect argument. The Chi-square statistics resulting from comparing
the log-likelihood of this model with that of the full model indicates that the exclusion of these
variables resulted in an inferior model, suggesting the statistical significance of these variables (χ2
= 38.58, p < 0.001). The significant beta coefficients of these variables in the full model offer
support to Hypothesis 1. That is, the linear term of the income inequality measure has a negative
beta coefficient (β=-0.745, p<0.01), whereas the quadratic term of the same variable has a positive
coefficient (β=0.009, p<0.01), thus lending support to Hypothesis 1. The inflection point was
calculated and sub-group analyses conducted to examine the curvilinear relationship between
inequality and subsidiary exit in more depth.
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics and correlations
Variables
Mean
SD
1
13.17
9.52
Subsidiary age
1
2.08
0.52
Subsidiary size
2
0.11
75.63 27.54
Ownership ratio
3
0.12
1.52
0.97
Number of foreign
4
-0.11
parents
Parent size
4.60
4.76
5
0.01
Parent R&D
4.76
4.89
6
0.02
intensity
Parent international 14.30 10.69
7
-0.44
experience
Industry dummies
8
0.06
Year dummies
9
0.16
Country dummies
10
0.25
68.30 12.14
Institutions
11
0.29
39.69
6.87
Gini coefficient
12
-0.16
4.17
Subsidiary survival
6.37
13
0.49

2

3

4

-0.13
0.08

-0.14

0.18
0.13

-0.01
0.02

0.12
0.00

0.79

-0.02

-0.07

0.09

0.05

0.01

-0.21
0.07
-0.11
-0.19
0.12
0.19

0.11
0.06
0.30
0.30
-0.15
0.05

-0.11
0.01
-0.12
-0.14
0.13
-0.02

0.02
-0.01
0.01
-0.05
0.03
0.02

0.07
-0.09
0.06
0.03
0.00
-0.04

Correlation coefficients greater or equal to |0.05| are significant at a 5% level.
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5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

0.01
0.06
-0.09
-0.18
0.19
-0.14

-0.20
0.17
0.25
-0.18
-0.11

-0.13
-0.18
0.26
0.66

0.24
-0.30
0.03

-0.43
0.07

0.03
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Table 9. Results from the extended Cox regression model
Independent Variables
Controls
Subsidiary age
Subsidiary Size
Ownership ratio
Number of foreign
parents
Parent size
Parent R&D intensity
Parent international
experience
Industry dummies
Year dummies
Country dummies
Main effects
Institutions
Gini coefficient
Gini coefficient2
Interactions
Gini coefficient ×
Institutions
Gini coefficient2 ×
Institutions
Number of
subsidiaries
Number of countries
Log likelihood
χ2 model against
null model
χ2 model against
Model 5
AIC

Model 5

Model 4

Model 3

Model 2

Model 1

-0.044***
(0.003)
-0.832***
(0.041)
-0.005**
(0.001)
-0.162***
(0.025)
4.19e-07
(0.000)
2.26e-06*
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.002)
Included
Included
Included

-0.044***
(0.003)
-0.827***
(0.041)
-0.005**
(0.001)
-0.161***
(0.025)
4.17e-07
(0.000)
2.24e-06*
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.002)
Included
Included
Included

-0.045***
(0.003)
-0.843***
(0.041)
-0.004**
(0.001)
-0.172***
(0.025)
5.41e-07
(0.000)
2.18e-06*
(0.000)
0.011***
(0.002)
Included
Included
Included

-0.045***
(0.003)
-0.843***
(0.041)
-0.004**
(0.001)
-0.169***
(0.025)
4.80e-07
(0.000)
2.23e-06*
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.002)
Included
Included
Included

-0.047***
(0.003)
-0.809***
(0.040)
-0.006**
(0.001)
-0.162***
(0.025)
6.70e-07
(0.000)
2.11e-06*
(0.000)
0.012***
(0.002)
Included
Included
Included

-0.198*
(0.084)
-0.745**
(0.266)
0.009**
(0.003)

-0.006**
(0.002)
-0.137***
(0.027)
0.002***
(0.000)

-0.010***
(0.002)
0.007*
(0.003)

-0.011***
(0.002)

0.010*
(0.004)
-0.001*
(0.000)
6,699

6,699

6,699

6,699

6,699

47
-29,334.35
2,261.38***

47
-29,337.26
2,255.56***

47
-29,350.71
2,228.64***

47
-29,353.63
2,222.80***

47
-29,375.06
2,180.09***

N/A

5.82*

32.74***

38.58***

81.17***

58,698.69

58,700.51

58,725.43

58,729.27

58,769.86

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001(two-tailed)
Standard errors in parentheses.
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The inflection point was estimated to be at a Gini coefficient of 387. Consistent with a procedure
used by Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim (1997), extended Cox regression models were fitted by
classifying the entire sample into two subgroups: subsidiaries operating in countries with Gini
scores of up to 38 (n1=3,380) and those operating in countries with Gini scores of above 38
(n2=3,319). In doing so, the intention was twofold. The first was to corroborate the finding of a
curvilinear relationship by calculating slopes for the relationship at both below and above the
inflection point. As Table 10 shows, in line with the theory and empirical evidence discussed
earlier, the relationship between the Gini coefficient and subsidiary exit is negative to the left of
the inflection point, but positive to the right. The second intention was to compare effect sizes or
the sensitivity of subsidiary exit to changes in Gini indices across the two subgroups. The model
for subgroup 1 indicates that the rate of subsidiary exit decreases by about one percent for a unit
increase in Gini coefficient, ceteris paribus. In contrast, the model for subgroup 2 suggests that the
chance of subsidiary exit increases by about 3 percent for a unit increase in Gini coefficient. This
implies that the sensitivity of change in exit rate is slightly greater at higher levels of income
inequality (i.e., above the inflection point).
In a separate post-hoc analysis, extended Cox regression models were run for three subsamples:
subsidiaries operating in locations of low inequality (i.e., Gini indices of at most 34 or below -1SD
of the mean), moderate inequality (i.e., Gini indices of between 34 and 45 or between -1SD and

7

2

𝜆(𝑥) = 𝑒 ((−0.1369𝑥)+0.0018𝑥 +⋯ )
Calculate the partial derivative of the hazard function with respect to x (i.e.,
And set

𝜕𝜆(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥

𝜕𝜆(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥

)

= 0 to find the inflection point
=>

If (-0.1369 + 0.0036x) = 0, then

𝜕𝜆(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥

𝜕𝜆(𝑥)
𝜕𝑥

= 𝑒 ((−0.1369𝑥)+0.0018𝑥

2 +⋯ )

* (−0.1369 + 0.0036𝑥) = 0

= 0. Thus, 0.0036𝑥 = 0.1369 => 𝑥 ≃ 38
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+1SD of the mean), and high inequality (Gini indices of at least 45 or above +1SD of the mean).
Figure 5 shows that over time subsidiaries operating in host countries with moderate Gini indices

Table 10. Results from subgroup analyses
Independent
Subgroup 1
Variables
β (s.d)
95% Conf. Interval
Subsidiary age
-0.040***
[-0.048
-0.034]
(0.004)
Subsidiary Size
-0.872***
[-0.985
-0.758]
(0.058)
Ownership ratio
-0.006***
[-0.008
-0.004]
(0.001)
Number of foreign
-0.168**
[-0.253
-0.083]
parents
(0.043)
Parent size
-1.61e-07
[ -1.47e-06 1.15e-06]
(0.000)
Parent R&D
2.69e-06*
[1.80e-06 3.58e-06]
intensity
(0.000)
Parent international
0.011***
[0.006
0.016]
experience
(0.003)
Industry dummies
Included
Year dummies
Included
Country dummies
Included
Institutions
-0.013
[-0.019
-0.006]
(0.003)
Gini coefficient
[-0.019
-0.007]
-0.013*
(0.003)
Number of
subsidiaries
LR chi2
Log likelihood
Prob > chi2

3,564

Subgroup 2
β (s.d)
-0.052***
(0.005)
-0.792***
(0.059)
-0.005**
(0.001)
-0.156***
(0.032)
-0.4.35e-08
(0.000)
2.90e-06*
(0.000)
0.014***
(0.003)
Included
Included
Included
-0.005
(0.003)
0.034*
(0.007)

95% Conf. Interval
[-0.062 -0.043]
[-0.908

-0.676]

[-0.007

-0.003]

[-0.218

-0.094]

[1.35e-06 1.27e-06]
[1.97e-06 3.82e-06]
[0.008

0.019]

[ -0.011

0.001]

[0.019

0.050]

3,135

1, 430.49
-15,694.259
0.00

859.03
-11,497.354
0.00

Note: Subgroup 1 is made up of observations with Gini Coefficient of less or equal to 38; whereas, subgroup 2 consists
of observations with Gini Coefficient of greater than 38.
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two-tailed)
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Figure 5. Smoothed hazard estimates for subgroups of subsidiaries
experience a lower likelihood of exit than their counterparts, providing additional support to the
proposed curvilinear relationship.
Model 4 in Table 9 serves to test the moderating effect of institutional development in the
inequality-subsidiary exit relationship. Excluding interaction effects of the linear and quadratic
forms of the Gini coefficient with the institutional development variable results in an inferior
model, suggesting the presence of a significant interaction effect (χ2 = 5.82, p < 0.05). Results in
the full model (i.e., Model 5) support Hypothesis 2 as the coefficient for the interaction of
institutional development with the linear term of Gini coefficient is positive (β = 0.01, p < 0.05)
and negative with the quadratic term of the Gini coefficient (β = -0.001, p < 0.05). This suggests
that institutional development attenuates the curvilinear relationship between income inequality
and subsidiary exit.
A battery of robustness tests was conducted to examine the sensitivity of the findings to variations
in the study sample, source of data, and model specification. To examine whether the results are
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driven by outliers in the sample, the models were reestimated for different sample compositions.
A potential problem is that the results might be influenced by an unusual data distribution of one
or more countries. To explore such possibility, models were run by removing five countries with
the lowest and highest average values for the variables of interest (i.e., income inequality and
institutional development). While the values of the estimates did fluctuate, their signs and
statistical significances remain unaltered.
Also, the models were rerun using alternative data sources for each of the main independent
variables. While the SWIID used in the analysis provides the most comprehensive and comparable
Gini data, it was essential to verify the sensitivity of the results to the use of Gini data from another
source. Consequently, the models were reestimated using the World Bank’s Gini data8. Similarly,
Models were rerun by considering the World Bank’s Governance indicator (Kaufmann, Kraay,
and Mastruzzi, 2005) as an alternative proxy to institutional development. In each case, the signs
and significances of the coefficient estimates did not change. Another potential problem with the
results of the study arises from region-specific differences that may influence inequality levels. To
control for this effect, the sample countries were classified into six regions namely Asia, Europe,
North America, South America, Africa, and Oceania and models were respecified by including
five region dummies. Results remain robust.
While the use of the fixed effects estimation can control for potential endogeneity concerns arising
from omitted variables, other potential sources of endogeneity remain. The income inequality
variable in the models might be endogenous as it could be affected by the actions of the

Average indices were used for each country as they are measured at different times for different countries and only a
single observation was available for over a third of the countries.
8
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subsidiaries. It could be the pattern in the exit of the subsidiaries that is shaping host country
income distribution. As well, there might be a possibility that market-seeking subsidiaries selfselect into countries with certain levels of income distribution. To mitigate such endogeneity
concerns, a two-stage instrumental variable approach was used. This approach requires identifying
an exogenous variable strongly correlated with the independent variable (i.e., income inequality),
but not with the error term in the second stage model (Semadeni, Withers, and Certo, 2014).
Following prior literature (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz, 2013), hostcountry ethnic fractionalization and its squared term were used as instrumental variables. Data on
ethnic fractionalization compiled by Alesina et al. (2003) was used and a two-stage residual
inclusion (2SRI) approach was applied. This approach generates unbiased and consistent estimates
from non-linear second stage models such as Cox regression model (Hausman, 1978; Terza, Baus,
and Rathouz, 2008). Results of the study remain robust.
DISCUSSION
Income inequality is a global phenomenon. However, some countries have more of it than others,
as shown in Table 7. Our understanding of its potential relationship with business performance has
been limited at best. The major objective of this paper is to make a modest contribution in this
respect. It argues that the relationship between income inequality and foreign subsidiary exit can
be complex both in terms of its fundamental nature and in its associated contingencies. The
empirical evidence supports a curvilinear relationship between inequality and subsidiary exit. It
was found that an increase in income inequality from the lowest point to the inflection point is
accompanied by a corresponding decrease in the exit probability of market-seeking subsidiaries.
This observation suggests that market-seeking subsidiaries operating in such countries as the
Netherlands (i.e., average Gini of 25.4) tend to benefit from increasing inequality, as such increase
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corresponds with a reduction in their exit probability. In this respect, Sweden’s experience is
telling: an increase in its Gini coefficient has been associated with a greater economic efficiency
(The Economist, 2012) which can, in turn, decrease the chances of subsidiary exit.
The relationship between subsidiary exit and income inequality follows a different pattern after
the inflection point. The benefits of increasing income inequality to subsidiaries, in terms of
decreasing their exit probability, reaches maximum levels at this point. Beyond this point,
increases in inequality tends to introduce resource limitations, resulting in increased exit
likelihood. This finding is consistent with the argument that an increase in income inequality
engenders multifaceted challenges (see for example, Bénabou, 1996; Easterly 2007) that can
increase subsidiary exit probability.
The general finding of a non-monotonic relationship of inequality and subsidiary exit is consistent
with that of Hasanov and Izraeli (2011) who found an inverted U-shape relationship between
inequality and economic growth. They identified that in the United States, state-level Gini scores
of below 0.17 or above 0.50 were associated with negative growth rates and the highest rates of
growth occur when the Gini values are in the 0.33 to 0.35 range. Since business entities form a
significant part of a given economy and are directly affected by trends in economic development,
this finding can be considered an extension to the organizational level of the similar pattern they
observed at a macro-level. Similarly, the findings of this study are in line with that of Lippmann
et al.(2005) in which they found a similar form of relationship between economic inequality and
the formation of opportunity-based ventures that can support operations of subsidiaries in their
host-country.
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A closer look at the relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit reveals an
interesting insight. The findings suggest that subsidiaries operating in countries occupying
symmetrical positions with respect to the inflection point (for example, Austria with an average
Gini of 27.3 and Thailand with an average Gini of 43) can have a roughly equal chance of exit.
Nonetheless, the sensitivity of the outcome (i.e., subsidiary exit likelihood) to changes in inequality
levels differs across the countries. A move to a less egalitarian society in Austria is likely to be in
the best interest of subsidiaries operating there as it, on average, decreases their exit likelihood.
However, such a move in Thailand will likely have the opposite implication. Instead, a move to a
more egalitarian society in Thailand may be required to improve environmental munificence and
thereby decrease exit likelihood of subsidiaries. This insight extends the arguments in the market
attractiveness literature that emphasizes aggregate (e.g., GDP) and average (e.g., Income Per
Capita) income characteristics by suggesting that dispersion (variance) of income is also an
important indicator.
Further post-hoc analyses confirm the results. First, as presented in Figure 5, subsidiaries operating
in locations with moderate income inequality levels have, on average, a lower probability of exit
than those operating elsewhere. Further, sub-group analyses of subsidiaries operating in countries
with different levels of inequality (i.e., below and above the inflection point) provide evidence
supporting the hypothesized non-monotonic relationship. Generally, the results indicate two ways
of decreasing subsidiary exit associated with income inequality: high income inequality countries
ought to work towards reducing income inequality; whereas, low income inequality countries need
to adopt policies that can push their inequality levels to intermediate levels. However, the subgroup
analyses indicate that high inequality countries have more to benefit, in terms of reduced subsidiary
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exit rate, from reduced income inequality than do low inequality countries from increased income
inequality.
The results of the study also show another layer of complexity in the relationship between
inequality and subsidiary exit. It was found that host-country institutional development moderates
the relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit. As depicted in Figure 6, across
different levels of inequality, subsidiaries operating in countries with high institutional
development have a lower exit probability than their counterparts operating in countries with low
institutional development. This suggests that institutional development improves environmental
munificence and thus counterbalances host-country resource limitations associated with extreme
income distributions, thus highlighting the need to consider the interaction of institutional

Figure 6: Interaction between income inequality and institutional development
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development and income inequality in examining potential hazards facing market-seeking
subsidiaries. The results of this study inform MNEs’ market-seeking investments in at least three
important ways. First, they stress the importance of considering income distribution within a
country when assessing investment potential and performance. Second, they highlight the
dynamics between the levels of income inequality and subsidiary exit and how a move to a
more/less egalitarian society relates with subsidiary exit depending on the prevailing level of
income inequality. Third, they show how the relationship of income inequality and subsidiary exit
can be contingent on host-country institutional development.
However, certain limitations and future directions should be noted. First, the proxy used for
inequality is the Gini coefficient. In spite of its widespread use, this measure may not perfectly
capture the construct—income inequality. Recent works in economics, for example, have used
ratio measures such as top 5 percent shares that provide information about what percentage of the
total national income is accounted for by the top 5 percent of the population (Piketty and Saez,
2006). Future research can test the robustness of the findings by using alternative indicators of
income inequality. Second, the empirical tests are based on data from Japanese MNEs and
subsidiaries. As such, before any generalization can be made, the study needs to be replicated using
subsidiary and MNE data from other home countries. It should be noted, however, that the use of
a single home country data serves an essential statistical purpose of controlling for variance arising
from home-country heterogeneity.
Future research needs to look at institutional antecedents/underpinnings of economic inequality,
as such research may provide a more refined understanding of how inequality is associated with
business termination. Research in the varieties of capitalism stream has been looking at the
institutional differences across different versions of capitalism and how different institutional
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arrangements can give rise to different levels of income inequality (Judge, Fainshmidt, and Brown,
2014). Future studies on economic inequality and business exit can clearly draw on this literature
to produce more refined insights. Another fruitful direction is to empirically examine the
relationship between income inequality and environmental munificence. The study wove together
relevant theoretical arguments to establish the relationship between the two and connect income
inequality with foreign subsidiary exit. However, empirical investigations of the underlying
relationship would not only help verify the robustness of the findings but also make for a nuanced
understanding of the ways through which inequality influences resource dynamics of the
environments in which subsidiaries operate.
We also see potential in a single host-country replication of this study so that the focal locus shifts
from countries to regions, provinces, or cities. Do regional, provincial, or city differences in
income distribution explain differences in the loss/retention of market-seeking subsidiaries? These
are questions of considerable practical as well as theoretical import. For example, Reich (2014)
argued that an unequal distribution of income was responsible for Detroit’s economic problems.
Future empirical research looking at the causal link between income distribution and business exit
can help advance better understanding, while also testing Reich’s thesis.
CONCLUSIONS
Davis (2015) identified income inequality as one of the three most important topics organization
and management researchers need to study. To the best of our knowledge, this study is among the
first to directly examine the relationship between income inequality and subsidiary exit. The study
finds empirical support for the relationship between inequality and subsidiary exit probability. In
particular, it finds a non-monotonic association between inequality and subsidiary exit in that the
relationship between the two is negative at lower levels of inequality but positive at higher levels
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of inequality. This finding is important as it shows the complex ways in which income inequality
relates with the exit of market-seeking subsidiaries.
The study also examined whether income inequality interacts with institutional development to
affect subsidiary exit likelihood. It finds that institutional development mitigates potential resource
limitations wrought by income inequality and facilitates coordination inside the subsidiary and
outside in the product as well as factor markets. This finding, therefore, suggests that marketseeking subsidiaries operating in countries with very high income inequality and low institutional
development have a greater likelihood of exit than such subsidiaries operating elsewhere.
The results of this study have important theoretical as well as managerial implications. From a
theoretical standpoint, this research makes a case for the influence of socio-economic forces on
subsidiary performance. It contributes to the stream of literature examining the effects of
environmental influences on subsidiary exit. In fact, a fundamental question in IB scholarship is
how environmental context influences foreign subsidiary performance and MNE behavior
(Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Clearly, understanding how social forces influence business
performance and what businesses (or governments) have to do to manage these forces has
considerable theoretical merit.
From a practical standpoint, the research suggests the need for organizations to consider socioeconomic forces more closely and critically. Particularly, the study shows how the probability of
subsidiary exit changes along different levels of income distribution. In addition, this study
provides firms with useful information about exit risks associated with different investment
locations having different income distributions. Finally, for host country governments, the results
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provide empirical evidence about when and how inequality relates to business exit, thereby
informing their policy decisions.
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CHAPTER FOUR
The Collective-Relational Approach to Political Connection: A Case for Political Rent?

INTRODUCTION
“China does not have a competitive edge over its Western counterparts in an open market.
But in a closed market like Africa’s, Chinese companies are able to gain from government
influence,” - a Beijing-based energy consultant, January 20069.
MNEs from the advanced economies have long dominated trade and FDI flows throughout the
globe. However, this extended domination has been threatened lately by new MNEs from the
emerging markets. Unlike their counterparts from the advanced economies, most MNEs from such
emerging markets as the BRICS10 are newcomers to the global scene and thus need to find unique
ways to thrive amid the challenges and multifaceted threats characterizing cross-border
investments. The introduction to the global competitive environment of these new MNEs has been
surfacing some important aspects of competitive advantage. The Sino-African case can be
illuminating in this respect. In 2009, China surpassed US as the largest single country trading
partner of Africa (OECD, 2011). Similarly, Chinese outward FDI to Africa has been rapidly
increasing over the last decade, while MNEs from the developed economies have continued to
divest from continent (UNCTAD, 2015). As well, on average, the performance in Africa of
Chinese MNEs compares favorably with that of their Western counterparts (Alden & Davies,
2006; Stevens and Newenham-Kahindi, 2017). What underlies such a performance edge?
Answering this question can provide important theoretical as well as practical insights.
The resource-based view (RBV) holds that competitive advantage can result from possession of
valuable and rare organizational resources (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Here, emphasis is on

9

China: Greasing wheels in Africa’, Energy Compass, 20 January 2006.
An acronym that stands for Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa
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resources found inside the organization as potential sources of competitive advantage. Dyer &
Singh (1998) extended the RBV argument by suggesting that organizational resources that provide
competitive advantage can be outside the organization and be embedded in the networks of
relationships the organization forms with others such as suppliers, distributors, and partners.
Drawing on the network and embeddedness literature in economic sociology (e.g., Granovetter,
1985), Dyer & Singh (1998) offer useful insight on the locus of valuable and rare resources.
However, Dyer & Singh (1998) considered only relationships in the market and did not consider
possible non-market relationships. Developments in the IB literature and non-market strategy
literature, however, have long acknowledged the strategic importance of relationships with
governments (e.g., Boddewyn, 2016; McWilliams, Van Fleet, and Cory, 2002; Schuler, Rehbein,
and Cramer, 2002). Research in these areas has also pointed to potential downsides of direct
political connections—downsides that may adversely affect the competitive position of the
business in question (Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun, Mellahi, and Thun, 2010).
Direct political relationships confer useful political resources; creating and maintaining these
relationships may be costly, however. Indeed, assuming the norm of rationality, organizations will
choose to build political relationships when their potential benefits outweigh their costs. In
contrast, the dynamics between benefit and cost distributions is likely to change when the political
relationships are indirect as in the case of the Chinese modified one-tier bargaining model—a
model especially used to support resource-seeking investments of state-owned MNEs (Li,
Newenham-Kahindi, Shapiro, and Chen, 2013). In this model, the Chinese government directly
bargains strategic and operational entry deals on behalf of a consortium of Chinese companies.
These companies receive financial and infrastructural supports from the Chinese government and
are expected to operate in a predetermined host country. In this bargaining model the Chinese
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government provides development assistance to the host country in the form of low-interest loans,
infrastructural development, and grants in return for the host country providing investment
opportunities and facilitating entry and local operations of the Chinese MNEs.
This study builds on Hillman & Hitt's (1999) arguments about the nature of political actions in
order to put forward a theoretical explanation for political connections and their implications on
MNE competitive advantage in developing countries. It conceptualizes the modified one-tier
bargaining model as a relational and collective approach to political connection and argue that this
approach enables Chinese MNEs to access useful political resources, without the direct costs
involved in creating and maintaining the linkage. Further, it puts forward theoretical arguments
suggesting that the relational aspect of this approach confers pragmatic legitimacy on the Chinese
subsidiaries. These gains in resources and legitimacy arising from the unique bargaining model
are likely to serve as mechanisms linking political connection and competitive advantage. The
bargaining model creates an imperfect factor market for political resources—a market in which
Chinese companies have a substantial access to political resources, with potential performance
returns. We view such returns as political rents.
As well as its potential contribution to the stream of literatures concerned with identifying the
locus of critical resources and specifying the condition in which political resources can make for
competitive advantage, this paper seeks to achieve the following five purposes. First, by
considering alternative governance mechanisms to structure non-market exchanges/transactions
between or among MNEs and governments (i.e., host and home), the study seeks to contribute to
a better understanding of the different approaches to political connection and their respective
implications for market competitiveness. Examination of the special governance mechanism
characterizing investment of Chinese SOMNEs helps us responds to a call by Wright et al. (2005)
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for a greater understanding of emerging market multinationals and the implications of their
strategic orientations for extending or refining existing theories.
Second, the study brings to the fore the issue of MNE- host country bargaining—an issue that has
received only limited attention despite its key role in informing early IB research (Eden, Lenway,
& Schuler, 2004; Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1971). The MNE-host government relationship is
vital as it affects virtually every aspect of MNE’s strategy and performance. This research
addresses the political dimensions of international business and has considerable theoretical
appeal. In fact, scholars have argued that this is an area in the IB literature with considerable
promise for building a unifying IB theory (Dunning, 1993; Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman, Eden, 2006;
Grosse and Behrman, 1992). Third, by examining the roles of host and home governments in the
bargaining process, the study brings the State back in to IB research and contribute to resolving
the limitation that most IB research is too MNE-centric (Hennart, 2009) and treats as exogenous
host-country politics and the state (Agmon, 2003). Likewise, by looking at the strategic interaction
between national states and MNEs, it departs from IB research that examines MNEs’ exchanges
in the (economic) market and consider the nature and implications of exchanges in the political
market.
Fourth, it seeks to contribute to IB/strategy research in emerging markets and specifically to the
literature focusing on how MNEs deal with institutional voids—absence or lack of marketsupporting institutions (Mair and Marti, 2009). Whereas MNEs employ non-market strategies to
mitigate economic challenges institutional voids pose (Dorobantu, Kaul, and Zelner, 2016;
Getachew and Beamish, 2017), understanding the nature of these international political strategies
is limited. By introducing a typology of approaches used to structure exchanges between host
countries and MNEs and examining their implications for the divestment of foreign subsidiaries,
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the study intends to advance the extant understanding of such strategies. Fifth, the research
indicates potential for integrating perspectives from the RBV and the resource dependence
perspective to explain competitive advantage. Here, the study argues that the bargaining model
characterizing the entry of Chinese MNEs elicits the complementary aspects of resource
mobilization and legitimacy in helping subsidiaries secure competitive advantage.
The following sections include discussion of related literature on political connections, sources of
competitive advantage, and MNE-developing host government bargaining models. These are
followed by the development of a typology of alternative governance structures (bargaining
models). The next part presents five propositions regarding the relationships between these
governance structures and the competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries as well as the
associated mechanisms and boundary conditions. Finally, the implications of this study for further
theoretical development and practice are discussed.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Developing countries feature contexts starkly contrasting to those elsewhere. MNEs operating in
these markets, for instance, need to deal with or mitigate challenges from greater levels of
institutional voids. Information asymmetries, weak property right protection, and higher
monitoring and enforcement costs plague MNE investments in locations of high institutional voids
(e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2013; Wright et al., 2005; Xu & Meyer, 2012). Likewise, unstable political,
economic, and institutional conditions constrain such managerial undertakings as planning and
adapting (Delios and Henisz, 2000; Henisz, 2000). Unlike those in advanced markets, states in
emerging markets play a more active role in not only regulating foreign firms but also running
their own business enterprises (i.e., state-owned enterprises) (Xu & Meyer, 2012). In emerging
markets, the political environment (of which the state is an integral part) is key and influences the
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strategy and performance of foreign subsidiaries. For example, a recent study of 150 North
American and European-based MNEs operating in Africa indicated that many of them incurred
significant losses mainly due to regulatory issues and bribery (Hochberg, Klick, & Reilly, 2015).
Given the challenging operating environments and active role of states in emerging markets,
MNEs often find it essential to forge political connections or partake in the political market
(Faccio, 2006). This is especially true of emerging-market MNEs (EMNEs), most of which
consider politics an integral part of their business (Park and Luo, 2001; Wang et al., 2012). For
example, Chinese MNEs leverage Guanxi and government ties to substitute for weak institutional
arrangements as well as facilitate their international expansion (Wang et al., 2012). These
connections afford strategic advantages through better access to useful information and protection
from political hazards (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Like
economic markets, political markets entail exchanges/transactions. Connected MNEs need to
provide something in return for the strategic advantages states set at their disposal (Bonardi,
Holburn, and Bergh, 2006). Connected MNEs may be required, for example, to keep excess
employment, pay higher wages, or even financially support the ruling party of the state (Brockman,
Rui, and Zou, 2013).
Competition within economic markets is an integral subject of emphasis in international business
practice as well as scholarship. However, the notion of competition has been extended less to
political markets in which policies, information, and financial supports are exchanged (Bonardi et
al., 2006; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Competition in the political market, like in economic markets,
requires deployment of organizational resources and adoption of apposite strategies, called
political strategies (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Political strategy of a firm
represents, “…those actions taken to favorably position the firm in its nonmarket environments by
123

124
managing those uncertainties and resource dependences stemming from the influence and/or
resistance of other nonmarket actors that (can) affect the firm’s overall economic performance’’
(Mahon, 1993; p. 196). Of interest here is a political strategy MNEs employ to structure their
relations with host-country governments. Whereas earlier research in the area has considered the
rationale behind such strategies (e.g., Brockman et al., 2013; Faccio et al., 2006), we have limited
understanding of the different types of political strategies employed by MNEs with disparate
experiential backgrounds (for example, MNEs from advanced markets vs EMNEs) and the relative
performance implications of these strategies.
An important aspect of MNEs’ political strategy in their respective host country is the bargaining
model they adopt to structure their relationship with the host government (Ramamurti, 2001;
Vernon, 1971). The chosen MNE-host country bargaining model governs the interaction between
MNEs and their respective host government. Bargaining between the two parties determines,
among other things, MNE entry to and performance in the host-country (Boddewyn, 2016; Eden
et al., 2004; Nebus & Rufin, 2010; Ramamurti, 2004; Vernon, 1971). These bargaining parties
have different natures and responsibilities, resulting in clear conflicts of interests and goals. MNEs
are business organizations and thus are accountable to their owners; whereas, host-governments
are political entities whose accountability is to the society in the host country. Whereas MNEs’
overriding purpose is to maximize returns (i.e. profits) (Friedman, 1970), host governments look
to maximize returns (e.g., tax revenue, job opportunities) from the MNEs. While the bargaining is
to develop mechanisms for mutual satisfaction of their interests, contracts arising from the
bargaining process are hardly complete and threats of opportunistic behavior abound.
Incompleteness of contracts and potential for opportunistic behavior translate to greater
uncertainty and transaction costs. Expropriation is a potential manifestation of such opportunistic
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behavior. Expropriation may take a direct or an indirect form. Direct expropriation involves a
situation where an MNE is forced by the host-government to relinquish its ownership rights on its
investment in the host-country. Indirect expropriation takes the forms of deliberately tampering
with the environment to make it hostile for the MNE to operate. Included in this form of
expropriation are excessive taxation, exchange rate manipulations, bribes, and new permit
requirements (Azzimonti & Sarte, 2007). In recent decades, direct expropriation has increasingly
made way for indirect expropriation as host-governments have come to realize that more value can
be had through the latter than the former (Chifor, 2002).
A key theoretical question is, therefore, how best to align the incentives of the exchange partners,
resolve attendant conflict of interest, and minimize hazards from opportunistic behaviours. This
study builds on Hillman and Hitt's (1999) arguments about the nature of political actions to identify
alternative governance structures (or bargaining models) used for organizing MNE-host
government exchanges. In so doing, it extends the argument of alternative governance structures
to organize economic transactions to the realm of the political market where policies, regulations,
information, and financial supports are exchanged (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Hillman and
Hitt, 1999). Also, by integrating insights from the Transaction Cost Politics (TCP) literature, the
resource-based view, and the social capital perspectives, the study examines the implications of
these governance structures for competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries. Such competitive
advantage is assumed to reflect the effectiveness of a governance structure. Further, it identifies
potential institutional boundary conditions by considering whether and how the development of
host-country economic and political institutions determine the effectiveness of a governance
structure.
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SOURCES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
The RBV holds that valuable and rare resources and capabilities undergird competitive advantage
(Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). While anything thought of as a strength or weakness can be a
resource (Wernerfelt, 1984), three broad categories are widely recognized. These categories
include physical capital resources, human capital resources, and organizational capital resources
(Barney, 1991). While it is generally accepted that resources and capabilities are possessed by
organizations, relatively little attention has been paid to their origin. Barney (1986) discussed this
issue and suggested that organizations acquire critical resources from strategic factor markets.
However, even here the source of resources is discussed in aggregate.
Dyer & Singh (1998) addressed the same issue of locus of critical resources and capabilities, but
with some degree of specificity. They suggested that some critical organizational resources may
span boundaries and be embedded in the inter-firm relationships with suppliers, distributors, and
partners. This work extended the RBV arguments in two ways. First, it advanced the notion that
inter-firm linkages can give rise to valuable, rare, and inimitable resources and capabilities. In the
traditional RBV literature, limited attention was paid to relationships as important sources of
critical resources and capabilities. Indeed, the organizational capital resources category includes
“…informal relations among groups within a firm and between a firm and those in its
environment,” (Barney, 1991: 101). However, little research looked at the micro-foundations of
resources as potential explanation of competitive advantage. Even in Barney’s (1991) definition,
only informal relations are considered, with no room for the formal and regular relationships a
firm may have and out of which it secures valuable, rare, and inimitable resources and capabilities.
Second, Dyer & Singh (1998) contributed to Barney's (1986) earlier work on the strategic factors
market concept that concerns the ultimate sources and locus of critical resources and capabilities.
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By drawing on an earlier work in economic sociology on embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985), Dyer
& Singh (1998) identified inter-firm linkages as useful sources of strategic factors. Unlike other
sources of strategic factors, inter-firm linkages enable access to several different types of resources
and capabilities such as information and financial resources. Nonetheless, such linkages also need
to be maintained on a regular basis, and clearly some costs would be incurred for that purpose.
The emphasis in Dyer & Singh (1998), however, is on market-based inter-firm linkages; the
relationship firms form is conceptualized as one with parties actively involved in the firm’s value
chain, namely upstream and downstream strategic alliance partners. However, developments in
the IB and non-market strategy literatures pointed to non-market (political) relationships.
Boddewyn & Brewer (1994), for instance, argued that international business fundamentally differs
from domestic business in the greater attention accorded to political factors and the relationship
with governments of different host countries. They suggested a move away from considering
political forces merely as constraints and emphasized the value to international business managers
of appreciating the merits of developing a political behavior capability. Table 11 presents a
summary of related research in IB and non-market strategy.
Political behavior involves, “…the acquisition, development, securing, and use of power in
relationship to other entities, where power is viewed as the capacity of social actors to overcome
the resistance of other actors,” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994: 120). It is conceptualized as an
important source of political resources and capability. These political resources and capabilities
entail “…intelligence and cognitive maps about non-market environments, better access to
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Table 11: Summary of IB/strategy research on political behavior and its resource and/or
legitimacy implications
Articles

Approach
(Theoretical or
Empirical)

Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994

Theoretical

Hillman & Hitt, 1999
Park & Luo, 2001

Theoretical
Empirical

Child & Tse, 2001

Theoretical

McWilliams et al., 2002

Empirical

Henisz & Zelner, 2005

Theoretical

Hillman & Wan, 2005

Empirical

Bonardi et al., 2005
Frynas et al., 2006

Theoretical
Theoretical

Holburn & Bergh, 2008

Theoretical

Oliver & Holzinger, 2008

Theoretical

Okhmatovskiy, 2010

Empirical

Sun et al., 2009

Empirical

Sun et al., 2010

Empirical

Holburn & Zelner, 2010

Empirical

Forstenlechner & Mellahi, 2011

Empirical

Sun et al., 2011

Theoretical

Doh et al., 2012

Theoretical

Wang et al., 2012
Li et al., 2013
Duanmu, 2014

Empirical
Empirical
Empirical

Stevens and Newenham-Kahindi,
2014

Empirical

Major Arguments

Examined the political nature of IB and the role of
government as a factor of production
Studied the process of political strategy formulation
Chinese companies use guanxi as a strategic mechanism
to overcome competitive and resource disadvantages by
cooperation and exchange of favours with competitors
and government authorities
The behavior and strategies of Chinese MNEs are
informed by political and economic motives of the
Chinese government
Extended the RBV argument to show its use to analyze
the effectiveness of non-market strategies
Cultivating local allies is further enhanced by the
legitimacy such partners may provide when incentive
alignment among the various partners can be maintained
Institutional factors and the search for legitimacy dictate
political strategy
Discussed competition in political markets
Discussed the long-term process of acquiring, sustaining,
and exploiting firm-specific political resources in
international business
Discussed strategies firms use to improve the nature of
their regulatory environment
Firm’s dynamic political management capabilities
determine effectiveness of political strategies
Firms with indirect political ties get access to resources
and legitimacy, while avoiding costs associated with
political connection
Political affiliation can help a firm access critical physical
as well as financial resources
Declining and even negative value of deep political
embeddedness by MNE in stable emerging markets
Organizational capabilities in assessing and managing
policy risks developed in home countries of weak
institutions helps when investing in host countries with
similar institutions.
Building legitimacy with the wider community is
particularly important in emerging markets
Identified four political tie archetypes of which none
recognized the case of ties created by national
governments to facilitate the entry and operations of
MNEs in other countries
Integration of institutional and strategic perspectives
would help advance study of non-market strategy,
especially in emerging countries
Examines the role of home states in foreign investments
Introduces the modified one-tier bargaining model
Examines the influence of home state on expropriation
risk
Explores the value of legitimacy spillover from home
states to firms in their foreign operations.
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decision makers and opinion makers….” (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994: 135). In keeping with Dyer
& Singh (1998), Boddewyn & Brewer (1994) advanced the notion that critical firm resources
figure in the linkages firms maintain with other parties, in this case with governmental parties.
However, to the extent that government parties do not directly feature in the market exchanges (at
least in capitalist systems) their work expands the scope of such relationships to non-market
interactions.
Further refinement and discussion of this idea featured in the non-market strategy literature
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Holburn and Bergh, 2008; Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Schuler et al., 2002)
and the IB literature (Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006; Sun, Mellahi, & Liu, 2009; Sun et al.,
2010). Along with these developments, however, came the recognition that political connections
may become liabilities and their returns may not justify the associated costs. That is what the
empirical evidence of Sun et al. (2010) seems to suggest. They found that deep embeddedness in
political networks has adverse effects on organizational performance as such embeddedness takes
away the ability and willingness to build market-based capabilities. In the absence or lack of such
market-based capabilities, organizations may be vulnerable to market dynamics that require
application of such capabilities. As well, political connections may become a liability in times of
significant changes to government officials. In such events, a firm’s prior affiliation may work
against the firm. In addition, creation and maintenance of political relationship has associated
costs.
The degree to which the attendant liabilities materialize and associated costs accrue depends
largely on the nature of the political linkage (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). A direct political linkage takes
the form of active involvement of the firm in creating and/or maintaining the connection. In this
case, the firm is likely to incur the entire amount of the associated costs and to encounter the total
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effects of the potential liabilities. Another way of securing political connections is indirectly
through a proxy or proxies. Hillman & Hitt (1999) coined such connection as collective. Collective
linkages are likely to reduce the direct risk exposures (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Okhmatovskiy,
2010).
As well as providing important resource and capability advantages, political connections have
potential implications on the pragmatic legitimacy of the organization in consideration. Pragmatic
legitimacy is an important sociologic outcome that is central to the resource dependence
perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Suchman, 1995). Pragmatic legitimacy is grounded in the
self-interested assessment by immediate constituents of the value obtained through exchanges with
a party under consideration (Suchman, 1995). Relationships can be useful sources of mechanisms
for such legitimacy. Hybels’ (1995) definition of legitimacy emphasizes the importance placed on
relations:
Legitimacy is better conceived as both part of the context for exchange and a byproduct of exchange [between an organization and its environment].
Legitimacy…exists only as a symbolic representation of the collective evaluation of an
institution, as evidenced to both observers and participants perhaps more convincingly
by the flow of resources…. (pp. 243).

In addition to emphasizing the place exchanges occupy in legitimacy, the definition highlights the
possible linkage between legitimacy and resources. In fact, the resource dependence perspective
holds that organizations seek legitimacy as it enables them to have continued access to important
resources to a sufficient level as to ensure their survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The link
between legitimacy and relationships becomes more potent in the case of political relationships
(Hillman & Wan, 2005).
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The importance of legitimacy is even greater for MNEs whose subsidiaries operate in foreign
locations. Acceptance and approval of MNE subsidiaries by stakeholders in the host country is
instrumental for their performance (Forstenlechner & Mellahi, 2011). As a result, MNEs employ
different strategies to secure host-country legitimacy. Kostova & Zaheer (1999) contend that hiring
local employees, especially those who have the potential to confer legitimacy on the subsidiary,
would help MNEs secure legitimacy. Another strategy employed by MNEs is to include influential
personalities in the host country in the board directorship of the subsidiary (Hillman & Wan, 2005).
Similarly, the need for legitimacy may require MNEs to have important political figures as part of
their subsidiaries or to partner with the government or other influential parties. Relations between
home and host states can also generate legitimacy advantages (Wang et al., 2012).
Some home states are more inclined than others to engage in social and personal relations with
host-country officials. For example, Chinese officials maintain a strong belief in the cultivation
and management such relations to achieve their goals—for example, fostering commercial success
of Chinese foreign subsidiaries (Eisenman, 2008; Li et al., 2013; Solomon, 1995). Attesting to this
notion, Eisenman (2008) noted that between 2006-2008, the communist party of China (CPC) had
established ties to at least 60 African political parties, including opposition parties. With the
intention of creating stronger social and personal relations, CPC often arranges lavish state visits
for the political leaders to develop feelings of goodwill, friendship, and associated obligations
(Solomon, 1995).
MNE-DEVELOPING HOST COUNTRY BARGAINING MODELS
A seminal work in the IB literature regarding the relationship between MNEs and developing host
countries is that of Vernon (1971). It introduced the obsolescing bargaining model that describes
the bargaining process between the two parties. Describing the MNE-host country relationship
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typical of the 1970’s and 80’s, the model specifies their bargaining as a function of negotiation
and compromises on the goals, resources, and constraints of each party (Eden et al., 2004;
Ramamurti, 2001; Vernon, 1994). The model suggests that MNEs tend to have a better bargaining
position at first, because they have firm specific assets appealing to many host countries, including
modern technology. The bargaining power, however, gradually shifts to the host countries once
the MNEs make commitments in the forms of fixed assets. As the initial contract expires and when
the MNEs want to strike a new deal, they find themselves at a less favorable position because of
the difficulty in relocating fixed investments. While the model aptly described the bargaining
process especially in the natural resource industries, its application can readily extend also to any
investment that requires commitment in the host country of significant fixed assets.
From the 1990’s onward, the MNE-developing host state relationships has departed from the
obsolescing bargaining model in at least two important ways. First, the spirit of competition
underlying the obsolescing bargaining model makes way for more cooperative dealings between
the two parties (Eden et al., 2004; Ramamurti, 2001). Developing host countries introduced
multiple waves of reforms to open their markets, partly through their own initiatives and partly
through pressures from home countries and such multilateral institutions as the World Bank, IMF,
and WTO (Ramamurti, 2001).
Second, other third parties including home countries and multilateral institutions became
increasingly involved in the bargaining process, rendering the bargaining process more complex.
One salient aspect of the complexity is the introduction of a level of bargaining between home and
host countries or between multilateral institutions and the host countries. This new tier of
bargaining, along with the bargaining at the traditional level (i.e., between MNEs and host
countries) gave rise to a two-tier bargaining process (Ramamurti, 2001). The introduction of these
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third parties was to ensure that MNEs would not suffer from a bargaining power that eventually
becomes obsolete. In the two-tier bargaining model, tier-one represents bargaining between home
countries (sometimes represented by multilateral institutions such as IMF and the World Bank)
and host countries. Tier-one bargaining involves bilateral or multilateral negotiations on strategic
issues of entry, market liberalization, and structural adjustments by host countries. In return, host
countries receive development assistance often in the form of loans. The tier-one bargaining is to
pave the way for tier-two bargaining between MNEs, affiliated to the home country or the
multilateral institution, and the target host country. The tier-two bargaining focuses more on
operational issues and carries much less significance than in the traditional obsolescing bargaining
model as host governments have their bargaining positions weakened in tier-one bargaining
(Ramamurti, 2001).
The two-tier bargaining augments the bargaining power of MNEs because powerful home
countries and/or multilateral institutions are on their side. As a result, the tendency for the
bargaining power of the MNEs to become obsolete is highly unlikely, as even when the MNEs
have committed considerable fixed assets, the presence in the background of such powerful
supporters preserves the bargaining power with the MNEs. While this bargaining model
contributed to the remarkable decrease in expropriation of subsidiaries by developing country
governments, it had also deprived government in developing countries of their ability to protect
their rights and secure equitable distribution of gains. Even when there is clear evidence that MNEs
are involved in a high-profile transfer pricing activity in which they transfer their profits to
subsidiaries located in tax havens, the host governments have but limited latitude to influence the
behaviors of the MNEs (Eden & Rodriguez, 2004). Ramamurti (2001) observed that any action by
the host government to clamp down on such behavior may be interpreted as aggression and the
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home countries can impose crippling economic sanctions on the developing host countries. As
well, bilateral and multilateral treaties as well as customary international law provide protections
against adverse actions by host countries (Dolzer and Schreuer, 2008).
Similarly, provision of loans or cancellation of debts for developing host countries further
weakened their bargaining power, limiting their ability to strike favorable deals with MNEs. In
exchange for these loan provisions or debt cancellations, host country governments are required
to meet the demands of the home countries, thereby ceding power to the MNEs from these
countries. Further undermining the bargaining positions of developing host countries is the
competition among many developing countries to attract inward FDI (Eden & Lenway, 2001).
Such competition may entail use of generous subsidies and tax holidays. In general, this bargaining
model makes for the maximization of MNEs’ returns, while reducing the share of host countries.
Likewise, Eden et al., (2004) argued that the entry and obsolescing conditions underlying the
obsolescing bargaining model are no longer applicable to the bargaining relationship between
developing states and MNEs. They advanced a political bargaining model which suggests
involvement of different parties including governments and MNEs negotiating on wide array of
government policies. This model is consistent with the two-tier bargaining model in that the
problem of the obsolescing bargaining power of MNEs is resolved by the introduction of third
parties such as home governments to maintain the better bargaining positions of the MNEs.
Similarly, most bargaining on entry conditions is either settled at the tier-one bargaining stage or
is rendered irrelevant as host countries are pitted against each other to attract FDI and take their
own initiative to lure MNEs.
Nebus & Rufin (2010) attempted to extend the bargaining power paradigm into what they called
the network bargaining model. Integrating insights from network theory, the model captures the
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complexity of the environment in which bargaining takes place and the diversity of the actors
involved in it. Particularly, the authors argued that MNE operation in host countries is a result of
bargaining among state governments, multilateral organizations, MNEs and NGOs. As well, the
model conceptualizes the bargaining process as being influenced by the power dynamics and
interplay between or among these parties.
Aside from the introduction of NGOs as relevant parties in the bargaining process and the
integration of the network theory with the bargaining theory, the view advanced by Nebus & Rufin
(2010) is fundamentally in line with those of the political bargaining model and the two-tier
bargaining model. Central to each model is the notion that bargaining is not dyadic but involves
parties other than MNEs and host-country government. Further, each model suggests that
bargaining has multiple spatial dimensions, taking place at different levels and contexts and
addressing different aspects of the bargaining results.
A recent work by Li et al. (2013), however, pointed to the presence of a different form of
bargaining model, with different structures and potential implications. In their study of outward
investment of Chinese companies in Africa, especially those investing in the natural resources
industry, the authors identified a bargaining model, which is different from the one used by the
advanced economies. The Chinese model involves the home government directly negotiating deals
with each host government on behalf of a consortium of investors. These investors get financial
and infrastructural backing from the Chinese government. As well, the Chinese government works
closely with potential host countries to identify opportunities for its affiliated firms. In this model,
unlike in the two-tier bargaining model used by most advanced economies, the home government
plays a more active role and works more closely with host governments to create favorable
investment opportunities.
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The dealing of the Chinese government differs from the two-tier bargaining model in three
important ways. First, the Chinese government, unlike the governments of the advanced
economies, deals with both the strategic issues of creating favorable investment host-country
climate and the operational issues of identifying opportunities and facilitating the actual entry and
operation of Chinese investors in the host country. In the case of the two-tier bargaining model,
home country governments assume a limited role of facilitating the creation of favorable
investment climate. Bargaining on operational issues is considered the responsibility of the MNEs.
Second, the MNEs represented by the Chinese government are not required to engage in direct
talks and relationships with the host governments; instead, they act as ‘ambassadors’ of the
Chinese governments. Once a deal is brokered between the Chinese government and a host country
and once a viable host-country opportunity is identified, these Chinese MNEs will invest in the
host country and start operations. MNEs entering through the two-tier bargaining model need to
directly interact with the host-country government; Chinese MNEs, however, have indirect
relations with the host-country government. It should be noted, however, that indirect political
connection can involve any third party conducting the entire political negotiation on behalf of the
principal(s) (i.e., MNE(s)). This research considers one form of indirect political connection in
which the third party is the home government (i.e. Chinese government).
Third, the bargaining between Chinese governments and developing host-country governments
has more to offer to the host-countries than is possible through the two-tier bargaining model. The
bargaining spirit is more cooperative in that host countries, in return for creating a favorable
investment climate and facilitating identification of local opportunities, receive development
assistance in the form of infrastructural construction, low interest loans, and outright grants.
Generally, since the bargaining model for the entry of Chinese MNEs involves bargaining between
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the home government and host government, Li et al., (2013) called it the modified one-tier
bargaining model, suggesting the similarity of this model to the traditional one-tier bargaining
model (i.e., the obsolescing bargaining model). Table 12 provides a summarized description of the
different bargaining models.
TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
To theorize about the performance implications of the modified one-tier bargaining model, this
research draws on Hillman & Hitt's (1999) arguments on the nature of political connections. They
developed two important sets of arguments regarding the nature of political ties. The first involves
the classification of political connections as transactional and relational. The transactional
approach entails building relationships on specific issues perceived as important by the firm under
consideration. It has a relatively short-term orientation, and during the planning of the transactional
approach, emphasis is laid on the substance of the exchanges between the parties. In contrast, the
relational approach requires building relations across multiple issues and over time. It has a more
long-term orientation, and crafting a relational approach requires emphasis on the structure and
process of the relationships. It can be argued that the modified one-tier bargaining model follows
the relational approach. Active involvement of the Chinese government in host-country
infrastructural development and the joint involvement of the Chinese government and host
governments in identifying investment opportunities (Li et al., 2013) are indicative of the relational
nature of the modified one-tier bargaining model.
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Table 12: Comparison of the bargaining models for inward FDI to developing countries
One-tier bargaining

Modified one-tier bargaining

Forms of bargaining

State to MNE (i.e., host state to MNE)

State to state (i.e., home country to host
country)

Relationship with
host government
Parties involved

Mostly transactional

Relational

Host government and MNE

Home and host governments

Exchanges

Host state - opens up market
- Incentives such as subsidies
and tax holidays
MNE – Tax revenues and firm specific
resources such as technology and financial
resources

Host state -opens up market
-Incentives such as subsidies and tax holidays;
mutually identifying investment opportunitiesa
Home state - Financial and technical support
for host country infrastructure developmenta;
low interest loans and outright grants to host
country

Issues bargained

Both strategic and operational issues of
investment at tier-two
Early Western MNEs in developing
countries
Individual-The MNE needs to create
direct political connection
Direct costs need to be incurred to
generate direct benefits
Direct costs need to be incurred to secure
social capital

Both strategic and operational issues of
investment at tier-one
Chinese SOMNEs in developing countries

Used by
Status of political
relations of the MNE
Costs/benefits to the
MNE
Social capital to the
MNE
a

Collective-Indirect political connection through
the home country
No direct costs incurred, but direct benefits are
generated
Trickles down from home state legitimacy; thus,
no direct cost by the MNE to secure social
capital

elements of the bargaining that define its relational nature
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Two-tier bargaining
State to state (i.e., home country to
host country)- tier-one
AND
State to MNE (i.e., host state to
MNE)- tier-two
Transactional
Home government, multi-lateral
parties (e.g., IMF, World Bank), host
government, and MNE
Host state - opens up market
- Incentives such as subsidies
and tax holidays
Home state - loans
Multilateral institutions- loans
MNE – Tax revenues and firm
specific resources such as technology
and financial resources
Strategic issues at tier-one and
operational issues at tier-two
Western MNEs in developing
countries
Individual-The MNE needs to create
direct political connection
Direct costs need to be incurred to
generate direct benefits
Direct costs need to be incurred to
secure social capital
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The second set of arguments concerns the parties involved in creating the political connection.
Drawing on earlier works in political science, Hillman & Hitt (1999) theorized about political
connections created through individual and collective actions. Connections through individual
actions entail direct linkages and load the entire political cost on the participating firm.
Connections through collective actions, in contrast, involve indirect linkage via third parties such
as trade associations. Not only does such a linkage secure greater economies of scale, it facilitates
sharing of political costs among members, thereby requiring lower direct expenditure by the target
firm. The study contends that inherent in the modified one-tier bargaining model is the collective
approach to political connections, with its attendant benefits.
Integrating arguments on the two aspects of political connections, this study submits that the
modified one-tier bargaining model is an empirical illustration of the collective-relational approach
to political connection. As presented in Table 13, political connections to developing host countries
may take any of the four types grouped into four quadrants, depending on the combination of the
general approach (i.e., transactional or relational) and the level of participation (i.e., individual
action or collective action) used. Quadrant-1 represents relational connections created directly by
an individual firm. A direct long-term relationship created by an MNE with a host-country
government falls into the individual-relational political connection presented in quadrant-1.
Quadrant-2 and Quadrant-3 represent transactional approaches to political connections created
through individual actions and collective actions respectively. The two-tier bargaining used by
most advanced countries is shown in Quadrant 3. Quadrant-4, on the other hand, entails a
collective-relational relationship, which involves long-term, multi-issue relationships formed by a
collective unit (e.g., the Chinese government) on behalf of individual firms (e.g., Chinese MNEs).
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Table 13: A typology of political connections with developing host states
Nature of political participation
Transactional

Relational

Home
gov’t

Host
gov’t

Individual

MNE

Level of political
participation

Sub.

One-tier bargaining
Bargaining
strategic issues

Bargaining
strategic issues
Host
gov’t

Home
gov’t

Sub.

MNE

Host
gov’t

Collective

Sub.

Bargaining
operational issues

Home
gov’t

MNE

Modified one-tier bargaining

Two-tier bargaining
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The Collective Approach
The Chinese government follows a hands-on approach in its bargaining with host developing
countries. Through intensive political coordination with host governments, the Chinese
government seeks to put its MNEs in better positions. Here, the study argues that the collective
nature of the modified one-tier bargaining model provides resource and capability endowments
that in turn offer competitive advantage to the MNEs and their subsidiaries in host countries. The
collective approach of political connection enables the affiliated subsidiaries to access resources
without incurring direct costs and to focus on developing market-based capabilities free of
political distractions.
Inherent in the design of the modified one-tier bargaining model are the potential advantages
Chinese MNEs and their subsidiaries get because of their association with the home and host
governments. The arrangement and the unique form of tie with host governments make it
possible for the Chinese subsidiaries to access useful pieces of information on government
policies. Clearly, such information has considerable value in anticipating changes in the policy
environment and reducing political uncertainty (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). In fact, literature in IB as
well as in non-market strategy holds that interactions between businesses and government can be
construed as a political market exchange in which business firms ‘procure’ vital information and
policy favors (Boddewyn, 2016; Bonardi et al., 2005; Hillman & Keim, 1995). As a result, by
reducing the cost of critical information and helping subsidiaries better coordinate their activities
in light of ex ante information, the collective nature of the modified one-tier bargaining model
can contribute positively to the competitive advantage of the Chinese subsidiaries.
Similarly, by virtue of their relationships with the home and host governments, MNEs and their
subsidiaries can have better access to financial resources, in the form of either access to loans or
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outright grants. The Chinese MNEs, because of their affiliation with the home government,
receive financial backing (Li et al., 2013; Luo & Tung, 2007). Further, because of their indirect
linkage with the host government, they are also entitled to privileged treatments in the form of
subsidies and other special incentives. The combined effect of these advantages is likely to offer
competitive advantages to the Chinese subsidiaries.
Another important aspect of the modified one-tier bargaining model is the development assistance
provided by the Chinese government on infrastructural building. A major challenge facing foreign
MNEs operating in developing countries is infrastructure. Indeed, implicit in the higher operational
risk associated with investing in developing countries is the challenges resulting from weak or
inexistent infrastructure (Doh & Ramamurti, 2003). To mitigate such infrastructural challenges,
organizations may need to incur additional expenses or devise alternative mechanism which may
require investment of different sorts. The assistance for infrastructural development offered
collectively by the Chinese government, whose interests are aligned with its MNEs, provides the
opportunity to synchronize infrastructural development with the present and future investment
directions of the MNEs (Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2011). Clearly, such synchronization will likely
have a positive implication for the competitive advantage of the subsidiaries. Further, such a widescale of assistance is unlikely to be imitated by other states or organizations, leading to the
following proposition.
Proposition 1: Foreign subsidiaries whose MNEs draw on the collective approach to
political relations with developing host-country governments are more
likely to achieve greater competitive advantage than those using the
individual approach.
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The Relational Approach
The relational approach to political action has favorable legitimacy and social capital implications
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). This approach confers legitimacy upon the parties involved as well as
their affiliates. In this case, these parties include the Chinese government and the consortium of
MNEs it represents. Legitimacy assumes an even greater significance when investing in a foreign
territory. Challenging foreign markets, such as those in developing countries, demand that MNEs
achieve economic efficiency as well as legitimacy to become successful (Chan, Isobe, & Makino,
2008; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Legitimacy of an MNE in a foreign country provides a mechanism
to overcome the liability of foreignness and grants a social license to operate (Kostova, and Roth,
2003).
One major source of gaining such important legitimacy is by having long-term oriented working
relationships with the host country government, which is assumed to represent the interests of the
society in that country (Hillman & Wan, 2005). The relational approach inherent in the modified
one-tier bargaining model provides the affiliated subsidiaries with legitimacy advantage. Owing
to the special arrangement in place by the modified one-tier bargaining model, Chinese
subsidiaries can gain legitimacy more than what a normal political tie is likely to provide. Such
gain results from the relationship maintained by the Chinese government on a wide-array of issues,
addressing host country interests on multiple fronts.
The potential for obtaining and maintaining legitimacy through such a bargaining model is high in
most developing countries where government officials wield considerable power and control in
the formulation of policies and regulations pertinent to inward MNE investments. Acquaah (2007),
for example, describes the value of political connections by explicating the substantial role played
by Ghanaian government officials in controlling financial institutions, awarding major contracts,
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and defining regulatory and licensing procedures. The CPC, with its distinctive negotiating
behavior that relies heavily on developing strong interpersonal relationships with foreign officials,
cultivates ties with these influential parties (Solomon, 1995).
While government is a useful source of legitimacy, it may not give rise to social capital from other
local constituents. In fact, legitimacy in each host country is a function of a goodwill not just from
the host government but also from other stakeholders with which a foreign subsidiary interacts in
its local operations (Suchman, 1995). The study argues that the development assistance the
Chinese government offers as part of the bargaining model consolidates the relational status of
political connection between home and host governments. That is, the reputation built for the
Chinese MNEs, because of visible impact on infrastructure and agricultural sector, is likely to
increase the popular legitimacy of China and by extension of its national subsidiaries. This
argument is consistent with the suggestion by Forstenlechner & Mellahi (2011) that building
goodwill with the wider community is key, especially when operating in emerging countries.
Proposition 2: Foreign subsidiaries whose MNEs draw on the relational approach to
political connections with developing host-country governments are more
likely to achieve greater social capital than those using the transactional
approach.
The Collective-relational Approach
That relationships are important sources of resources and capabilities is widely acknowledged
(Dyer & Singh, 1998). As with market relationships, non-market relationships, of which political
relationships are a type, provide benefits with important performance implications. In addition,
political resources are frequently in short supply and difficult to be copied by competitors
(Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994). Access to political figures is often limited and creating and
maintaining political ties requires, among other things, experience (and capability) in dealing with
political decision makers (Frynas et al., 2006). Invisibility and associated causal ambiguity makes
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political resources difficult to imitate, thus serving as a useful source of competitive advantage
(Lippman & Rumelt, 1982).
Particularly, the scale of political connection (because of the collective approach) and the level of
benefits channeled to host country governments (because of the relational approach) in the
modified one-tier bargaining model make it practically impossible for Western MNEs as well as
their governments to remain competitive. Given that neither Western MNEs nor their home
governments appear likely to match the scale and scope of support rendered by the Chinese
government, it is reasonable to expect that Chinese subsidiaries will have enduring host country
preferential treatment. As well, the CPC demonstrates a greater level of commitment to building
strong relations with key host-country government officials than its western counterparts. A telling
account of Chinese distinctive approach to such ties features in Eisenman (2008):
“…While delegations looking to visit the United States…are subjected to an endless
array of security procedures and red tape, Beijing has simplified procedures and
supported delegations led by African political leaders. One former African ambassador
to China recounted his own experience: ‘when I was arriving at my post, I was
scheduled for a brief meeting and photo with President and CPC Chairman Jiang
Zemin. Instead, we spoke for nearly an hour. President Jiang not only had a broad
continental view of Africa, but I was also very impressed with his detailed knowledge
of African issues and how close they were to his heart.’,” (p. 236).
Empirical evidence abounds on the positive influence of political ties on organizational
competitiveness and performance (e.g., Frynas et al., 2006; Hillman, 2005). However, an equally
convincing body of literature shows the downsides of creating and maintaining political
connections (e.g., Okhmatovskiy, 2010; Sun et al., 2010). The study argues that looking at the
different types of political ties can help us appreciate the finer nuances in the relationships between
political relations and firm competitiveness. The typology of political connections advanced here
represents an attempt to understand these nuances. Such consideration can potentially help explain
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the mixed results besetting this line of inquiry. It can, therefore, be argued that the indirect linkage
Chinese MNEs and their subsidiaries have with the host government enables them to focus more
on their core functions, while benefiting from spillover legitimacy resulting from their
government’s political coordination and involvement in host country development activities.
Proposition 3: Foreign subsidiaries whose MNEs draw on the collective-relational
approach to political connections with developing host-country
governments are more likely to achieve greater competitive advantage than
those using the collective-transactional, individual-transactional, or
individual-relational approaches.
Investment Motive as Boundary Condition
Foreign direct investment by MNEs arise from the need to achieve a given investment motive(s).
These motives define the rationale for which the investment was made and undergird pertinent
strategy formulation and decision processes. Four major motives drive firms’ engagement in
foreign value-adding activities in developing countries: market-seeking, resource-seeking,
efficiency-seeking, and strategic assets seeking (Dunning, 1998). The motive(s) underlying MNEs’
foreign direct investments is (are) likely to have structural as well as strategic implications for the
foreign subsidiaries. For example, structurally, a market-seeking subsidiary is much less integrated
with its parent MNE as well as its sister subsidiaries. Strategically, it is more focused on hostcountry markets (Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010; Getachew and Beamish, 2017). In contrast,
resource-seeking subsidiaries are vertically integrated extensions of their parent MNE. As such,
they have a strategically important role in their respective MNE’s global value chain (Nachum and
Zaheer, 2005). The key role such subsidiaries play in their parent network and their desire to access
host-country resources, which the host government may consider strategic, are likely to result in
different dynamics to the MNE-host country bargaining process.
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A resource-seeking subsidiary is principally concerned with accessing useful resources that are
not available in the home country of the investing firm, or are available at higher cost than could
be obtained in the selected host country (Dunning, 1998). Foreign subsidiaries whose prime
purpose is to access host-country natural resources and raw materials, which are immobile or costly
to transport, represent ideal examples of such subsidiaries. Bargaining in the case of resourceseeking investments is likely to be complicated for at least three reasons. First, resource-seeking
subsidiaries often play an integral part in the global value-chain of their parent MNE, with key
contributions to sister subsidiaries as well. With this key role such subsidiaries play comes a greater
dependence of their respective MNEs on these subsidiaries and thus a greater need to establish
their continued operation. Such dependence is likely to undermine the MNEs bargaining power
over the host government (Fagre and Wells, 1982; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Second, resource-seeking investments tend to be much larger and less mobile than other kinds of
investments such as those which are market-seeking (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). As well, assets
of resource-seeking subsidiaries are less fungible (or have greater asset specificity) and thus are
less likely to be redeployed elsewhere (Anand and Singh, 1997; Dunning and Lundan, 2008;
Williamson, 1985). As a result, MNEs with resource-seeking investments in a given host country
tend to exercise lower bargaining power in their dealing with host government. Third, resourceseeking investments carry greater policy/regulation risks because of the considerable strategic
importance developing host countries attach to (natural) resources, the politically sensitive nature
of resource use by foreign agents, and the negative externalities (for example, environmental
degradation) associated with resource extraction (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Eden et al., 2004;
Vernon, 1971). Therefore, an MNE employing an individual and/or transactional bargaining model
is likely to suffer the consequences of a weaker bargaining power coupled with greater
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policy/regulation risks. In contrast, an MNE using a collective-relational bargaining model is likely
to command a better bargaining stand. A telling example is that of Chinese government, which not
only has propelled Chinese MNEs to invest in gold mining in Ghana but also has reportedly
managed to exert pressure on the Ghanaian government to allow firms to bypass local regulations
(UNCTAD, 2007). This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4: The relationship between the use of the collective-relational approach to
political connection and competitive advantage is stronger for a resourceseeking investment of MNEs such that, for investments of this kind, the
collective-relational approach is more likely to lead to a greater competitive
advantage than the collective-transactional, individual-transactional, or
individual-relational approaches.
Institutional voids as Boundary Condition
Institutional voids characterize economic markets of developing host countries and are largely
responsible for the greater level of uncertainty MNEs encounter when operating in these countries
(North, 1991; Wright et al., 2005; Xu & Meyer, 2012). Three main challenges beset
transformations and transactions in locations of high institutional voids: limited access to quality
information, regulations that limit scale and/or scope of business operations, and issues in
enforcement of contracts and protection of property rights. As well, the absence/lack of such
institutional arrangements provide corrupt politicians with an opportunity to exploit firms for their
private benefits. All these undermine the efficiency of MNEs while also subjecting them to greater
uncertainty.
Firms use political connection to mitigate the dual hazards of inefficiency and uncertainty (Inoue,
Lazzarini, and Musacchio, 2013; Musacchio, Lazzarini, and Aguilera, 2015; Park and Luo, 2001).
By nurturing and leveraging long-term reciprocal formal and informal ties with host-country
governments, firms economize on transaction as well as transformation costs. Firms with such ties
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are likely to gain better access to key resources and information, thus benefiting from potential
improvements in efficiency and/or reduced uncertainty in the political and regulatory environment
(Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000). Political connections also help in safeguarding property rights and

mitigating contractual hazards (Luo et al., 2010). In fact, in locations of high institutional voids,
politically connected firms tend to outperform their counterparts (Brockman et al., 2013).
To mitigate challenges in property right protection, contract enforcement, and information
availability, firms form political connections. However, the value of political connection as a
substitute for weak economic institution is likely to decline as these institutions develop
(Brockman et al., 2013; Musacchio et al., 2015). Development in economic institutions can render
such political connection less useful and relevant. With improvements in economic institutions,
the appeal of the collective-relational bargaining model is likely to diminish for two main reasons.
First, developing institutions undermine the potential to get political rents through political ties
and instead emphasize the need to secure market-based capabilities and efficiencies. Foreign
subsidiaries drawing on the collective-relational bargaining model are often hybrids with dual
objectives (i.e., economic and political objectives) (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Deng, 2009). As
a business entity, these subsidiaries seek to secure economic returns (i.e., profits). However, by
dint of their collective affiliation (i.e., affiliation to the home state), they intend to achieve the
political interests of their home government. For example, some of the Chinese state-owned
MNEs (SOMNEs) which are operating in the African infrastructure and mining sectors are
designed to satisfy both commercial and non-commercial purposes. Specifically, they are designed
to increase the Chinese government’s influence in the continent, and foster partnerships between
the Chinese government and the host governments (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014). Such dual
objectives can undermine the focus of the subsidiary and harm its market competitiveness. This is
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likely to be truer in circumstances when developing economic institutions reduce the value of
political rents.
Second, the collective-relational bargaining model, which features direct involvement of the home
country in the bargaining process, is likely to generate concerns of sovereignty breach and
extraterritoriality. In fact, in most developing countries, there is a tendency to consider foreign
subsidiaries as extensions of imperialistic rule (Chironga et al., 2011). With direct and active
involvement of the home country, it is likely that such concerns will be even more intense.
SOMNEs, which by design draw on the collective approach to bargaining, tend to be perceived as
threats to the host’s national security because of their apparent ties with their home country
(Globerman & Shapiro, 2009) and are likely to suffer competitive disadvantages in attracting local
customers (Cui & Jiang, 2012). The adverse effects of such concerns are likely to be more salient
as economic institutions develop and market competition intensifies—developments that may
undermine the upsides of political connections. The foregoing arguments, therefore, lead to the
following proposition:
Proposition 5: Development of economic institutions in the host country attenuates the
positive relationship between the use of the collective-relational approach
to political connection and competitive advantage. As economic institutions
develop, the use of the collective-relational approach is less likely to secure
competitive advantage.
Political Institutions as Boundary Condition
By defining expectations and rules, host-country political institutions substantially influence the
strategy and performance of foreign subsidiaries (Henisz, 2000; March and Olson, 1996; North,
1991). Whereas political institutions constitute various aspects of shared meanings and practices
that shape the actions and organization of political actors (including states and business
organizations), a prime representation of political institutions exists in the governing mechanism
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underlying the political system of the country (i.e., democratic or autocratic) (Li and Resnick,
2003). Although consensus has yet to be arrived on what constitutes democratic institutions, they
include:
“…government based on majority rule and the consent of the governed, the existence
of free and fair elections, the protection of minorities and respect for basic human
rights. Democracy presupposes equality before the law, due process and political
pluralism,” (The Economist, 2007).

Developments in democratic institutions have potential implications for the effectiveness of the
collective-relational approach to political connection in at least two respects. First, such
developments undercut the advantage MNE subsidiaries obtain from the strong partnership (or
collusion) between the home and host governments. The nature of the principal-agent relationship
between host government and the society it governs in the presence of democratic institutions is
considerably different from when they are absent. Whereas, in general, autocratic political systems
are characterized by potential asymmetry between the interests of government officials and that of
the people, democratic political systems are better at aligning the interests of the two parties (Huber
and Powell, 1994; Li and Resnick, 2003). Democratic institutions place constraints upon
government officials and restrict their ability to grant special favours and prevent them from
engaging in predatory rent seeking (Feng, 2001). Similarly, freedom of expression and free media
characterizing democratic political systems promote better monitoring of elected officials and
allow local stakeholders to have greater voice in policy formulations. These, therefore, limit the
potential for the collective-relational approach to generate competitive advantage as well as
political rents to foreign subsidiaries.
Second, as well as limiting the rent-seeking benefits accruing to foreign subsidiaries through the
collective-relational approach, democratic institutions provide mechanisms for credible property
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right protection and contract enforcement (Feng, 2001; Olson, 1993; Pastor and Sung, 1995). The
associated risks which foreign subsidiaries face in democratic political systems, therefore, are less
than that in autocratic systems. One of the main reasons for political connection by MNEs in
developing countries is to access a substituting mechanism for a better protection of property rights
and enforcement of contracts. Ties to government officials can provide the needed buffer from
property right and contractual hazards (Zheng, Singh, and Mitchell, 2014). By providing
alternative

and less costly mechanisms, democratic institutions render the return to political

connection inconsequential. The foregoing arguments, therefore, lead to the following proposition
and Figure 7 shows the entire theoretical model:
Proposition 6: Development of democratic institutions in the host country attenuates the
positive relationship between the use of the collective-relational approach
to political connection and competitive advantage. As democratic
institutions develop, the use of the collective-relational approach is less
likely to secure competitive advantage.
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Figure 7. Theoretical model of the research

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
High institutional voids characterizing developing countries give rise to economizing challenges
as well as strategizing benefits (Getachew and Beamish, 2017; Williamson, 1991). In such
countries, MNEs often put in place strategies to mitigate economizing challenges and/or leverage
strategizing benefits. Forging political connection with host-country government officials is one
such strategy that may help tap strategizing advantages as well as attenuate economizing
challenges arising from poor property right protection and contract enforcement as well as from
limited access to useful, timely information. However, there are different approaches to political
connections and not all political connections are equally effective in securing strategic advantages
and/or reducing economizing challenges. By considering several approaches to political
connection (i.e., bargaining models), this study seeks to develop a better understanding of the
attributes and implications of different approaches to structure the relationship between MNEs and
respective host countries. This study attempts to theorize about the different forms of political
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connections in international business. In doing so, it draws on insights from prior literature that
discusses political connections across the basic approach followed (i.e., transactional vs. relational)
and the locus of action (i.e., individual vs. collective). It grounded its theorization in an illustration
of the different kinds of bargaining model supporting foreign direct investments in developing
countries. Specifically, it advance the notion that the collective-relational approach to political
connections is likely to afford foreign subsidiaries a better competitive advantage when operating
in developing countries. This approach often involves an active role of the home-country
government in bargaining both strategic and operational issues on behalf of the MNEs hailing from
the same country. For example, investment of Chinese SOMNEs in Africa leverages the collectiverelational approach to political connection and consequently reaps the benefits of the strategizing
advantages set at their disposal (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Li et al., 2013; Luo et al. 2010;
UNCTAD, 2007).
Prior evidence on the performance implications of political connections is mixed at best. One
potential approach to resolving such empirical challenge is by disaggregating political connection
to its different formats. This paper does just that. By classifying political connections across the
level and nature of political participation, it identifies four different typologies of political
connection. The study positioned its theoretical arguments about these different types of political
connection in the bargaining models characterizing foreign investment of MNEs in developing
countries. In doing so, it not only engages the issue of political connection in the context of
international business but it also grounds its theorization in the unique realities of developing
countries where host states are more active and political connections more important. These
different approaches to political connections reflect the different ways through which MNEs from
different backgrounds (i.e., MNEs from advanced vs. emerging markets) seek to gain strategizing
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advantages through political connections. As such, on a broader level, the theorization can
contribute to a better understanding of the differences in the fundamental assumptions and strategy
governing foreign direct investment of MNEs with disparate backgrounds.
The typology identified to classify different kinds of bargaining models can be considered
governance structures used to structure political exchanges between MNEs and their respective
host governments. The notion of governance is central to the transaction cost economics in which
different types of governance structures—namely, market, hierarchy, and hybrid—used to
structure economic exchanges (e.g., Williamson, 2010). This paper attempted to extend this notion
of governance to political exchanges in which MNEs and their host government engage in
recurrent bargains on strategic and operational issues. The four different approaches identified can
be considered alternative governance structures, providing the foundation on which political
exchanges take place. The theoretical argument suggests that the collective-relational governance
structure is likely to offer superior value in terms of competitive advantage for foreign subsidiaries
operating in developing countries, ceteris paribus. Future research in this area can draw on the
transaction cost politics (TCP) arguments to further refine our understanding of the nature as well
as implications of these governance structures (Henisz and Zelner, 2005; North, 1991).
By identifying and theoretically examining potential boundary conditions, this study further
refined understanding of the relationship between the type of governance structures employed and
the competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries leveraging these structures. It extended the
transaction cost logics regarding asset specificity and governance structure to political exchanges
and argued that the effectiveness of the collective-relational approach becomes stronger for
resource-seeking investments—investment with greater asset specificity and thus less likely to be
redeployed elsewhere (Anand and Singh, 1997; Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Williamson, 1985).
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It also puts forward arguments suggesting that developments in host-country economic as well as
political institutions provide alternative mechanisms for MNEs to mitigate economizing
challenges, rendering political connections somewhat redundant and less useful. Also, the
theoretical arguments suggest that the influence of the bargaining model on competitive advantage
is through improved resource/capability mobilization and social capital. By highlighting the
intermediate mechanisms at work in the relationship of political ties and competitive advantage,
this work provided an important theoretical connection.
As well, this study extends theoretical discussions on several streams of inquiry. First, it provides
additional support to arguments in strategy research that emerging market MNEs have different
strategic orientations and studying these MNEs can generate useful insights for our existing
theories (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005; Xu & Meyer, 2012). Second, it contributes
to a better understanding of the business environment in developing countries and supports the
idea that such countries have unique features worthy of further exploration (Wright et al., 2005;
Xu & Meyer, 2012). Third, the collective-relational approach introduced here uncovered the
complementary nature of resource mobilization and legitimacy as explanations of competitive
advantage. As such, this study has not only integrated perspectives from the RBV and the resource
dependence perspective but also highlighted the value of doing so. Finally, it examined political
connections, an important area in IB research, and points to the merits of considering non-market
forces when dealing with MNE and subsidiary performance.
Regarding practice, the theory developed in this study indicates that the collective-relational
bargaining model—in which political connection in the host country involves an active collective
actor (e.g., home state)—is likely to be more effective for MNE managers in securing better
competitive advantage when operating in developing countries. This is especially true for
156

157
investments of a resource-seeking nature such as in mining and oil exploration. However, the
effectiveness of the bargaining model is contingent on the development of economic as well as
political institutions. That is, as host-country economic and/or political institutions develop, the
extent to which the collective-relational bargaining model affords competitive advantage declines.
Therefore, such bargaining model is likely to be most effective in less democratic (or more
autocratic) developing countries with high levels of institutional voids. These dynamics suggests
that the use by managers (or home states) of the collective-relational bargaining model needs to be
informed by a thorough examination of both the current levels of economic and/or political
institutions, and a clear understanding of how such institutions are likely to change going forward.
In conclusion, this study encourages future research to further explore the relationships between
market outcomes and non-market forces. By closely studying the roles of government-business
interaction, such research can make important inroads regarding our understanding of the
mechanisms through which social and business interests can be aligned. Also, the theoretical
arguments forwarded in this paper need to be subjected to rigorous empirical testing. By doing so,
future research will no doubt advance development of fine-grained insights about the relationships
discussed herein as well as the mechanisms at work.
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CHAPTER FIVE
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
In recent decades, scholars in IB and strategic management have devoted a great deal of attention
to understanding developing country contexts and their strategic as well as performance
implications for businesses operating there (e.g., Beamish, 1985; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, and
Wright, 2000; Vernon, 1971). A salient feature of these contexts is the high level of institutional
voids representing the lack or absence of market-supporting institutions (Mair and Marti, 2009).
Insights from the new institutional economics (NIE) substantially inform our understanding of
institutional voids as well as their strategic and performance implications (Williamson, 2000;
North, 1991; Santangelo and Meyer, 2011). Per this perspective, institutional voids engender
increased transaction costs in enforcing contracts, protecting property rights, and accessing
information.
In contrast, research in industrial organization theory suggests that institutional voids can
contribute to a rather easier creation of market power by MNEs, which possess firm-specific
advantage (Porter, 1981). Therefore, a more complete understanding of institutional voids and
their implications for foreign subsidiaries requires engaging both the transaction-cost (economic)
and market power (strategic) implications. This dissertation, therefore, has addressed two sets of
research questions: (a) Whether, how, and when host-country market and institutional conditions
have implications for the performance of foreign subsidiaries? And (b) Whether, how, and when
investment purposes/motives for which foreign subsidiaries are established relate to the extent to
which the subsidiaries/their parents overcome the hazards of or capitalize on the opportunities
from operating in locations of high institutional voids?
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Essay 1 (Chapter 2) draws on insights from NIE and industrial organization theory to examine the
economic and strategic implications of entry to the African market. As well, by leveraging insights
from the investment motives literature (e.g., Dunning, 1998; Nachum and Zaheer, 2005) and the
subsidiary mandate/charter literature (e.g., Birkinshaw, 1996; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998), the
essay examines the moderating roles of investment purpose diversity and market-seeking
orientation. To empirically test the hypotheses in this essay, a paired-sample design of Japanese
foreign subsidiaries entering Africa and OECD countries was used. This design helped minimize
endogeneity concerns by comparing exit of foreign subsidiaries operating in Africa with
counterfactual cases of subsidiary exits from the OECD countries (Reeb, Sakakibara, and
Mahmood, 2012). Results from the extended cox regression models generate useful insights. First,
the empirical evidence suggests that Japanese foreign subsidiaries that entered the African market
have a greater likelihood of exiting than their counterparts in the OECD markets. This finding
indicates that the economic (i.e., transaction cost) challenges of entry to the African market
outweigh the associated strategic (i.e., market power) advantages.
Second, the empirical evidence suggests that Japanese foreign subsidiaries that entered Africa with
diverse investment purposes and/or greater market-seeking orientation have registered a lower
likelihood of exit than their counterparts. These findings, thus, present investment purpose
diversity and market-seeking orientation as potential mechanisms to mitigate the economizing
challenges of institutional voids. Further, the findings as well as theoretical arguments associated
with investment purpose diversity can contribute to extending the firm scope argument to a
subsidiary level (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Wan, 2005; Wan and Hoskisson, 2003; Peng, Lee, and
Wang, 2005). As such, the essay introduces the notion of subsidiary scope, here represented by
the within-subsidiary diversity of purposes, and advance an understanding of its implications for
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foreign subsidiary exit (or survival). As well, by considering investment purpose diversity, the
essay addresses a call by Adner (2007) to engage the notion of flexibility by reassignment of
resources (shifting resources to a more favorable activity in a subsidiary). Also, it finds that the
unique structural and strategic attributes of market-seeking subsidiaries contribute to mitigating
institutional hazards.
Essay 2 (Chapter 3) examines the effects of host-country market and institutional conditions on
the survival likelihood of market-seeking subsidiaries. Entry of these subsidiaries to their
respective host markets is contingent on the presence/absence of sufficient market opportunities
in the host country (Brouthers, Gao, and McNicol, 2008). This essay argues that the pattern of
income distribution in the host country is an important variable in determining market
attractiveness and seek to explore how this variable relates to the survival (or exit) probability of
market-seeking subsidiaries. Drawing on insights from research in environmental munificence,
market imperfection, and NIE, the essay intended to examine the complex ways in which hostcountry income distribution is associated with survival of market-seeking foreign subsidiaries. As
well, is explored institutional boundary conditions for the proposed relationship.
Analyses of subsidiary-, parent-, and country-level data on 6,699 Japanese market-seeking
subsidiaries operating in 47 countries suggests that host-country income distribution has a nonlinear relationship with subsidiary survival. Specifically, the essay finds empirical evidence
suggesting a presence of a U-shaped relationship between income distribution and subsidiary exit
in that subsidiary exit is high in host countries with highly egalitarian or highly dispersed income
distributions. This empirical evidence supports the notion that market-seeking subsidiaries face a
lower likelihood of exit in host countries with intermediate levels of income distribution (as
measured by the Gini index). Post-hoc analyses indicates the inflection point to be at a Gini index
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of approximately 38. The maximum and minimum Gini indices in the data are 57 and 22
respectively, and lower Gini score indicates more egalitarian income distribution.
Empirical findings also uncovered another layer of complexity in the relationship between income
distribution patterns and exit of foreign subsidiaries. The study finds that development of free
market institutions in the host country attenuates the relationship between income distribution and
subsidiary exit. Host-country institutional development provide alternative mechanisms
substituting for the hazard that extreme levels of income distribution (i.e., highly egalitarian or
highly dispersed) pose. By reducing transaction and information costs associated with exchanges,
free-market institutions compensate for the product and factor market limitations that extreme
income distributions engender and improve host-country munificence (North, 1991; Shinkle and
Kriauciunas, 2010; Xu and Meyer, 2013). As well as advancing a more nuanced understanding of
how host-country income distribution relates with survival of market-seeking subsidiaries, this
finding suggests the potential interaction between market and institutional factors and points to the
need to examine such interactions to gain better understanding of subsidiary exit.
Like Essay 1, this essay advances the notion that the effects of market and institutional factors on
foreign subsidiary survival is contingent on the purposes for which the subsidiary is established.
Of special consideration here are market-seeking subsidiaries which differ from other types of
subsidiaries in both structural and strategic terms. Structurally, these subsidiaries are horizontal
extensions of and are loosely integrated with their respective parent firm as well as ‘sister’
subsidiaries (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005). Strategically, they are heavily dependent on host-country
market and institutional conditions (Nachum and Zaheer, 2005; Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010).
Such structural and strategic attributes of market-seeking subsidiaries provide an ideal context to
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study the important issue of income distribution and its potential influence on subsidiary survival
(Bidwell, Briscoe, Fernandez-Mateo, and Sterling, 2013; Davis, 2015; Davis and Cobb, 2010).
This essay makes several contributions. First, it extends our understanding of the subsidiary exit
phenomenon by examining a variable—income distribution—that hitherto received a limited
attention as a relevant factor in explaining business outcomes (Davis, 2015). Whereas the issue of
income distribution has attracted a considerable public attention and remained central to studies in
such disciplines as economics and sociology, it has yet to be considered relevant to studies in
management (Bidwell, Briscoe, Fernandez-Mateo, and Sterling, 2013; Davis, 2015). Given the
substantial role businesses play in influencing income distribution (Davis and Cobb, 2010), such
disregard is hard to justify. Second, this essay points to the importance of refining our
understanding of foreign subsidiaries by considering the purposes(motives) for which they are
established. Specifically, by considering market-seeking subsidiaries, this essay advances the
notion that the interface between host-country environment and MNE subsidiaries is contingent
on the kind of subsidiaries under consideration and that different aspects of the environment are
relevant for different kinds of subsidiaries (Castrogiovanni, 1991). Third, the essay also contributes
to research on income distribution by indicating the potentially complex ways through which it
relates to, or affects, different organizational outcomes.
Essay 3 (Chapter 4) examines the strategic implications of institutional voids by considering the
potential effects of alternative governance structures to organize the relationship between MNEs
and host countries. In emerging markets, where institutional voids abound, governments play a
more active role in business activities and political connections yield greater benefits to business
performance (Brockman, Rui, and Zou, 2013; Xu & Meyer, 2012). Whereas existing research
indicates the presence of different governance structures (or bargaining models) underlying foreign
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direct investments in developing countries, synthesizing these approaches and examining their
comparative performance implication is largely limited. Essay 3 aims to contribute to filling this
lacuna by identifying three alternative bargaining models—namely, the one-tier bargaining, the
modified one-tier bargaining, and the two-tier bargaining models—and theoretically examining
their characteristics using arguments from Hillman and Hitt (1999) about the nature of political
actions. In doing so, the essay not only advances a better understanding of these bargaining models
and their implications, but also offers a potential explanation for the increasing competitive edge
of Chinese MNEs in such developing countries as those in Africa (Stevens and NewenhamKahindi, 2017; UNCTAD, 2015).
Following Hillman and Hitt (1999), the essay categorized the three bargaining models along the
two dimensions of the level and nature of political participation. The level of political participation
takes either individual (i.e., MNE) or collective (i.e., state); the nature of political participation
includes transactional or relational. Thus, using the dimensions, the essay identified that the
modified one-tier model—typically characterizing Chinese resource-seeking FDI in such
developing countries as those in Africa—follows the collective-relational approach to political
connection. To establish a theoretical link between a given bargaining model and competitive
advantage benefits spilling over to associated subsidiaries, the essay first forwarded theoretical
mechanisms suggesting the marginal benefits of using collective as well as relational approaches
to political connection. Then, it integrated mechanisms along the two dimensions to forward a
proposition in support of a positive relationship between using the collective-relational approach
(or the modified one-tier bargaining model) and competitive advantage of foreign subsidiaries.
The proposition suggests the presence of political rent and its influence on market competition.
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Resource-based view, resource dependence theory and NIE provided the requisite foundations for
the theoretical development.
The essay further refined its theoretical development by identifying relevant boundary conditions
to the proposed relationship. It identified investment motive and institutional development
(economic and political) as potential boundary conditions influencing my baseline argument (i.e.,
the positive relationship between the use of the collective-relational approach and competitive
advantage). The greater asset specificity characterizing resource-seeking investments manifest
itself in increased threat of opportunistic behavior by host-country government (Anand and Singh,
1997; Dunning and Lundan, 2008). Such investments, therefore, place MNEs at a less favorable
bargaining position (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The collective-relational approach has a better
potential of tipping the balance in favor of the MNEs and their respective subsidiaries. That is, the
presence of a collective actor such as the home government and the inherent commitment to
building long-term relationships underlying such approach has a potential to circumvent threats of
reduced bargaining power. Also, the essay advances theoretical arguments suggesting the
substitutive nature of advanced institutions and strong political connections. As economic and/or
political institutions develop, MNEs tend to enjoy increasingly better protection of property rights
and enforcement of contracts. Under this conditions, the potential spillover advantages flowing to
foreign subsidiaries drawing on the collective-relational approach is likely to be inconsequential.
This points to the potential tradeoff between market power advantage (through such strategizing
efforts as political connection) and efficiency advantage (through reduced transaction costs)
(Getachew and Beamish, 2017; Teece, Pisano, and Shuen, 1997).
Collectively, this dissertation makes the following empirical and theoretical contributions. First, it
advances a more nuanced understanding of how host-country institutional conditions relate with
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foreign divestment, by engaging both the economizing and strategizing mechanisms underlying
institutional influences (Teece et al., 1997; Williamson, 1991). Second, it integrates insights from
the eclectic paradigm of foreign production and the investment motives literature to respond to
calls for research looking at the interaction between location factors and investment motives
(Dunning, 2009; Mesquita, 2016). Third, it contributes to the institutional voids literature by
suggesting response mechanisms operating at the subsidiary level (i.e., investment purpose
diversity and market-seeking orientation) and at the multi-party bargaining level (i.e., the modified
one-tier bargaining model). Fourth, it contributes to our understanding of how the effects of hostcountry (dis)advantages can be best understood by identifying a form of organization for which
such factors are more relevant. Fifth, it extends the investment motives literature by indicating the
useful insights to be generated by considering fine-grained aspects of investment motives (i.e.,
investment purposes). Finally, it advances our understanding of foreign divestment by considering
how market conditions, market-supporting institutions, and their interactions with investment
motives relate with the exit likelihood of foreign subsidiaries.
This dissertation has important policy implications. It finds empirical evidence suggesting the
potentially adverse effects of institutional voids for the viability of foreign subsidiaries. As such,
improvement of host-country institutional conditions is important to realize the multi-faceted
benefits of foreign investment to host country development. A particular emphasis may need to be
placed on developing institutions pertinent to information access, property right protection,
contract enforcement, and market entry. As well, the dissertation forwards theoretical arguments
suggesting the benefits of institutional development in promoting social welfare by discouraging
rent-seeking behaviors. Further, policies targeted at developing institutions can also contribute to
limiting the adverse effects of such socio-economic conditions as extreme income distribution.
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Limitations and future directions
The theoretical and empirical contributions of this dissertation notwithstanding, some caveats are
in order. Empirical tests of the arguments in Essay 1 and Essay 2 are based on data from a single
home country (i.e., Japan). This limits the generalizability of the findings and thus future research
needs to verify the robustness of these arguments and the associated theoretical implications drawn
using data on foreign subsidiaries originating from other countries. Nonetheless, the use of firms
from a single home country achieves an empirical purpose of avoiding potential variance arising
from the home country effects. As well, the firm- and subsidiary level data used in these two essays
are extracted from a dataset with an extensive coverage (both in time and space) of Japanese
foreign subsidiaries.
Another potential limitation lies in the measurement and operationalization of some of the
constructs (or variables). For example, Essay 2 used the Gini index to measure the income
distribution construct. While this measure is widely used and its data more comprehensively
available, it may not fully capture the essence of the construct. In fact, influential research in
income distribution has used the ratio measures such as such as top 5 percent shares as alternatives
to the Gini index. Whereas a consensus on the specific measure to use for income distribution has
yet to be reached, the value of verifying the robustness of the findings using alternative measures
is unquestionable. Similarly, throughout the dissertation, the term ‘emerging markets’ was used as
being synonymous with ‘developing countries’. Such use, while necessary for the practical
purposes of this research, may not be conceptually accurate. Whereas emerging markets refer to
countries characterized by rapid economic growth and government policies favoring liberalization
and free markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000), not all developing countries subscribe to this
characterization. Some African countries, for example, have neither rapidly growing economies
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nor market-oriented government policies. Granted, there is a considerable overlap between the two
(i.e., emerging market and developing countries) and both refer to contexts characterized by high
institutional voids—a notion central to this dissertation.
This dissertation provides useful theoretical and empirical evidence indicating the need to consider
both the structural and transaction-cost market imperfections typifying locations of high
institutional voids. However, further study is required to better understand the dynamics between
structural market imperfections responsible for the strategizing benefits and transaction-cost
market imperfections responsible for economizing challenges. Whereas Essay 1 and Essay 3
examined subsidiary and country-level conditions influencing the dynamics between the two kinds
of market imperfections, more needs to be done to determine additional boundary conditions,
explore temporal dimensions, and understand the dynamics in light of evolutionary/revolutionary
changes to the institutional environments of host countries.
A key element of the dissertation is the divestment of foreign subsidiaries, which is a key response
variable in Essay 1 and Essay 2. The contributions of these essays notwithstanding, more work
remains to better understand the association between institutional voids and foreign divestment.
Foreign divestment is an important construct in IB research not least because it indicates
sustainability or long-term performance. Foreign divestment can be an indication of failure in that
the foreign subsidiary has not been successful in registering the desired level of performance. In
contrast, it can also be a corporate strategy through which the parent MNE seeks to respond to
changes. For example, it can result from a decision by an MNE to shift from hierarchy to market
in response to progresses in the development of market-seeking institutions (Williamson, 2000).
Distinguishing between these aspects of foreign divestment requires, among other things,
accessing qualitative data which provides further insights about the rationale behind divestment
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decisions. Therefore, future research drawing on such qualitative data will no doubt foster better
understanding of foreign divestment and its relationship with institutional voids.
Another promising direction for future research resides in the study of investment motives (or
purposes). A core element in the strategy formulation process of an MNE contemplating a move
to a given host country is a decision/determination of the underlying investment motive/purpose.
The motive/purpose specifies the why of the investment and has a potential implication for the
extent to which the MNE achieves its purposes. This dissertation provides evidence suggesting
that subsidiaries differing in the investment motive underlying their establishment (i.e., market
seeking, resource seeking, efficiency seeking, and strategic-asset seeking) have different potentials
of leveraging the strategizing advantage and/or mitigating the economic challenges of high
institutional voids. That said, further research is warranted to verify these findings as well as
identify additional mechanisms. Similarly, the dissertation indicated the value in disaggregating
investment motives and consider specific purposes guiding foreign direct investment. A potentially
fruitful future research agenda lies in considering the dynamic interactions between investment
purposes (which may harbor MNE’s perceptions and expectations about the host-country
environments) and institutional voids (which the MNE subsidiary faces).
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